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ABSTRACT
The study describes how estrogen was standardized in Canada, in the 1940s and early
1950s, under the Food and Drugs Act. Contributing to interdisciplinary conversations, it provides
an empirical case of how regulatory practices enact material realities. Using archival material,
the study describes how estrogen was achieved, in part, through heterogeneous practices of the
Canadian Committee on Pharmacopoeial Standards, National Health, and government
solicitors. These regulators disagreed on whether, how, and by whom estrogens should be
standardized. Rather than resolve these disagreements, Canada enacted multiple regulations
purporting to standardize estrogen, and government solicitors practiced “techniques of
validating” to render the regulations as lawful. I argue that these regulatory enactments
materialized estrogen as a potent, unpredictable, and multiple object. Further, I show how
estrogen spawned novel regulatory techniques in Canada, particularly the use of consumer
product labels. In this way, estrogen catalyzed an early example of risk regulation in Canada.
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PART I
An introduction
All substances are poisons; there is none which is not a poison. The right dose differentiates a poison
from a remedy. – adage credited to Paracelsus (1493-1541)
Take a moment to consider the temporalities of toxicity; or less rhetorically, and better refining
the realities being put into relation, to consider the historicity of hormone disruption. How has
hormone disruption been materialized in the past? When have estrogenic chemicals, drugs and
cosmetics been potent in bodies? When has the dose made the poison?
Today, in Canada, hormone (or endocrine) disruption is a well-established phenomenon.1
That synthetic industrial chemicals could disrupt the endocrine systems of humans and wildlife
alike burst into popular consciousness in the mid-1990s, with the publication of Our Stolen
Future.2 In translating the emerging science to policy makers and publics, researchers and
activists have often leveraged the fact that endocrine disrupting chemicals can mimic estrogen
in bodies.3 Some have drawn connections between these chemicals and the synthetic estrogen
DES,4 or troubled distinctions between so-called “natural” hormones and “synthetic” chemicals.5
Some have perpetuated repronormative, heterosexist, transphobic, or ableist discourses that
reinforce sex panics about endocrine disruption of normative bodies;6 others in queer and trans
studies, and critical animal studies, have explored the chemical (and multispecies) productions

1

See e.g. House of Commons, Healthy Environment, Healthy Canadians, Healthy Economy: Strengthening the Canadian
Environmental Protection Act – Report of the Standing Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development (June 2017)
(Chair: Deborah Schulte), online: <https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/42-1/ENVI/report-8>.
2

Theo Colborn, Dianne Dumanoski & John Peterson Myers, Our Stolen Future: Are We Threatening Our Fertility, Intelligence
and Survival? – A Scientific Detective Story (London: Little, Brown and Company, 1996).
3

Such that these chemicals were called “environmental estrogens” in the 1980s. That term has fallen out of use as scientists
have come to understand that endocrine disrupting chemicals have many different and complex modes of action. In addition to
estrogenic activity, EDCs can have androgenic or anti-androgenic effects. Further, they do not only mimic hormones in bodies
by attaching to hormone receptors, but can block hormone receptors, among myriad other participations and interferences.
For one scientist’s account summarizing the field since the DES crisis in the early 1970s, see JA McLaclan, “Environmental
signaling: from environmental estrogens to endocrine-disrupting chemicals and beyond” (2016) 4 Andrology 684.
4

See e.g. Nancy Langston, Toxic Bodies: Endocrine Disrupters and the Lessons of History (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2010) [“Langston 2010”].
5

See e.g. Celia Roberts, Messengers of Sex: Hormones, Biomedicine and Feminism (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2007) [“Roberts 2007”].
6

For critique of these moves, see e.g. Giovanna Di Chiro, “Polluted politics? Confronting Toxic Discourse, Sex Panic and
Econormativity” in Catriona Mortimer-Sandilands and Bruce Erickson, eds, Queer Ecologies, Sex, Nature, Politics, Desire
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010); Dayna Nadine Scott, “Gender-benders”: Sex and Law in the Constitution of
Polluted Bodies” (2009) 17 Fem Leg Stud 241; and Malin Ah-King & Eva Hayward, “Toxic Sexes: Perverting Pollution and
Queering Hormone Disruption” (2014) 1 O-Zone: A Journal of Object-Oriented Studies 1.

1

of sex,7 and celebrated the queer intimacies and pleasures of endocrine disruption.8 Without
mongering these fears or indulging these pleasures, it can be said that endocrine disrupting
chemicals can change birth weights and fetal reproductive and neurological development; can
impact fertility, metabolism, and behaviour; and can cause cancer, among multitudinous other
effects and affects.
Endocrine disrupting chemicals have upset the toxicological truism that the “dose makes the
poison”. Conventionally, the greater the amount of a substance administered to an organism,
the greater the physiological response – a relationship that, in pharmacology, is referred to as
potency. In recent years, however, novel facts have crystallized. Not only do some endocrine
disrupting chemicals cause adverse effects at low doses, but they can have relatively greater
toxicity at lower doses, and little or no effects at high doses.9 This non-conventional doseresponse relationship has major implications for risk assessment and for public policy, as it
suggests that there is no safe threshold for exposure to these chemicals.10
Nonetheless, truisms about dose remain embedded in regulatory habits. As one discrete (if
not isolated) example, in 2011, when environmental and health organizations asked Health
Canada to explain why it was not applying an existing legal prohibition against the sale of
cosmetic products containing an “estrogenic substance” to endocrine disrupting chemicals such
as phthalates and parabens, the Minister’s response emphasized that “in their present practices
of use”, these ingredients were “less potent than the natural estrogens in the body”.11 That
prohibition, created at the peak of concern about estrogenic drugs in the 1970s, brings to mind
further examples. By the beginning of that decade, the contraceptive pill had been tied to a

7

See e.g. Anne Fausto-Sterling, Sexing the Body: Gender Politics and the Construction of Sexuality (New York: Basic Books,
2000) [Fausto-Sterling 2000]; Anne Pollock, “Queering Endocrine Disruption” in Katherine Behar, ed, Object-Oriented Feminism
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2016); Donna Haraway, “Awash in Urine: DES and Premarin® in Multispecies
Response-Ability” (2012) 40:1-2 WSQ 301 [“Haraway 2012”]; and Eva Hayward, “Transxenoestrogenesis” (2014) 1:1-2 TSQ 255.
8

See e.g. Paul B Preciado, Testo Junkie: Sex, Drugs, and Biopolitics in the Pharmacopornographic Era (New York: The Feminist
Press, 2013) [“Preciado 2013”]; and Mel Y Chen, Animacies: Biopolitics, Racial Mattering, and Queer Affect (Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 2012).
9

See e.g. Laura Vandenberg et al, “Hormones and Endocrine-Disrupting Chemicals: Low-Dose Effects and Nonmonotonic Dose
Responses” (2012) 33:3 Endocr Rev 378; and World Health Organization, “State of the science of endocrine disrupting
chemicals”, in An assessment of the state of the science of endocrine disruptors prepared by a group of experts for the United
Nations Environment Programme and WHO (Geneva: WHO Press, 2013).
10

See e.g. Dayna Nadine Scott, “Conclusion: Thinking about Thresholds, Literal and Figurative” in Dayna N Scott, ed, Our
Chemical Selves: Gender, Toxics, and Environmental Health (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2015) [“Scott 2015”]; and Sheldon Krimsky,
“Low-Dose Toxicology: Narratives from the Science-Transcience Interface”, in Soraya Boudia & Nathalie Jas, eds, Powerless
Science? Science and Politics in a Toxic World (New York, NY: Berghahn, 2014).
11

Health Canada, “Health and environmental impact of endocrine disrupting chemicals used in cosmetics”, Response to
Petition No. 310 to the Commissioner on Environment and Sustainable Development (June 2011, Canada), online:
<http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/pet_310_e_35780.html>.
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range of adverse health effects;12 soon thereafter, its association with ovarian cancer saw the
original pill removed from markets, replaced with a pill just one-tenth the dose.13 In 1971, the
synthetic estrogenic chemical DES – three times more potent than estradiol – was found to
cause a rare vaginal cancer in the daughters of women who had been given the drug while
pregnant.14 In the second half of the 1970s, high-profile studies found that women taking
hormone replacement therapy (“HRT”) were four to 14 times more likely to develop endometrial
cancer. Cancer was more likely the higher the dose of drug that the women had taken, and the
longer they had taken it.15 At some times, in some bodies, dose clearly mattered.
If (different) doses make the poison, what is to be done? Who – or what – shall be delegated
to do it? Thinking with these examples hints at a pattern, different though its repetitions may be.
During the 1970s, DES was banned for use in pregnancy, though its lack of therapeutic efficacy
was arguably as weighty a factor as its toxicity. For more efficacious estrogens, however,
another regulatory technique emerged. By the late 1970s, North American regulators required
packages for both oral contraceptives and HRT to include patient package inserts (“PPIs”), with
detailed information about the health risks of these prescription drugs that patients could read
for themselves.16 In shifting power from physicians to their patients, PPIs also delegated
responsibility; patients considering birth control or HRT must now exercise (a more informed)
choice about whether to assume the risks. Moving from feminist health activism of the 1970s to
the neoliberal market-based advocacy of the present, and from drugs to cosmetics, the strategy
now favoured by North American regulators to mitigate risk of cosmetics is to require ingredient

12

Including blood clots, heart attack, stroke, depression, weight gain, and loss of libido; see e.g. Barbara Seaman, The Doctor’s
Case Against the Pill (New York: P.H. Widen, Inc., 1969).
13

Barbara Seaman, The Greatest Experiment Ever Performed on Women: Exploding the Estrogen Myth (New York: Hyperion,
2003) [“Seaman 2003”] at 30.
14

Arthur L Herbst, Howard Ulfelder & David C Poskanzer, “Adenocarcinoma of the Vagina: Association of Maternal Stilbestrol
Therapy with Tumor Appearance in Young Women" (1971) 284:15 N Engl J Med 878.
15

Harry K Ziel & William D Finkle, “Increased Risk of Endometrial Carcinoma among Users of Conjugated Estrogens” (1975)
293:23 N Engl J Med 1167; and Donald C Smith et al., “Association of Exogenous Estrogen and Endometrial Carcinoma” (1975)
293:23 N Engl J Med 1164. These December 1975 findings were corroborated by two studies in the June 1976 issue of the New
England Journal of Medicine. By the decade’s end, US researchers were unanimous that HRT substantially increases the risk of
endometrial cancer, with nine more studies showing that women using HRT were four to 20 times more likely to develop it; see
Frances McCrea, “The politics of menopause: the discovery of a deficiency disease” (1983) 31 Social Problems 111 [“McCrea
1983”] at 115. British researchers, however, were less convinced; see Frances B McCrea & Gerald E Markle, “The Estrogen
Replacement Controversy in the USA and UK: Different Answers to the Same Question?” (1984) 14:1 Soc Stud Sci 1. See also
Elizabeth Watkins, The Estrogen Elixir: A History of Hormone Replacement Therapy in America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2007) [“Watkins 2007”] at 92-98; she also notes that two 1976 studies considered effects on all estrogen
users, regardless of whether they had uteruses or ovaries, finding a very slight correlation with increased risk of breast cancer.
16

In the late 1970s, the US Food and Drug Administration required PPIs for four types of prescription drugs, all of which were
hormonal drugs for women: oral contraceptives, DES as a postcoital contraceptive, other estrogenic products (i.e. HRT), and
progestational products. See Marsha Wertzberger Gardner, “Increasing Patient Awareness in Drug Therapy: Ramifications of a
Patient Package Insert Requirement” (1978) 66 Geo LJ 837 at 839-841.

3

labels on product packaging.17 As a technique of responsibilization and governance of the self,18
ingredient labels delegate to women, as consumers, responsibility for ensuring safety from
toxics by virtue of “precautionary consumption”.19 While it can be tempting to represent product
packaging as apolitical – consumer advocates might ask who suffers from having the “right to
know” – the adoption of labelling for potent substances, marketed to women, has a political and
regulatory history. How did the labelling of estrogenic drugs and cosmetics come to be required
by law in Canada, and with what distributive consequences?
Now take all these questions and elements, and stir them into one concentrated concoction,
by asking: if the dose made the poison, then what made the dose?
***
While it is now scientifically accepted that endocrine disrupting compounds can have greater
effects at lower doses, in the field of pharmacology in the 1940s, the conventional paradigm
ruled supreme. It structured determinations of whether a substance was safe for therapeutic
use, as pharmacologists evaluated what precise amounts and strengths a substance should be,
in pharmaceutical form, to induce physiological effects and to avoid toxicity. Such investigations
of potency were especially important for drugs made from biological substances, which had to
be standardized. And perhaps no substances were so resolutely characterized as potent, in the
1940s, as were sex hormones.20 So-called “natural” estrogens like estrone and estradiol, and
“synthetic” estrogens like DES, had been crystalized or synthesized in researchers’ labs in the
late 1920s and throughout the 1930s, and pharmaceutical firms were eager to capitalize.
How exactly, though, did these potent molecules get transformed into therapeutic drugs? As
of 1939, menopause had only just begun to be constructed as a disorder;21 estrogens could

17

Mandatory ingredient labelling for cosmetic products was introduced in the United States in 1977, and in Canada in 2004.
However, as shown in Chapters 5 and 6, in Canada the first uses of ingredient labels to regulate potent substances, in lieu of
regulatory standards, were for estrogenic drugs in 1944 and estrogenic cosmetics in 1949.
18

For a summary of the huge body of Foucauldian scholarship on governmentality, aimed at socio-legal scholars, see Nicholas
Rose, Pat O’Malley & Marianna Valverde, “Governmentality” (2006) 2:1 Annu Rev Law Soc Sci 83.
19

Norah MacKendrick, “Media Framing of Body Burdens: Precautionary Consumption and the Individualization of Risk” (2010)
80:1 Sociol Inq 126; Norah MacKendrick, “More work for mother: chemical body burdens as a maternal responsibility” (2014)
28:5 Gend Soc 705; and Norah MacKendrick & Lindsay Stevens, “‘Taking Back a Little Bit of Control’: managing the
contaminated body through consumption” (2016) 31:2 Sociol Forum 310.
20

The expression “sex hormones” is fraught with difficulty and has been problematized in Nelly Oudshoorn 1994, Anne FaustoSterling 2000 and Celia Roberts 2007. Like them, I continue to use the term in its historical context. Scientists and bureaucrats
on the Canadian Committee on Pharmacopoeial Standards did not always use this expression. At risk of overgeneralizing here,
members tended to speak of “sex hormones” when contemplating end-use drug products (and relatedly, in the context of the
Sex Hormone Regulations), and in other contexts spoke of estrone, estradiol, stilboestrol, or collectively the “oestrogens”.
21

Susan E Bell, "Changing ideas: The medicalization of menopause" (1987) 24:6 Soc Sci Med 535 [“Bell 1987”]; McCrea 1983.

4

“best be described as drugs looking for diseases”.22 Moreover, evidence from lab studies in the
1930s demonstrated that estrogens were carcinogenic in animals.23 How then did sex hormones
begin their explosive transformation into drugs and cosmetics that, in the second half of the
century, would be used by millions of women?24
Feminist scholarship in the history of science, sociology, and science and technology studies
(STS) has given rich insight into this question.25 Perhaps most foundational is Nelly
Oudshoorn’s study showing how hormonal drugs emerged in “the triangle of the laboratory, the
pharmaceutical industry and the clinic”.26 However, my research suggests that the better
geometric metaphor is a square – as regulators were critical actors. In Canada in the 1940s,
regulators laboured to enumerate, standardize, and control estrogens, facilitating the circulation
of certain materialized forms of drugs and cosmetics in products, markets, and bodies.
Contributing to interdisciplinary conversations in socio-legal studies, legal history, STS, and
pharmaceutical history by providing an empirical case of how regulatory practices enact material
realities, this study composes a series of toxic enactments. Using archival material not
previously written about by historians, the study describes how the enactment of estrogen in
Canada was achieved, in part, through heterogeneous practices of regulators brought together
in 1942 through the Canadian Committee on Pharmacopoeial Standards (“the Committee”).
Comprised of physicians, pharmacists, pharmaceutical researchers, and federal bureaucrats,
22

Nelly Oudshoorn, Beyond the Natural Body: An Archeology of Sex Hormones (London: Routledge, 1994) [“Oudshoorn 1994”]
at 108.
23

See Chapter 1, section 1.i.

24

There appears to be no research into how many millions of Canadian women used estrogenic drugs (or cosmetics) in the
twentieth century; however, “millions” is a very safe estimate when extrapolating from American research. As growth
hormones, estrogens were also transformed into growth promoters for livestock, administered through feed or implants; see
Langston 2010 and Jean-Paul Gaudillière, “DES, Cancer, and Endocrine Disruptors: Ways of Regulating, Chemical Risks, and
Public Expertise in the United States” in Soraya Boudia & Nathalie Jas, eds, Powerless Science? Science and Politics in a Toxic
World (New York, NY: Berghahn, 2014) [“Gaudillière 2014”]. However, those technologies are beyond the scope of this thesis.
25

Susan E Bell, “Gendered Medical Science: Producing a Drug For Women” (1995) 21:3 Fem Stud 469 [“Bell 1995”]; FaustoSterling 2000; Jean-Paul Gaudillière, “Better prepared than synthesized: Adolf Butenandt, Schering Ag and the transformation
of sex steroids into drugs (1930–1946)” (2005) 36 Stud Hist Phil Biol & Biomed Sci 612 [Gaudillière 2005a”]; Jean-Paul
Gaudillière,”The Visible Industrialist: Standards and the Manufacture of Sex Hormones”, in Christoph Gradmann & Johnathan
Simon, eds, Evaluating and Standardizing Therapeutic Agents, 1890-1950 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) [“Gaudillière
2010”]; Gaudillière 2014; Haraway 2012; Nancy Krieger et al, “Hormone replacement therapy: cancer, controversies, and
women’s health: historical, epidemiological, biological, clinical, and advocacy perspectives” (2005) 59:9 J Epidemiol Community
Health 740 [“Krieger et al 2005”]; Langston 2010; Allison Li, “Marketing Menopause: Science and the Public Relations of
Premarin” in Georgina Feldberg et al, eds, Women, Health and Nation: Canada and the United States since 1945 (Montreal and
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003) [“Li 2003a”]; Bob Ostertag, Sex Science Self: A Social History of Estrogen,
Testosterone, and Identity (Amherst and Boston, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2016) [“Ostertag 2016”]; Oudshoorn
1994; Sheila M Rothman & David Rothman, The Pursuit of Perfection: The Promise and Perils of Medical Enhancement (New
York: Vintage Books, 2003) [“Rothman & Rothman 2003”]; Roberts 2007; Seaman 2003; Chandak Sengoopta, The Most Secret
Quintessence of Life: Sex, Glands, and Hormones, 1980-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006) [“Sengoopta 2006”];
and Watkins 2007. This list excludes historiography on the contraceptive pill.
26

Oudshoorn 1994, at 82.
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with its proposed regulations reviewed by federal solicitors, the Committee was coordinated by
the Department of Pensions and National Health (“the Department” or “National Health”).27
When it came to standardizing estrogen(s) and their potency, these actors practiced numerous,
divergent scientific and statutory techniques for enumerating substances, prescribing test
methods, and mandating labelling. Analytically, my study shows how these practices often
“hinged” on practices of delegation, used both in a doctrinal administrative law sense and with a
more Latourian valence, in which desired behaviours are inscribed into technology.28 In brief,
responsibility for ensuring safety was repeatedly directed away from the Department. Following
Annemarie Mol’s praxiological reformulation of actor-network theory,29 I argue that these varied
regulatory practices materialized estrogen as a potent and multiple object. Further, drawing on
notions of co-production, I show how estrogen spawned novel regulatory techniques in Canada.
Toxic enactments potentiated legal substances, and substantiated potent laws.30
***
Part I sets the historical, conceptual and methodological stage. Chapter 1 relates numerous
families of history and theory. It begins by recalling mid-twentieth century histories on the
emergence of sex hormones and on the standardization of biological drugs. Swerving from
history to theory, the chapter turns to review the more theoretical literature that grounds this
story. Distilled here to one word, the key concept is enactment. Rather than a grand explanatory
theory of historical events, enactment describes how realities are done in practice. In this, I draw
heavily on the ontological and praxiological concepts of Annemarie Mol, an STS scholar and
philosopher of medicine. The rest of the chapter canvases literature by some of Mol’s scholarly
relatives: first, Larry Busch’s political sociology of standards; and second, intersections between

27

I refer to “the Department” or “National Health” to capture the department’s various names during 1939-1951. In October
1944, a reorganization divided what had been the Department of Pensions and National Health into the new Department of
Veterans Affairs and new Department of National Health and Welfare, the latter of which continued to house the Food and
Drugs Division. See An Act to establish a Department of National Health and Welfare, SC 1944-1945, c 22. See also AL Davidson,
The genesis and growth of food and drug administration in Canada. (Ottawa: Ministry of National Health and Welfare, 1949)
[“Davidson 1949a”] at 88; and AL Davidson, Canada Pioneers in Food and Drug Control: The Story of the Food and Drug
Directorate (Canada: Department of National Health and Welfare, Information Services Division, 1949) [“Davidson 1949b”].
28

Bruno Latour, Pandora’s Hope (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999) [Latour 1999a] at 185; and Bruno Latour,
“Where Are the Missing Masses? The Sociology of a Few Mundane Artifacts” in Wiebe W Bijker & John Law, eds, Shaping
Technology/Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical Change (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1992) [Latour 1992] at 226-236.
29

Annemarie Mol, The Body Multiple: Ontology in Medical Practice (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002) [“Mol 2002”].

30

“Legal substances” comes from Javier Lezaun, “The Pragmatic Sanction of Materials: Notes for an Ethnography of Legal
Substances” (2012) 39:1 J Law & Soc 20 [“Lezaun 2012”].
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socio-legal studies and STS,31 including not only Sheila Jasanoff’s concept of co-production, but
newer work by Javier Lezaun, Emily Grabham, and Emilie Cloatre that takes a material turn.
Chapter 2 details the research methods practiced in this study. To the extent that studies of
enactment-in-practices are fundamentally empirical,32 the first chapter already addresses
methodology. Yet it says nothing of the disciplinary kin to which this thesis – arguably – most
closely relates, namely legal history.33 Thus, the second chapter ponders relations of (legal)
history-in-theory and theory-in-(legal)-history. Recalling concern with the familiar method that
centers law as nucleus and everything else merely as extended family (or “context”), the second
chapter identifies recent engagements of legal history with materiality that allow (legal)
historians to compose a different object, one in which law and matter are imbricated.
Part II provides my account of how estrogen co-emerged with regulatory techniques in
Canada, between 1939 and 1953. Necessarily arbitrary, these dates bracket a time of explosive
growth in the variety of sex hormone products available;34 DES arrived on the market in Canada
in 1939, Premarin in 1941.35 Moreover, the 1940s belonged to an era in pharmaceutical history
often referred to as the “therapeutic revolution”, in which drug development, and the economic
and political power of the drug industry, grew immensely.36 The 1940s also witnessed a major
expansion of National Health’s aims and ambitions; in the wake of the Treaty of Westminster,
senior officials seized the opportunities, including those presented by WWII, to unleash a suite
of food and drug regulations and to build the Department’s bureaucratic machinery. During this
decade, the Food and Drugs Act aimed to protect public health through a scheme heavily
premised upon delegation. Notably, while the Act did not at the time require pre-market approval
for new drugs (unlike in the US), drug standards could still be imposed by delegated legislation.

31

To contest and collapse the distinctions between “law”, “society” and “science” inherent to this formula, Cloatre and
Pickersgill propose instead the “social studies of law”; see their introduction to Emilie Cloatre & Martyn Pickersgill, eds,
Knowledge, Technology and Law (London: Routledge, 2015) [“Cloatre & Pickersgill 2015”] at 8-9.
32

Mol follows Latour and others in querying whether ANT can properly be characterized as a “theory”. Annemarie Mol, “ActorNetwork Theory: sensitive terms and enduring tensions” (2010) 50:1 Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie
(Sonderheft) 253 [“Mol 2010”] at 253-254, 261-262.
33

Some historiography canvassed here, such as environmental history by Nancy Langston and pharmaceutical history by JeanPaul Gaudillière, examines patterns in regulatory decision-making, providing close readings of judicial decisions and exploring
transformations in regulatory logics regarding sex hormones. But these scholars do not situate their work as legal history per se.
34

Note that this is not the same as claiming there was explosive growth in the use of estrogenic drugs in the 1940s.

35

Both DES and Premarin were already on the Canadian market before they were approved for sale in the U.S.

36

Vivianne Quirke, “From alkaloids to gene therapy: a brief history of drug discovery in the 20th century”, in Stuart Anderson,
ed, Making Medicines: A brief history of pharmacy and pharmaceuticals (London: Pharmaceutical Press, 2005) [“Quirke 2005”]
at 177.
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Alongside these legal, political, and economic dynamics, the human and nonhuman actors in
this story are also introduced in Chapter 3. There is no analytic magic to the word actor;37 one
could also use actants,38 agents,39 participants,40 or actives (with its pharmacological invocation
of active ingredients). Nor does it reflect a puritanical commitment to an imagined actor network
theory (“ANT”).41 There is, however, much more deliberation behind estrogen, the term chosen
for the leading actor. Readers may protest that this term is ahistorical or unscientific, carries too
much gendered or heteronormative baggage,42 or, if they are especially perceptive, that the
term is a self-serving attempt to render semantically singular what is a group of substances, in
order to better dramatize the argument that estrogen is multiple. After all, estrogen carries no
single specific meaning for biochemists, endocrinologists, physicians, or pharmacists, nor did it
in the 1940s. Thinking of steroidal estrogens, the molecules produced endogenously in human
bodies, this umbrella term colloquially refers to what biochemists have known, since the 1930s,
was a class of hormones – the three main such estrogens being estradiol, estrone and estriol.43
Other “natural” estrogens also used in pharmaceuticals are endogenous not to human but to
equine bodies, like equilin and equilenin, extracted from pregnant mares’ urine and conjugated
into the hormone replacement therapy branded so memorably as Premarin.44 The best known
“synthetic” estrogen, referred to here as DES,45 was synthesized in 1939 as an inexpensive
37

Mol 2010, at 255: “It is easy, everyone knows what an actor is – an actor does things – it, he, she acts. But no, of course it is
not easy, because in different theoretical repertoires an ‘actor’ is made to be different things. Look at these sentences. First,
they state that an actor acts and then that an ‘actor’ is made to be. From one sentence to the next there is a shift from a real
life actor who acts to the term actor which is made to be and, at the same time, a shift from the active to the passive. Making
such shifts and playing with them to see what happens, is one of the pleasures of engaging in ‘actor-network theory’.”
38

Adopted originally from semiotics, “actant” has been used in material-semiotic traditions such as ANT; see e.g. Bruno Latour,
“On Recalling ANT” (1999) 47:1 Sociol Rev 15 [“Latour 1999b”] at 19-20.
39

In Messengers of Sex, Celia Roberts conceives of hormones as “active agents in bio-social networks that constitute materialsemiotic entities such as ‘sex’”; Roberts 2007 at 22.
40

In the specific context of endocrine disrupting chemicals, see Dayna Nadine Scott, Jennie Haw & Robyn Lee, “‘Wannabe ToxicFree?’ From precautionary consumption to corporeal citizenship” (2017) 26:2 Environ Politics 322 at 332; and Max Liboiron
“Redefining pollution and action: The matter of plastics” (2016) 21:1 J Material Cult 87 [“Liboiron 2016”] at 97.
41

Latour has often disclaimed the terms actor, network and theory (and the dash); see e.g. Latour 1999b.

42

While estrogen and androgen hormones are produced in bodies of all sexes and serve many physiological functions, culturally
these steroid hormones continue to be positioned as female and male (Fausto-Sterling 2000; Roberts 2007). The names
historically assigned to them are examined in detail by Anne Fausto-Sterling; see Fausto-Sterling 2000, at 170–194. Unlike
androgen, which means to produce a man, estrogen means to produce estrus. In her analysis, not only does this entrench a
hormonal model of sex, but it reduces “woman” to reproductive fecundity; at 188. Continued use of the word estrogen to refer
to these hormones arguably continues to produce reproductive femininity and cis-heterosexuality as biologically natural.
43

These are the three principle forms of estrogen in human bodies, although there are others. Estradiol is the most potent and
abundant in women’s bodies before menopause; estrone forms from estradiol and predominates after menopause; estriol is
abundant during pregnancy. Progesterone and testosterone, other steroid hormones, also play roles in menopause. By 1939,
biochemists “had crystalized at least seven estrogenic molecules”, including equilin and equilenin; Fausto-Stirling 2000 at 189.
44

It is thought that Premarin was so named for pre(gnant) mar(e) (ur)in(e).

45

From its origin, DES was assigned different proper names in different countries’ pharmacopoeia and regulations. In the US, it
was diethylstilbestrol, while in Britain, it was stilboestrol. In Canada, after some debate, the 1944 Sex Hormone Regulations
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alternative to estradiol preparations, and other synthetic estrogens followed.46 While the phrase
“estrogenic substance” gets closer to my intended meaning, it is encumbered as a term of art in
the Sex Hormone Regulations,47 and it may run a risk of re-enacting the nature-culture divide,
implying a substance with fixed, natural, essential attributes that active cultural actors may then
manipulate. Crafting terminology adequate to a performative approach to socio-materiality has
been vexing; the closest concept might be “estrogenizer”. Assigning effects to substances is
also vexing, as it requires measurement practices. Yet, as will be seen, when presented with
legal opportunities to standardize measurements for defining sex hormones and their activities,
Canadian regulators demurred. Trying to hold together undefined estrogenic effects and their
many materialized forms, I have settled on the term estrogen.
What of the argument that it is self-serving to lump a class of substances under a singular
noun? In arguing that estrogen was multiple, I am striving to capture something beyond simply
its many material compositions (as oestrone, oestradiol, estriol, DES, estrogenic substances,
conjugated equine estrogens, the drug and cosmetic products containing them, etc.). Estrogen
is capacious enough also to encompass these entities’ many onto-epistemological modes, in
which different human practices of knowing are implicated in the active becoming of matter,48
whether as chemical structures, biological sources, physiological functions, pharmacological
effects, forms of administration, or industrial intentions. Put at its simplest here, estrogen was
multiple because it was done multiply. And not just by humans. Nonhuman supporting actors in
this estrogenic cast will also be credited – mice and rats, vaginas and ovaries, bioassays and
monographs, delegation and validity, telephones and stenographers, reference materials and
labels, hot flashes and skin wrinkles, injections and inunctions, inscriptions and prescriptions.
The human actors introduced in Chapter 3 suffer from fewer nomenclatural difficulties,
although identifying professors as regulators may seem, to some, to extend that word too far.

assigned it the proper name “stilboestrol”, while the Canadian Supplement to the British Pharmacopoeia, and Part V of
Schedule B to the Food and Drugs Act, used the term “stilboestol” (with “diethylstilbestrol” indicated as a synonym in the
Canadian Supplement) and the term “stilboestrol diproprionate” (a derivative ester). This study uses “DES” to refer both to the
substance and its esters, unless otherwise noted.
46Another

well-known synthetic estrogen is ethinyl estradiol. Derived from estradiol, and patented by German scientists in
1938, it is seventeen times more potent than estradiol. It was approved by the FDA for use in humans in 1949 and has been
used in most oral contraceptives since the 1960s. See Seaman 2003, at 31, 34.
47

The 1944 Sex Hormone Regulations, at s C.02.006(b)(i), assigned “estrogenic substances” as the proper name of the category
of “mixed or impure” estrogenic sex hormone products. By contrast, the other category of sex hormone products was that of
“pure synthetic or natural crystalline products”, which included oestrone, oestradiol, oestriol, and stilboestrol. Also, as of 1977,
cosmetic products containing an “estrogenic substance” – which, consistent with the Sex Hormone Regulations, meant a mixed
or impure sex hormone product – were banned from import or sale in Canada; see Cosmetic Regulations, CRC, c 869, s 15(b).
48

Karen Barad, “Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How Matter Comes to Matter” (2003) 28:3 Signs
801 (“Barad 2003”). At 829, she describes onto-epistem-ology as “the study of practices of knowing in being”.
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Yet even without drawing on the enormous literature “decentering” the concept of regulation,49 it
should be sufficient to recall that the Committee was empowered by an order-in-council and its
members appointed by the Minister to advise on new drug standards and regulations.
Chapter 4 examines the events, decisions, and practices that first materialized estrogen
under the Food and Drugs Act, homing in on a series of technical and legal controversies. At the
Committee members’ first meeting in Ottawa in January 1943, and in the next two years of their
deliberations and deferrals, no substances were as contentious and complicated as estrogens.
Their nature was contested – were they biological substances, chemicals, or pre-made
products? What were the best methods for measuring their potency? Who should decide on the
methods? Disagreement bedeviled discussion of whether, how, when, and by whom estrogen
should be standardized or regulated. When solicitors were consulted, matter(s) became further
destabilized. The chapter shows how resolution officially arrived through legally debated and
experimental techniques – including delegating to industry the power to standardize sex
hormones’ potency, through regulating via labels rather than by standards. In the fall of 1944,
Committee members came to the realization that these heterogenous and incommensurable
practices for standardizing drugs had, ironically, led to multiple versions of single substances.
In the second half of the decade, estrogen increasingly shaped regulations under the Food
and Drugs Act. Chapter 5 describes estrogen’s legal trajectories in the late 1940s and early
1950s. Regulatory tinkering aimed to close controversies and gather estrogen together as a
singular, stable, and safe object. However, concurrent with new statutory powers, other
amendments extended regulatory coverage to estrogenic cosmetics while sustaining National
Health’s retreat from setting standards for products sold to women. Not only did new regulations
and their implementation (re)enact estrogen as indeterminate and unpredictable, they were an
early foundation for conceptualizing risk in Canadian law. Absorbed into new domains, estrogen
spawned novel techniques of delegating to consumers, through labelling, the responsibility for
ensuring a product’s safety. In these ways, the regulation of estrogen was coterminous with its
materialization as a potent substance – law and toxicity were being co-produced.50
Part III offers some brief concluding reflections – on potency, on power, and on possibility.

49

This literature is far too large to adequately capture here. For a leading intervention, see Julia Black, “Decentring Regulation:
Understanding the role of regulation and self-regulation in a ‘post-regulatory’ world” (2001) 54:1 Current legal problems 103.
50

On the co-production of knowledge and order, see Jasanoff’s essays “The Idiom of Co-production” and “Ordering Knowledge,
Ordering Society”, in Sheila Jasanoff, ed, States of Knowledge: The co-production of science and social order (London and New
York: Routledge, 2004) [together, “Jasanoff 2004”]. For scholarship addressing the co-production of toxicity and regulation, see
e.g. Soraya Boudia & Nathalie Jas, “Introduction: The Greatness and Misery of Science in a Toxic World””, Soraya Boudia &
Nathalie Jas, eds Powerless Science? Science and Politics in a Toxic World (New York: Berghahn, 2014) [“Boudia & Jas 2014”].
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Chapter One
History and theory: toxic enactments
...hormones message across this mobile boundary, between social and biological, disrupting any attempts
at delineating what belongs in each category, or indeed where the outline of the categories might lie. –
Celia Roberts (2007)
By what strange alchemy is a legal obligation transformed into a material constraint? – Javier Lezaun
(2012)

My story of the enactment of estrogen and legal techniques in Canada in the 1940s is
animated by many strands of history and theory. This chapter weaves those literatures together.

1.

Sex hormones and drug standardization in the 1930s-1940s
This chapter summarizes two related mid-twentieth historiographies, which recount the

emergence of sex hormones and the standardization of biological drugs.

1.i.

Sex hormones on the edge of transformation

Over the last 80 years, estrogen has become among “the most widely used drugs in the
history of medicine.”1 Beginning in the 1950s, estrogen became an ever-present “elixir”, used for
combatting aging, promoting beauty, and, later that decade, for practicing birth control.2
However, in Canada in the late 1930s and early 1940s, sex hormones were still marginal drugs.
What changed, and how did regulatory practices contribute to this transformation?
This thesis appears to be the first study of the standardization of estrogen in Canada. With
the exception of Allison Li’s research on Premarin, there are no Canadian histories of sex
hormones.3 Nor, more generally, have historians attended to the Canadian Committee on
Pharmacopoeial Standards or its role in standardizing and regulating drugs, or to the Food and
Drugs Act and its implementation in the 1940s.4 Beyond Canada, a rich body of research exists

1

Oudshoorn 1994 at 9. However, note that Oudshoorn makes this claim as of 1994.

2

Watkins 2007. The US FDA approved Enovid for menstrual irregularities in 1957 and for birth control in 1959.

3

Li 2003a. Although see Haraway 2012, which weaves Canadian strands into a tale of Premarin’s many entanglements.

4

Two exceptions addressing this period, with a range of methodologies, are Joel Lexchin, Private profits versus public policy: the
pharmaceutical industry and the Canadian state (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016) [“Lexchin 2016”]; and Matthew
Herder, "Denaturalizing transparency in drug regulation" (2015) 8:2 McGill JL & Health S57 [“Herder 2015”] at S101-S115.
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on sex hormones in this period, arising from sociology, history of science and medicine, and
science and technology studies (STS).5 Hormones are “interesting precisely because they sit at
the boundary between ‘sex’ and ‘gender’”;6 thus, not surprisingly, much of this scholarship
examines how hormonal knowledges have produced or problematized sex and gender.
Of this work, perhaps most foundational and influential is Nelly Oudshoorn’s study, Beyond
the Natural Body.7 Oudshoorn provides an account of the development of endocrinology in the
1920s and 1930s, a period in which scientists rushed to identify, isolate, and purify hormones in
an endocrinological “gold rush”,8 and “established the basic concepts and techniques that have
served as cornerstones in structuring our knowledge of hormones to this day.”9 Drawing on
Foucauldian concepts regarding the materiality of discourse-building, she investigates not only
how these scientists used “cultural notions as resources in their research practice”, but also,
and indeed primarily, the “complex instruments, research materials, careful preparatory
procedures and testing practices” that were the material conditions of endocrinal knowledge.10
With special attention to the Dutch context, Oudshoorn painstakingly sets out the scientific
alliances and material practices through which scientific claims about sex hormones were
naturalized into universalized facts and stabilized as technological artefacts in the form of drugs.
Focused on steroidal hormones, she describes how, in the 1920s and early 1930s,
biochemists like Adolf Butenandt and Edward Doisy created techniques to extract “female” and
“male” sex hormones from glands, isolate them from urine, and purify them as crystalline
preparations.11 In the process, they established new facts about sex hormones – which, by the
late 1930s, they apprehended as the molecules estrone, estriol, and estradiol – that profoundly
challenged a binary model of sex centered on reproductive organs: estrogens were in all male
bodies and androgens in all female bodies, ovaries secreted not only estrogen but also
testosterone, and these hormones were not made only in gonads but in adrenal glands. Rather
than anatomical, sex increasingly appeared to be chemical.12 Oudshoorn argues that this new

5

See Introduction at note 25. As noted, that list excludes historiographies of the contraceptive pill.

6

Emilia Sanabria, Plastic Bodies: Sex Hormones and Menstrual Suppression in Brazil (Durham, NC: University Press, 2016)
[“Sanabria 2016”] at 105; see also 5, 149.
7

Oudshoorn 1994.

8

On the “gold rush” or “golden age” in endocrinology, see Li 2003a at 103, and Fausto-Stirling 2000 at 170. The metaphor
appears to have originated with leading reproductive endocrinologist Alan S Parkes; see e.g. Alan S Parkes, “The rise of
reproductive endocrinology, 1926-1940” (1966) 34:3 J Endocrinol 20.
9

Oudshoorn 1994 at 9.

10

Ibid at 10-11 and 12-13; see also 148-150 and fn 17 at 154-155.

11

Ibid including at 46-48, 71-79.

12

Ibid at 24-34, 145.
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endocrinological knowledge radically transformed views of sex and the body. Nonetheless, most
scientists continued to produce the same dualistic model of sexual difference.13
In one chapter of her book, Oudshoorn describes the bioassay methods and standardization
techniques developed by laboratory scientists, and, critically, how these testing tools contributed
to transform sex hormones into material realities.14 In subsequent chapters, she examines two
other means by which sex hormones materialized. Research materials – gonads and urine –
were required by laboratories and served to connect laboratory scientists’ practices to clinics
and pharmaceutical firms. The ability of industrial and clinical actors to supply materials, and
pre-existing gynecological (and not andrological) clinical practices, led to a concentration of
research activity on “female” sex hormones.15 While these practices ultimately materialized sex
hormones as chemical products, they were further shaped into estrogenic drugs through the
socially networked practices of clinical trials and industrial marketing. In short, before companies
could create markets, they needed to work with clinicians to help them identify diseases for their
drugs. Oudshoorn’s history illustrates how the properties of estrogenic drugs were not fixed
before being marketed. Rather, marketing practices, themselves deeply shaped by gendered
cultural norms, materialized sex hormones as drugs for menstruation and female menopause
(and not for contraception or male menopause).16 As Li notes, this challenges “the traditional
linear model of drug development in which it is assumed that a new drug is tested and its
purpose defined before it is taken to the marketplace.”17 In examining these structural
relationships and material practices, Oudshoorn concludes that estrogenic drugs emerged in the
interactions within “the triangle of the laboratory, the pharmaceutical industry and the clinic”.18
Oudshoorn’s historical findings have been built upon and distinguished by scholars in many
disciplines.19 Often this scholarship aims to trouble hormonally deterministic constructions of sex
and gender, demonstrating how feminists can engage with the materiality of bodies without
simply rejecting biological knowledge as a social construction. In Sexing the Body, biologist and

13

Ibid at 144-148. See also Fausto-Stirling 2000 at 182-191.

14

I leave more detailed engagement with this chapter of Oudshoorn’s book, on measuring sex hormones, to my discussion of
the historiography on standardization of biologicals (including estrogen); see Chapter 1, section 1.ii, below.
15

Ibid at 65-81.

16

Ibid at 82-111, and 140-141.

17

Li 2003a at 102; see also Oudshoorn 1994 at 3.

18

Oudshoorn 1994 at 83.

19

In this paragraph I discuss the work of scholars who, while not disciplinarily situated in history per se, have partly framed their
inquiries historically. I exclude from this discussion scholarship on sex hormones that is purely ethnographic, regardless that it
explores similar questions about pharmaceutical ontology, such as Sanabria 2016.
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gender theorist Anne Fausto-Sterling also considers endocrinology during the interwar period.20
Agreeing that scientists created chemical sex through practices used to isolate and purify,
measure and standardize, and define and name the “sex hormones”, she also describes their
work as deeply informed both by prevailing gender norms and by social struggles against them.
Scientists intersected with other social worlds – “feminists, advocates of homosexual rights,
eugenicists, birth control advocates, psychologists, and charitable foundations” – which
empowered and shaped hormone research, not least through philanthropic and political
support.21 Further, while emphasizing how “scientists are a diverse lot” and indeed how some
scientists of the time resisted efforts to fit new, unexpected test results into existing gender
constructs, Fausto-Stirling examines closely the ways that many scientists embraced and
incorporated pre-existing cultural assumptions in developing new endocrinological facts.22
Feminist theorist Celia Roberts further augments this body of work in Messengers of Sex.23
While lauding Oudshoorn’s account of how sex hormones “were not ‘discovered’ in nature, but
rather were produced through scientific interaction and work”,24 she takes pains to distinguish
her approach from what she paints as Oudshoorn’s use of social network analysis. 25 She
argues that, in studying how hormones were produced in interactions of human actors,
Oudshoorn circumscribes networks of practice in a way that “tends to leave important questions
open”.26 The critique typifies frustrations that normatively-oriented scholars, including feminist
scholars, can have with network or assemblage analyses that describe how but do not explain
why realities materialize. Unsatisfied by Oudshoorn’s description, for example, of how existing
gynecological practices facilitated translation of hormones into drugs, Roberts asks “why were
clinics set up around women’s bodies and not around men’s? Which ‘practices of masculine
supremacy, or … other systems of structural inequality’ were built into this practice fact?”27
To approach such questions, Roberts attempts to avoid separating culture from science, or to
deploy it as an ahistorical explanation for science. Developing STS network approaches,28
20

Fausto-Sterling 2000.

21

Ibid at 148; see generally 170-177.

22

Ibid at 190; see generally 147-148 and 177-194.
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Roberts 2007.

24

Ibid at 44.

25

Ibid at 36; see generally 37-45. See also Oudshoorn 1994 at 153-154 (at fn 13), addressing her use of social network theory
rather than ANT.
26

Ibid at 44; see also generally 36-46.

27

Ibid. At 38-39, Roberts also asks why new endocrinological facts of the 1920-30s did not mean “the end of the two-sex
model”, a question that was likewise investigated in Fausto-Stirling 2000.
28

Ibid at 41. In this respect, Roberts considers Bruno Latour’s ANT approach alongside Donna Haraway’s reservations that ANT
can over-emphasize technical aspects of science and under-emphasize power.
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including by adopting Serres’ notion of crumpled or folded time to explain the persistence of
notions of sexual difference in the history of hormones,29 she expands her analytical focus
beyond technoscientific practices to include non-human actors – most particularly, by
foregrounding “the activities of sex hormones themselves.” She theorizes hormones not merely
as biological substances, but as bio-social actors that “actively participate in the enactment of
particular versions of the biological (or nature) and the social (or culture) and of sex”.30 In the
form of HRT technologies, hormones have social and biological effects that are produced
through networks of representation and that cannot be parsed. Nor can these effects be isolated
from the culturally and historically situated and already sexed/gendered bodies in which they are
circulated and with which they interact.31 As messengers, hormones create a relationality
reflected by the hyphen in bio-social, “which represents a constituting, active relation between
two entities (the biological and the social) that do not pre-exist on their own but are constituted
through their connection with each other.”32 These methodological and conceptual differences
signal a modified answer to the question of how estrogen became a drug for menopausal
women. In Roberts’ view, pre-existing cultural conceptions of racial and sexual difference were
folded into the new science of endocrinology in the 1920s and 1930s, and were carried through
into the estrogenic technologies that developed during the twentieth century. Embedded in HRT,
specifically, were discourses in which femininity was inextricably linked to reproductivity and in
which menopause was unnatural.33
None of these scientific and cultural histories consider how regulators’ activities may have
contributed to transforming sex hormones into drugs. Other historical subdisciplines, however,
have since brought regulators into the picture. In Toxic Bodies, environmental historian Nancy
Langston gives a detailed account of the regulatory history of DES.34 In 1938, the biochemist
Edward Dodds invented DES as a coal-tar based synthetic substitute for steroidal estrogens.
While dissimilar in chemical structure to the steroids, it was a potent analog of estrogens.35 DES
“could cornify the lining of mouse vaginas far more potently than anything produced by living
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Ibid at 46-50.

30

Ibid at 47. Notably Roberts describes these enactments as historically contingent: “such enactments are historically specific
materializations (to use Judith Butler’s term) or articulations (to use Donna Haraway’s term)”.
31

Ibid at 155-158.
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Ibid at 181.
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Ibid at 114-34.
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Langston 2010. For other work that integrates political, legal and/or regulatory history into scientific and social histories of
DES and steroid hormones, see Gaudillière 2014; Gaudillière 2005a; and Gaudillière 2010.
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Langston 2010 at 32; and Gaudillière 2014 at 78.
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bodies”, making it “more estrogenic than estrogens”.36 Langston unearths the record of the US
FDA’s deliberations, in 1939 to 1941, on whether to approve DES as a drug for menopause
(and of later US regulatory decisions, in 1947, to approve DES for use by pregnant women and
for poultry).37 She does not, however, query whether the US FDA played a role in materializing
DES. This is perhaps unsurprising, as the statutory setting of her DES story in the US tends to
obscure such questions. As of 1939, the US Food, Drugs and Cosmetics Act required all new
drugs to obtain pre-market approval; in that context, it is more difficult to perceive how a drug
can be approved if it does not yet exist. In Canada, by contrast, where drugs did not require
approval and yet were increasingly shaped by regulatory standards, I argue that regulators’
activities were more constitutive, and that, in their practices of enumerating and standardizing
estrogen, regulators were not simply sanctioning pre-existing substances but enacting them.
Beyond DES, many other new estrogenic products were marketed in the 1930s, despite little
evidence of therapeutic efficacy. Proof of efficacy was not a legal precondition for the US FDA’s
approval of DES, nor a precondition for its clinical use.38 For steroid estrogens, in the late 1920s
and 1930s, drug companies promoted a plethora of indications, “starting from a restricted group
of menstrual disorders and extending, by the late 1920s, to include the treatment of menopause,
infertility, problems of the genitals, psychiatric conditions such as schizophrenia and depression,
dermatological diseases such as eczema, and even diseases of the joints”.39 Estrogen even
instigated the proliferation of new disease categories, largely related to menstruation and
sterility.40 Despite this, estrogen therapies were not popular in the 1930s.41 In expanding
Oudshoorn’s research into clinical domains, Chandak Sengoopta shows that physicians were
not convinced that estrogen was an effective remedy for anything. He asks “[w]hat exactly
happened in the clinic once the sex hormones were available as potent, standardized and
reliable therapeutic preparations? Did they bring about the therapeutic revolution prophesied by
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so many in the 1920s?” For menstrual disorders, by the late 1930s, most gynecologists had
answered this question in the negative – clinical results were “notoriously unsatisfactory”.42
That being said, gynecologists also believed that the therapeutic efficacy of estrogens was
closely connected to the dosage level.43 Despite this centrality of dose to medical discourses,
radical variability continued to characterize the dosages of therapeutic estrogen preparations,
the bioassays used to measure their potency, and the units used to express potency.44
The change, if you will, began in the early 1940s. Some firms, like the Dutch firm Organon,
had sought as soon as the early 1930s to position sex hormones as a remedy for menopause.45
Yet throughout that decade many women, and many gynecologists, did not see menopause as
a disease.46 Physicians tended to view it as a stage of life that, for a minority of women, involved
unpleasant symptoms for a short period. However, the very possibility of relieving these
women’s discomfort with dependable estrogenic drugs, even in the short-term, “resulted in the
reconceptualization of menopause as a deficiency disease”.47 Put differently, “before Ayerst
could sell the drug, it had to sell the disease”.48 The rush to sell estrogen – and with it,
menopause – took off after the US FDA approved DES in September 1941. Before DES was
available, most preparations on the North American market were estradiol or estrone products,
but in comparison, DES was much cheaper to produce, and as it was unpatented, many firms
promptly began manufacturing DES products.49 Less than a year later, conjugated estrogen,
branded as Premarin, received US FDA approval as a new menopause therapy.50 By some
measures, Premarin was nearly as potent as DES, but without the notoriously noxious side
effects. As a tablet, it was easier to administer than DES or oestradiol preparations, typically
given by intramuscular injection. Further, by aggressively marketing it as a “natural” product,
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Ayerst quickly established Premarin as the main competitor to DES.51 Together these “two
products became the treatment of choice” for menopause,52 though as Premarin grew in
popularity over the decade, drug companies began promoting DES for other purposes (notably,
to reduce miscarriage and promote healthy pregnancies).53 This proliferation of potent products,
and the consolidation of menopause as a disorder, caused skeptical physicians to reconsider
their views in the years after WWII, when there was an explosion of “menopausal disorders” and
drugs to treat them.54
The number of commercial preparations grew in the 1930s not only despite tenuous evidence
of efficacy, but in the face of carcinogenic hazards. Historians generally concur that, while data
published in major American journals was not conclusive, the “possibility that estrogen use
caused cancer” was “well appreciated in the late 1930s and early 1940s”.55 With respect to
DES, within mere months after it was synthesized and then continuing throughout the 1940s,
researchers were linking it with cancer, and with genital and reproductive abnormalities.56 By
1939, “nearly all researchers agreed that natural estrogens had the potential to be carcinogenic
in laboratory animals, and that DES was at least as carcinogenic, if not more so, than natural
estrogens because it was more potent”, though researchers and physicians were often
dismissive of the significance of these animal studies to human health.57 Throughout the 1930s,
steroidal estrogens had also been found carcinogenic in laboratory experiments by biochemists
and endocrinologists, though “for clinicians, these studies translated to debates about the
correct dose to be given”.58 Furthermore, studies were published showing that “high doses of
estrone over prolonged periods could produce malignant breast tumours in hitherto healthy
mice”;59 whether sex hormones were carcinogenic or not – and debates raged in major journals

51

Li 2003a at 102; and Watkins 2007 at 25-26.

52

Rothman & Rothman 2003 at 70-71. Cf Ostertag 2016 at 65 (claiming that Premarin “immediately displaced” DES as the drug
of choice for menopause).
53

Langston 2010 at 48-60; see also Ostertag 2016 at 69; and Gaudillière 2014 at 68.

54

Rothman & Rothamn 2003 at 71; Sangoopta 2006 at 168-170; Bell 1987; McCrea 1983; and Watkins 2007 at 30-31. See also
e.g. Emil Novak, Gynecology and Female Endocrinology (Boston: Little, Brown, 1941) at 447.
55

Rothman & Rothman 2003 at 79, and 80-81; see also Krieger et al 2005 at 741-742, 743-744, and 746-747 (fns 25-43, 68-70).

56

Langston 2010 at 10-11, 31-33; Seaman 2003 at 14, 38; Rothman & Rothman 2003 at 80-81; Gaudillière 2014 at 78-79. As just
one example, see e.g. CL Buxton & Earl Engle, “Effects of the Therapeutic Use of Diethylstilbestrol” (1939) 113:26 JAMA 2320.
57

Langston 2010 at 33; see also 34-39. However, as Langston shows, specifically with respect to DES, some research had also
shown, as early as 1939, that toxicity did not relate to the amount of dose, and that “low doses of DES could be more toxic than
high doses”; at 38. “As early as the 1930s, however, researchers knew that estrogens do not act in linear or predictable ways”;
at 38. Some physicians at the time also recognized “the same harm may be obtained through the use of small doses of estrogen
if they are maintained over a long period”; see “Contraindications to Estrogen Therapy”, editorial, (1940) 114:16 JAMA 1560.
58

Krieger et al 2005 at 741; see also Watkins 2007 at 34-35 and 43.

59

Sengoopta 2006 at 195.

18

– there was also little doubt that they stimulated existing breast malignancies in humans.60
Sengoopta argues that while some practitioners in the 1930s “strongly suspected a link between
the sex glands and certain kinds of cancer”, it was not widely accepted that hormones may
cause breast, uterus and prostate tumours until the 1940s.61 Yet other scholars date this
acceptance to the late 1930s.62 As early as 1933, even those gynecologists enthusiastically
promoting estrogen acknowledged that “estrogenic substances administered in large doses and
for prolonged periods in certain experimental animals, have been shown to produce cancer”.63
Thus, regardless of when precisely the hazard of cancer hardened into a fact, throughout the
1930s and 1940s, the question of estrogen’s safety was widely conceived as a matter of dose.

1.ii.

Standardization of biological drugs in the mid-twentieth century

In order to contextualize the activities of the Committee and National Health officials, and
their approaches to enumerating, standardizing and regulating estrogen in the 1940s, I
summarize the relevant pharmaceutical historiography.64 Until the 1990s, pharmaceutical history
tended towards disciplinary stratification; in particular, historians of pharmacy adopted
methodological approaches that limited their inquiries to the techniques of pharmacists, or to the
changing professional boundaries between pharmacy and medicine in various times and
places.65 More recently, some social historians have tried to reunite history of pharmacy and
pharmaceutical history, so as to encompass “the entire history of medicines and those who
make them”.66 Yet, even that approach was inadequately interdisciplinary, as understanding
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pharmaceuticals requires following the interactions of medicine, science, technology, industry,
and law. Fortunately, within the last fifteen years, a more sociologically-inflected, disciplinarilyintegrated historiography of pharmaceuticals has emerged.67 Enriching our understanding of
drugs as enacted by historically and locally specific medical, laboratory, technological, and legal
practices, these studies place drugs “at the centre of complex networks that bind together the
various professionals involved in their invention, the companies responsible for their production,
the doctors who prescribe them, and the pharmacists who sell them, as well as the patients and
consumers who take them.”68 They take, as entry points to more integrated histories of
scientific, technological and medical practices, topics previously disregarded in the history of
medicine – including biological drugs (or biologics), and drug standardization.69 The efforts of
the Committee and National Health, including negotiations between physicians,
pharmacologists, pharmacists, manufacturers, bureaucrats, and lawyers, are properly placed
within this pharmaceutical history. After all, the Committee was not a sex hormone committee,
but a committee on pharmacopoeial standards. By thus situating my story, I aim to more fully
historicize the Canadian debates on standardization of estrogen, the decision to define drugs in
the Canadian Supplement by chemical and biological methods, and the ways in which Canada
regulated sex hormones differently than other (biological) drugs in the 1940s.
Narratives about pharmaceuticals in the twentieth century have often been chemical.
Gaudillière summarizes this historiography as typified by an emphasis on drugs’ molecular
structure and on the industrialization of synthetic drug manufacturing (and relatedly, the
marginalization of pharmacists),70 and by a diminishment of the role of physicians in shaping
drugs and their uses.71 Whatever its merits, this chemical narrative is troubled by the biological
Dennis Worthen, Pharmacy in World War II (London: Haworth Press, 2004) [“Worthen 2004”]; and David Cohen & William
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drugs that “dominated the world of pharmacy until the Second World War” – both by the plant
extracts long described in pharmacopoeias and, in the interwar years, by the drugs derived from
biologically active substances in living organisms like vaccines, antibiotics, sera, vitamins, and
hormones.72 As historians are quick to note, biologics were not understood in strict opposition to
chemicals. In some cases, biological extracts were converted easily into artificially synthesized
chemical compounds; further, some substances could simultaneously “in one setting be viewed
(and handled) as a biological while in another context as a chemical”.73 The ongoing efforts, in
this period, to chemically synthesize biological substances arguably “dissolved the boundaries
between natural and artificial substances”.74 Still, despite this lack of essential difference,
“[b]iologicals were often more complex, more difficult to handle, and less standardized than the
chemical drugs”.75 Many biological substances were highly potent and unstable, with multiple
physiological effects that “oscillate between desirable and harmful”.76 Rather than see these as
side effects, Alexander Von Schwerin, Heiko Stoff and Bettina Wahrig argue that biologics were
ontologically precarious. This precariousness arose precisely from their “historical construction
as both natural and artificial objects”, as the “naturalness” of biologics made them culturally
desirable and pharmaceutically promising, and yet difficult for humans to produce and control.77
The task of stabilizing these “natural” substances, and converting them into drugs, fell to
standardization. At a technical level, drug standardization referred to “a formal agreement to use
the same instrument, the same substance or the same procedure in order to enforce the
comparability and the replication of measures and – more generally – of technical operations.”78
Replicability had multiple goals: industrially, to produce identical high-quality goods; clinically, to
ensure safe use; and scientifically, to measure properties and effects.79
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Importantly, although this is much oversimplified, whether a drug substance was taken as
chemical or biological changed the approach to its standardization. Chemical approaches
involved purifying a chemical substance, measuring its weight, and determining the amount to
be included in a drug product based on a (linear) dose-response curve. A pure chemical was a
more compliant ingredient, making it easier to guarantee product identity and uniformity; further,
chemicals attracted greater patent protection. By contrast, biological substances, in their natural
variability, required more complexly constructed dose-response curves based on repeated
physiological tests using different species and evaluating different physiological effects.80
Bioassays aimed to “know – or to fix – a product’s activity by performing animal experiments”.81
They were necessary to measure potency, ideally by making it quantifiable in potency units. By
translating anticipated physiological effects into the activity of a biological substance, expressed
and measured in units, the therapeutic efficacy of the substance could be fixed numerically.
Such tests were then the basis for determining dosage, and as such were critical to patients and
physicians.82 Mobilizing this technical distinction more ontologically, I broadly contemplate that
chemical standardization apprehends what a drug is – its properties, essence, composition –
while biological standardization apprehends what a drug does – its activity, capacity, potency.
Historians have shown how these elements all crystallized in estrogen. Oudshoorn examines
how test methods in the 1920s and 1930s contributed to transforming sex hormones into
material realities.83 With a comparable methodology, Jean-Paul Gaudillière has examined
bioassay techniques in sex hormone networks, but with a different emphasis; while Oudshoorn
focused primarily on laboratory research, Gaudillière zeroed in on industrial testing.84 Their
histories explore how bioassays were “magic tools” for standardizing estrogen and determining
its potency, and a necessary means for scientific evaluation of physiological effects, industrial
control of drug manufacturing, and pharmacological decisions about dosage.85
In describing and analyzing work by laboratory scientists in the 1920s and 30s to biologically
standardize sex hormones, Oudshoorn begins with their efforts to define which substances
would be defined as “male” or “female”.86 For the “female” substance, they agreed that the
80
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standard should be a physiological function that changed in an organism after ovariectomy.87
While they also agreed that ovarian extracts should be used to test for the “female principle”,
when it came to methods for testing these extracts, gynecologists and laboratory scientists
diverged. The former tested the weight of the uterus, often in ovariectomized rabbits. The latter
tested a wide variety of physiological changes – on “the feathers of domestic fowl; the growth of
mammary rudiments in male mice; the growth of the vulva and the mammary glands in infantile
female rat; and muscular activity basal metabolism, and the levels of calcium and sugar in
blood, both in mice and women” – such that, by the late 1920s, there was a “bewildering variety”
of test methods.88 During the 1920s, use of the vaginal smear test, created by American
physiologist Edgar Allan and biochemist Edward Doisy, gained momentum. The Allen-Doisy test
involved injecting an ovariectomized female rodent – a mouse or a rat – with an ovarian
preparation and, three days later, examining a vaginal smear under a microscope for any
changes in epithelial cells considered characteristic of estrus. These tests effectively defined a
female sex hormone as “any extract, purified product or any synthetic compounds bearing some
resemblance to the natural preparation inducing a ‘female’ reaction in such a standardized
test.”89 As summarized by Fausto-Stirling, while these tests “distanced animal masculinity from
reproduction, linked animal femininity directly to the cycle of generation, and made less visible
the effects of these hormones on nonreproductive organs in both males and females”, the
particular tests that scientists chose to use were not somehow required by “nature”.90 Further,
using biological standards allowed substances other than steroid hormones to make the
estrogenic grade; DES could be perceived “as a potent estrogen rather than as an aromatic
compound with an ethylene side chain”.91 With these tests, estrogen – and sex – materialized.
Moreover, these bioassays also measured the potency of the estrogen that they materialized,
through numerical units that could be used to quantify the potency of any estrogenic substance.
To continue with our example, the Allen-Doisy test defined one mouse-unit (or sometimes, one
rat-unit) as the minimum dose of substance potent enough to induce changes in vaginal
epithelial cells characteristic of estrus in the spayed female rodent.92 Here, too, methods
proliferated. Specifically, estrogenic activity (potency) was expressed using a variety of different
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units connected to different bioassay tests – rat units, mouse units, rabbit units, and eventually
international units. Some scientists were vexed by the existence of many units to express the
potency of the same substance, and British scientists with the National Institute for Medical
Research (NIMR), led by Henry Dale, spearheaded efforts for greater standardization.93 In
1932, at an international conference on the standardization of sex hormones, organized through
the League of Nations, a group of elite physiologists and biochemists adopted the Allen–Doisy
vaginal smear test for producing estrus as the international standard (or definition) for “female
sex hormone”. Ironically, they adopted two standard units – either mouse units or rat units,
which reflected European versus American lab practices respectively – as the ‘international unit’
of female sex hormone.94 After 1935, related in part to new abilities to isolate estrogen from
urine, a shift to a more chemical paradigm of standardization and testing emerged, although
chemical testing did not completely supplant bioassays.95 The conferences also spurred
creation of an official reference material to be kept by NIMR – a pure substance prepared from
the urine of pregnant mares – against which estrogenic hormones could be compared. As a
result, “the unit of estrogen would no longer be an animal unit, but a weight unit, even if the
relationship between weight and potency remained based on biological assays.”96
This push by laboratory researchers for molecular standardization of estrogen was not,
however, widely reflected in clinical use or industrial practices in the mid or late 1930s. Instead,
these practices were marked by national and corporate variation. As Gaudillière has shown,
different firms’ laboratories used different species, strains, and numbers of animals (which
reacted in different ways); they used different modes of administration (i.e. single versus
fractionated inoculations, and subcutaneous versus intravenous injections); and even different
timing changed results (for example, “mice did not react well in dry, cold weather”). Units used
by manufacturers were wildly variant, as the Allen-Doisy rat unit was still common in the US,
and “[t]here were other ‘rat units’ too – not to mention ‘mouse units’ – and many manufacturers
were slow to standardize their products in the new ‘international units’.” For example, the
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German firm Schering made its products using a rat unit equivalent to almost five international
units, while the US firm Parke Davis employed a rat unit equivalent to 3.3 international units.97
With rigorous attention to different institutional and commercial research and production sites
such as Schering, IG Farben, Bayer, and Butenandt’s research institute (and the intricate
collaborations among them), Gaudillière details the heterogeneity of sex hormone bioassays
and potency units in Germany and France in the interwar years and during WWII.98 While this
diversity did not necessarily diminish quality control within each firm, for estrogenic products,
“comparability and robustness remained local achievements”.99 Scientists and engineers in
German firms adapted existing bioassays, and generated new techniques to test commercial
preparations.100 Some laboratory scientists viewed this multiplicity as a “source of discrepancies
and chaos that one could only overcome with stronger standardization that could cut across
laboratories, firms and national lines”. However, as Gaudillière points out, this heterogeneity had
important benefits. Using a variety of bioassays for estrogen allowed for a greater number of
physiological effects to be identified – which also multiplied a drug’s indications, and its
marketable forms.101 Bioassays thus always had a “double meaning”, serving many masters –
as “the boundaries between research and control were often blurred … this porosity could
become an industrial asset”.102 The role of industry in standardizing estrogenic drugs meant that
bioassays were also entangled with medical practices and normalization, most directly through
relationships to dosage, mode of administration, and indications, as mediated by clinical
testing.103 Notably, in this time, the German state did not seek to impose standards on firms,
nor, unlike in the US, did this demand arise from “elite physicians in teaching hospitals”.104
In concluding this brief review of pharmaceutical history, I also highlight Jean-Paul Gaudillière
and Volker Hess’s theoretical framework on “ways of regulating drugs”.105 While they stress that
ways of regulating are “sociohistorical products” which have been “utterly variable” in their
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historical articulations, as a basic framing heuristic, the framework “seeks to bring to light the
internal logic of specific combinations of practices and procedures, describing the various
rationalities underpinning the management of therapeutic agents”.106 Pharmaceutical
historiography has largely conceived of regulation as legal control by state actors of drugmaking and marketing activities (despite that obviously many actors, and not just firms, are
involved in making markets). Yet the diversity of sociohistorical practices involved in shaping
drugs – including a range of standardization practices both between and within laboratories,
factories, and clinics – suggests that drug regulation should be defined more broadly.107 More
specifically, based on the distinct social actors, and their aims and values, forms of evidence
and expertise, and intervention tools, Gaudillière and Hess propose five ways of regulating
drugs: professional, industrial, administrative, public, and juridical.108 Of these, the first three are
relevant to this thesis. The professional way of regulating drugs has involved state delegation to
physicians (with grants of autonomy) and pharmacists (with grants of monopoly). Professional
regulation has often relied on “pharmacology, animal models, dosage, indications” as key forms
of evidence, and employed “pharmacopoeia, prescription, guidelines” as key regulatory tools.109
In many states, with the emergence of mass-produced and widely-marketed pharmaceuticals, a
transition from professional to industrial ways of regulating drugs marked the interwar years and
WWII, even if one mode did not automatically replace the other but rather they often operated in
parallel.110 Industrial regulation by firms, aided by representative associations, has aimed not
only at profit but at product quality. It has used tools of intellectual property rights, quality
control, and scientific publicity; it has engaged scientific evidence and cost-benefit analyses.111
While administrative ways of regulating have attracted relatively greater attention, this
scholarship often focuses on the postwar period, when most industrialized states first adopted
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and implemented legislation that required pre-market approval supported by evidence from
clinical trials.112 Administrative actors include not only state agencies but also governmental
committees; their regulatory tools include not just approvals or enforcement but also labelling.113
Understanding pharmaceuticals, then, involves tracing interactions between ways of
regulating that were often multiple, overlapping, and dynamic.114 The authors propose that
historians ask “[w]hich values guide the regulation process? Which problems or adverse
practices are targeted? Who are the most important actors? What are the forms of evidence
accepted in decision making? Which regulatory tools are mobilized to oversee and control the
fate of drugs?”115 By asking such questions, which drive not only at “who benefits” but “through
what regulatory practices”, historians can take their studies of pharmaceuticals beyond historical
contingency and draw out the unequal power gradients at the “very core of drug regulation”.116

2.

Theoretical literatures on enactment
Moving from historiography and towards a framework for theorizing law in-and-of estrogen,

the remainder of this chapter contemplates enactment. First, it summarizes Annemarie Mol’s
contributions to theorizing how realities are enacted in practices, and places her work both in
relation to actor-network theory (ANT) and the material turn more broadly. It next considers
Lawrence Busch’s typologies of standards, which draw on Mol’s performative approach, and the
new embrace by socio-legal studies of Mol and other STS scholars’ approaches to materiality.

2.i.

Annemarie Mol and the enactment of multiple ontologies

The theorist that most empowers the history of estrogen told here is Annemarie Mol. Her now
canonical study, The Body Multiple, has been hugely influential in STS and social studies of
medicine.117 Empirically, it is an ethnography of atherosclerosis practices in a Dutch hospital.
Methodologically, she argues that studies of science, technology, and medicine should abandon
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an epistemological focus on their objects of analysis, and take a praxiological approach.118 That
is, rather than approaching objects as being one fixed reality represented or known by multiple
perspectives, Mol argues that reality is enacted in practice – reality is performed, achieved,
done.119 As practices in medicine are not singular and coherent, but are often incommensurable
or contradictory in the various techniques, tests, materials, and actors that are involved, the
diseases enacted in these practices are also multiple. From the leg pain felt by patients, to
tissue studied on microscope slides, to arterial surgeries, atherosclerosis is multiple. The
realities of diseases and bodies are enacted multiply in diverse socio-material practices.120
This begs the question of how this multiplicity manages to “hang together”.121 Mol shows how
it is that “the singularity of objects, so often presupposed, turns out to be an accomplishment”.122
This achievement is the work of various forms of coordination,123 which include simply adding
diverse testing practices together without concern for their cohesion, hierarchizing diverse
measurement techniques if one must be prioritized, ignoring and bracketing discrepancies, and,
as described in ANT studies, translation of tests and outcomes to make them comparable.124
Sometimes, incoherent practices cannot be smoothed away; here, rather than resort to the STS
metaphor of “closure” where differences are “settled” and matter stabilized, Mol looks at how in
practice differences are diffused and distributed, controversies dissolved rather than solved.125
In labelling her approach “empirical philosophy”, Mol re-emphasizes the need for questions
about ontologies – how objects and orders come to be and do – are best approached through
detailed evidence of the provisional, relational practices that perform them. 126 This also raises
the question of where to begin – who or what enacts, who or what is enacted. The term
enactment intentionally leaves open who or what the actor is, and who or what is acted upon.127
Enactment is, of course, also a legal term. Loosely speaking, enactment refers both to the
making of a piece of legislation – an act – and to the law that is the outcome of that process.
More technically, at least with respect to federal law in Canada, an enactment means “an Act or
regulation or any portion of an Act or regulation”. Further, “to enact” includes “to issue, make or
118
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establish”. 128 In the theoretical tenor suggested in this thesis, toxic enactment simultaneously
captures how regulatory practices perform toxicity and how toxicity shapes and infuses laws.129
Toxic enactment does not reflect any pretensions of a new theoretical development. Rather, I
am trying to experiment, if rather unfaithfully, with Mol’s approach, by expanding and extending
enactment to regulatory practices. This thesis tests whether enactment is as generative a
concept for studying regulatory practices, as performances that shape the material world, as it
has been for investigating other techniques, scientific, medical, or technological, for doing
realities. It also aims to contribute to discussions on the nature of toxicity, by apprehending a
potent and changeable substance as the effect of multiple regulatory practices. While using a
concept developed within social studies of medicine in a legal history context may seem like a
stretch, as this thesis examines drug standardization and the activities of scientist-regulators, I
suggest this is a natural extension.
It should be noted that enactment, as does ANT, comes largely out of ethnomethodological
and ethnographical traditions. That ethnographers would embrace a praxiological approach to
studying ontological questions makes sense, as ethnography provides immediate access to
what (living) people say and do. Admittedly, historians may be limited to primarily documentary
records to find evidence about (often dead) people’s practices; they lack direct access to
physical performances of humans or nonhumans in past times. There is no reason in theory
though that historical methods cannot provide access, if more mediated, to past practices, and
efforts to do so have offered historians of medicine a productive way to keep material practices
in sight.130
Similarly, environmental historians have taken, if in modified theoretical vocabularies,
praxiological approaches to studying how toxicity is materialized within human and nonhuman
assemblages. In her wide-ranging study into the ontologies of low-dose chemical exposure,
historian Michelle Murphy argues that “exposures were brought into existence in multiple, often
conflicting circumstances – the result of not just specific environments but new arrangements of
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technologies and practices through which laypeople, scientists, and corporate experts
apprehended the health effects of buildings on bodies,”131 using the term “apprehended” to
grasp both the epistemic and physical capture of phenomena. Weaving together numerous
histories, from the organizing activities of women office workers embracing epidemiology to the
toxicological dose-response curves originating from industrial hygiene, she argues that sick
building syndrome formed as a phenomenon in the encounters between these multiple practices
and knowledges.132 As with estrogen, materialized in diverse historical practices of laboratory
science, clinical medicine, and pharmaceutical developments, and in Canada through particular
arrangements – in other idioms, networks, assemblages, entanglements – of heterogenous
regulatory practices, sick buildings also came into existence “with divergent and even
contradictory qualities”,133 and their “very existence contained uncertainty, multiplicity, and
nonspecificity”.134 In short, multiple historical practices lead to a multiple object: “[m]ultiplicity
was itself one of the ways that historical actors brought sick buildings into being. That is,
multiplicity was a quality with which objects, like buildings, could be imbued”.135
Focusing on the “contested ontological politics” that materialized indoor chemical exposure,
Murphy shows that while these multiple histories helped to mobilize some people into action,
they also precluded certain causal narratives about low-dose exposures.136 This produces what
she calls regimes of imperceptibility.137 As toxicological instruments and methods “required toxic
exposures to be both regular and specific”, this in turn served to render “ubiquitous and lowlevel exposures unprovable and imperceptible.”138 Considering, then, the ways in which experts
deploy toxicological technologies – whether in laboratories or in regulations – can render
perceptible the historicity of toxicity and of hormone disruption. Sliding back from history to
ethnography, anthropologists are now elaborating on Murphy’s concepts, aiming to move
beyond documenting the existence and dominance of historical regimes of imperceptibility and
131
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towards theorizing the techniques by which such regimes are accomplished and constituted.
Nicholas Shapiro has documented how divergent scientific and legal practices, in US federal
regulatory agencies and in court proceedings, have strategically shaped the “unknowing” of
formaldehyde exposures in FEMA-issued trailers following Hurricane Katrina.139 Drawing on
participant observation in a law firm, expert evidence, and internal FEMA emails, he analyzes
multiple “techniques of un-knowing” that actively functioned to induce ignorance of and disavow
adverse health effects,140 including “secrecy, assessment postponement, scientific
disqualification/knowledge subjugation, knowledge avoidance, and the ontological obfuscation
of environmental triggers”.141 By extending analyses of the enactment of chemical exposure,
moving beyond technoscientific practices to encompass regulatory and legal practices, the
processes by which toxic harms are concealed and ignored – whether intentional, willfully
ignorant, or through “unpremeditated discursive blinders” – can be better apprehended.142
These historicizations and theorizations of toxic techniques afford a rich conceptual language to
articulate how estrogenic potency was achieved in Canada. As will be seen, despite the
dominance of dose-response discourses in pharmacology in the 1940s, specific dose-response
relationships for estrogenic drugs were rendered imperceptible and unknowable in the 1944 Sex
Hormone Regulations. Dose-response logics did not disappear in estrogen regulation, however;
in 1950, National Health resurrected them for estrogenic cosmetics, materializing dose through
novel labelling techniques, and mobilizing response from consumers rather than manufacturers.
It should also be noted that, while Mol does not expressly situate her study on atherosclerosis
in ANT,143 her work on enactment is an extension – perhaps better, a transmutation – of that
material-semiotic tradition.144 Where ANT scholars inquired into (social) construction of reality
through networks, Mol considers the (multiple) enactments of realities through practices.145 The
metaphor of enactment is more contingent, situational, precarious, fluid, and arguably more
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feminist. As practices change, so do realities – the material world becomes less fixed.
Enactment moves us away from ANT’s masterful, masculinist, Machiavellian mobilizer and
maker of reality, with his efforts to translate facts and actors into ever-further domains, to
stabilize interactions within a constructed network, to enroll others to play supporting roles, to
inscribe materials with scripts that ensure control from a distance.146 Further, the temporality of
enactment differs from construction, which suggests a hard dividing line before and after reality
is built. Social construction tends to describe “social processes that result in durable realities”,
while performance describes practices “that produce ephemeral effects – effects essentially
coextensive with the practices that create them”.147 Yet there are also many similarities and
overlaps. Both approaches claim to be more methodological and empirical, mapping relations in
action, than they are theoretical.148 Both attempt to describe and, importantly, to expand the
repertoire of actions – translation, stabilization, delegation, in the case of early ANT, or
coordination, distribution, inclusion, in the case of Mol’s enactment – that bring about worlds.
Drugs and their diseases have been a favoured focus of ANT-inspired or material-semiotic
analyses.149 In ANT, pharmaceutical substances do not have inherent, stable properties that are
interpreted varyingly; rather, their properties are “the outcome of multiple events and scripts that
they embed and carry”.150 Andrew Barry gives an especially rich theorization of chemical
ontology.151 Building on Stengers and Bensaude-Vencent’s notion of informed materials – a
concept conveying that chemistry is not the discovery of “bare molecules” but rather involves
invention – Barry posits that, even before bodies consume them, pharmaceutical chemicals are
“constituted in their relations to informational and material environments”.152 Informational
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enrichment of these molecules happens in laboratory practices, as well as through legal and
economic relations, for example those mediated by intellectual property law.153
Rather than discovery narratives, then, close study of institutional, epistemic, and regulatory
practices will disclose how chemicals and drugs are enacted. In this vein, Mol has criticized calls
for a “turn to ontology” by the “so-called ‘new materialists’”, whom she views as essentializing
matter and dichotomizing materiality and discursivity, discarding hard-earned STS lessons and
“naively echoing natural science textbooks and journal articles”.154 In contrast, as she argues
that objects are not essentially stable or singular but afforded their essences only in relational
interactions (or intra-actions), Mol positions her own work as relational materialism.155
Nonetheless, Mol’s materialism is reasonably situated within an ascendant trend in the
humanities and social sciences, over the last 15 years,156 that centers the interaction of matter
and meaning. This material turn has found tremendously diverse expression.157 Without
minimizing the important differences in these literatures, for the limited purpose of considering
practices that enact law and materiality,158 some high-level commonalities can be identified.
First, the trend reacts to a perceived over-emphasis on discursivity in postmodern scholarship,
which underplays materiality.159 Further, these literatures often reject rigid analytic dichotomies
between “subject (human, social, representational) and object (thing, material, real)”.160 Rather
than inert substance awaiting cultural interpretation, nonhuman matter is active or agential; as
Barad puts it, matter kicks back.161 These theoretical commitments all challenge nature-culture
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divides – regardless of whether conceptual labour is supplied by feminist material-semiotics,162
Haraway’s natureculture,163 Barad’s onto-epistemology,164 or Mol’s relational materialism.
These versions of (new, relational and/or feminist) materialisms all wrestle, moreover, with
the political implications of their ontologies, particularly in the wake of critiques of ANT. In
viewing power largely as an effect of the relational associations or networks being investigated,
rather than as a ready cause or explanation of events, ANT’s originators have long been
criticized by feminist scholars as reproducing narratives of the powerful and masterful, and as
sidestepping any meaningful analysis of power (or of patriarchy, racism, capitalism, or
colonialism).165 Put differently, while material-semiotic approaches can map very effectively the
relational webs that enact, maintain, transform, or dissolve material realities, they may do “little
to navigate one through the theoretical thickets of legitimacy, obeisance, and power that are the
‘standard fare of sociolegal research’”.166 Unlike some theorists building on ANT traditions, Mol
has tried to directly confront ontological politics. Mol first articulated this term two decades
ago,167 and STS scholars continue to leverage the concept.168 Opening up consideration of how
the “real is implicated in the political and vice versa”,169 at its simplest, ontological politics
recognizes that, once one accepts that multiple versions of realities are enacted in different
practices and relations, then one should next ask “[w]hich version might be better to live with?
Which worse? How, and for whom?”170 Mol rejects that this is simply a matter of “choice”,
recalling how the scientific and medical practices that perform realities differently rarely emerge
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explicitly in any decisive moment or definitive place,171 how the political implications of each of
these realities are themselves extensive and complex,172 and how “choice” wrongly implies that
multiple realities do not co-exist or depend on one other.173 Tentatively, Mol begins to grapple
with the ontological politics of clinical versus surgical ways of enacting atherosclerosis;174 the
same questions are possible for regulatory ways of enacting estrogen. Additionally, ontological
politics is one further reminder to be self-reflexive and accountable in approaching the objects
that we study – recalling that our own scholarship performatively participates in their invention
and, as Murphy cautions those swept up in an ongoing always becoming, scholarly “exuberance
for unformed objects” is not necessarily “a critical or politically-charged commitment”.175

2.ii

Enactment and the sociology of standards

Informed in part by these performative approaches, a growing sociological literature seeks to
theorize standards and standardization. To understand Canadian drug standards in the 1940s, I
draw on Lawrence Busch’s work on standards, especially his readily applicable typologies.176
Busch describes how, given their ubiquity, standards are rarely noticed until they break down.
Both material and ideational, “standards are where language and world meet; better still, the
widespread use of standards and their virtual inescapability illustrates the interpenetration of
language and world”.177 Standards “always incorporate a metaphor or simile, either implicitly or
explicitly”; indeed, they make metaphors real. Maybe the most tangible example of this is
reference materials, prepared by state agencies, against which substances can be calibrated.178
In short, standards are “means by which we perform the world” and “recipes for reality, or
perhaps for realities”.179 Busch takes inspiration from Mol’s ontological theory, in which our
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techniques do not just allow us to know the world, but to enact it multiply. Standards accomplish
realities, providing “the scripts, the playbooks, the librettos, the recipes that guide practice”.180
Busch’s typologies of standards help to clarify estrogen regulation in Canada in the 1940s.
He posits that all standards fall into one of four types which he calls Olympics, filters, ranks, and
divisions.181 Relevant to this thesis are filters and divisions. Filters are designed to “eliminate the
unacceptable” by requiring things to “pass through the filter”’. Foods that pass through a food
safety standard, for example, can then be considered safe. Divisions are unranked categories,
often aimed at product differentiation; for example, apples are divided into categories like
McIntosh and Granny Smith. Such divisions allow “different” products to be sold without price
competition, and the constructed differences can then be “linked to an implied or demonstrably
superior quality”.182 Relatedly Busch outlines different purposes or logics of standardization,
distinguishing between industrial and merchant standards (among others). Commonly acting as
filters, industrial standards aim to ensure things are all “the same” and “make the grade”. Often
numerically premised, industrial standards promote precision and accuracy, fundamentally
aiming at replicability. Reference materials are an obvious example. In contrast, drawing on
work by sociologist and STS scholar Michel Callon, Busch describes merchant standards as
intended “to qualify things to enter the marketplace”, by letting otherwise incommensurable
things be made comparable. Targeted at product identity, such standards are often indicated by
labels designed to facilitate market transactions.183 While drug standards have been naturalized
as proxies for quality, safety, and replicability, and thus understood as industrial standards and
filters, efforts to standardize estrogen in Canada also involved market standards and divisions.
Also very useful is Busch’s distinction between standards, tests, and indicators, interrelated
concepts that can easily be conflated. He gives the simple example of citizenship: the standards
for citizenship would be set out in legislation, the test to meet this standard usually “requires
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being born in or swearing allegiance to a given nation”, and an indicator that this test has been
met is a passport.184 Notably, standards cannot be implemented unless tests exist for measuring
compliance with them. However, constructing tests or measurements for standards is often
complicated and iterative. To prevent a disconnect between a standard and its test, Busch
argues that tests must robustly measure the key dimensions of concern in the standard, be
rigorous enough to “prevent exaggerated claims or even outright fraud”, and involve neither too
much nor too little “precision and accuracy for the purposes at hand”.185 This distinction between
standards, tests, and indicators, and the role of tests in the performance of standards, allows for
better apprehension of the Sex Hormone Regulations and of the estrogen they enacted, as
explored in Chapter 4.186
Finally, readers are also reminded of the ethical and political implications of standards. Not
only can standards create path dependence and thus burden future generations, they have
distributive consequences, as their benefits and costs are differentially allocated.187 In the
context of estrogen, dose and potency standards not only have health implications, they
distribute risk and power differentially to women, physicians, manufacturers, and state actors;
less obviously, tests used to identify estrogen arguably produce sex and gender differently. In
considering how estrogen standards, tests, and indicators were “constructed, contested,
modified, enforced and abandoned” in regulatory practices, this thesis therefore opens up
political questions.188

2.iii

Enactment in interdisciplinary legal studies

While ostensibly a work of legal history,189 this thesis has as its main theoretical guide a
philosopher and anthropologist of medicine who works in STS and ANT-inflected veins. How
have legal studies incorporated STS insights? Have STS approaches to materiality, and
particularly Mol’s theory of enactment, been taken up in socio-legal studies? If so, how?
In recent years, socio-legal scholars have begun to embrace STS approaches to materiality.
Working within ANT, Emilie Cloatre has researched local practices and socio-legal assemblages
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related to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),
which inscribe pharmaceuticals with multiple scripts. Weaving together an ANT-inspired
methodology with other philosophical and methodological traditions, Emily Grabham has written
about law, materiality, and the enactment of time. Before relating to their work, l summarize
more generally certain types of interaction – or imbrication – between legal studies and STS.
Legal scholars deploy STS in different ways. While legal scholars are notoriously late to every
party – as Simon Cole and Alysa Berthenthal note, “STS found law before law found STS” – the
contention regarding when, exactly, law “found” STS reflects the diverse ways in which legal
studies engage STS.190
Perhaps the most dominant framework used is coproduction. Popularized in a 2004 volume
edited by Sheila Jasanoff that gathered together a wide variety of literatures,191 coproduction is:
“…shorthand for the proposition that the ways in which we know and represent the world
(both nature and society) are inseparable from the ways in which we choose to live in it.
Knowledge and its material embodiments are at once products of social work and
constitutive of forms of social life”.192
Jasanoff’s basic argument is that scientific knowledges and social orders, whether historically or
presently, are properly understood only if conceived as being produced together. Studying how
knowledge-making practices are integrated within state-making practices or other forms of
governance, and conversely how governance practices shape knowledge, provides greater
explanatory power of complex sociotechnical worlds. While often focusing on expertise and
epistemic authority, coproduction studies can have an ontological focus, in viewing knowledge
as “crystallizing in certain ontological states – organizational, material, embodied”.193 Jasanoff
characterizes coproduction not as a theory but as a framework, and speaks of research in a coproduction idiom.194 Nonetheless, beyond the rich description that results from considering
190
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connections between knowledge and power, it is claimed that coproduction carries explanatory
and normative force – in its abilities to analyze the formation of new sociotechnical objects, and
to find power in non-traditional places – and indeed even holds predictive power, insofar as it
allows us to better perceive contingent patterns in sociotechnical networks.195 While the latter
claim seems overblown and unnecessarily scientistic, coproduction has no doubt helped to
further dismantle instrumental notions of law as purely a “tool” that is epistemically and
normatively distinct from, and that simply reacts and responds to, the separate domain of
science and technology. Instead, it brings a less linear and more entangled relationship into
view, in which legal processes have constitutive power in stabilizing facts and shaping
technology. This recalls what Jasanoff labels the constitutive tradition in coproduction, which
she says goes back to Latour.196 As a second broad stream of coproductionist thought, she
identifies work in an interactional tradition, which she says “is less overtly concerned with
metaphysics and more with epistemology”, in which research examines boundary conflicts
between scientific and social knowledges.197 My research describes how regulators’ practices
materialized estrogen as a potent and malleable object, and analyzes how estrogen sparked
new regulatory logics and techniques centered on product labelling; coproduction is a natural fit
with these processes. Thus, while this research takes an elementally constitutive approach, in
focusing on conflicts between Committee members (and departmental lawyers) in deciding how
to understand estrogen and how to regulate it, it also engages certain interactional concerns.
Scholars have recently reclassified the ways in which STS is engaged specifically by sociolegal studies. In reviewing law and society scholarship that draws on STS, Cole and Bertenthal
identify two distinct avenues in the literature: interaction and analogy.198 As they use it – which
differs somewhat from Jasanoff’s formulation – interaction involves areas “in which there
actually is interaction between law and science”, including law in laboratories, intellectual
property, controversies that are simultaneously scientific and legal, and law’s response to
scientific expertise and uncertainty. In such contexts, legal scholars can use STS to ensure
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nuanced understanding of scientific knowledge.199 Analogy, in contrast, refers to legal research
that approaches law analogously to how STS approaches science, as a social phenomenon or
epistemic institution. While this arguably describes most socio-legal research, legal scholars
have analogically borrowed STS concepts, including from ANT, and methods to examine
reflexivity and materiality.200 Law and STS can swap “tools, methods and concepts, in order to
study their respective objects of inquiry”,201 though often the trade is unidirectional as legal
scholars adopt STS methods (if not its theoretical traditions).202 The leading or at least earliest
proponent of this adaptation might be Mariana Valverde, who has long urged borrowing STS
methods and promoted ANT to socio-legal scholars.203 If, as Valverde urges, rather than study
static categories of scientific or non-expert, legal or lay knowledge, one tries to trace “the
dynamics of knowledge processes” in socio-legal-technical networks, then “one sees new
things”.204
Materiality is a pervasive theme in socio-legal research proceeding analogically from STS,205
inspired by growing theoretical attention to matter and materialization in feminist science
studies,206 posthumanist philosophy,207 and political theory.208 Studying materiality in and of law
requires considering how things shape legal processes, how law is entangled in material forms,
and “how materials become sites that produce, stabilize, and perpetuate particular kinds of
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power”.209 Analytic tools from STS include apprehending things as socio-legal objects, in which
legal, technological and social relations are inscribed. Such objects are performative – they do
things in the world, with potentially powerful effects that enact socio-techno-legal realities.210
An oft-cited example is Javier Lezaun’s compelling ethnography of the European agency
that creates “reference materials” for the many substances enumerated in EU law.211 He asks
how law comes to matter: “[b]y what strange alchemy is a legal obligation transformed into a
material constraint?”212 Also called reference standards – such as in the Sex Hormone
Regulations – reference materials instantiate legal categories; they are things which “the law
would be unable to find in the world if it were not for the availability of an official, stable version
of the material in question”.213 Resulting from ontological practices of certification,
documentation, and technical handling, reference materials render law and matter indivisible. In
approaching standards as material rather than as texts or rules, Lezaun shows how, within a set
of broader practices and relations, legal scripts get embedded in matter. Thinking with this
“strong case” of legal ontology,214 I likewise approach law’s materialization through estrogen.215
Though inspired by ANT and investigating the textual, handling, machinic, and physical
practices that materialize law, Lezaun does not explicitly draw on Mol. Yet other socio-legal
scholars have recently have done so, demonstrating the utility to legal studies of evaluating how
realities are enacted in practice. In Brewing Legal Times, Emily Grabham brings together
philosophical work on time, literatures on law and time, social and legal history, and ANTinspired literature that engages questions of materiality.216 She does so to explore relationships
among time, matter, and law. Following Mol, she aims to move beyond the idea that time has
many representations, to think about how practices enact “multiple legal ontologies of time” or
the “more-than-oneness of time”.217 In the context of a case study on HIV activism, for example,
she shows how new temporalities result from law’s entanglements with clinical knowledge, tests
and drugs. Other case studies review practices that do things with law to “trace the provisional,
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and thing-related, enactment of legal temporalities as they constitute new legal worlds”.218 Thus,
by applying Mol’s praxiographic approach to temporalization, Grabham argues that objects and
humans together enact and sustain multiple legal temporalities, and materialize law.219
In Pills for the Poorest, Emilie Cloatre also draws on Mol’s scholarship on the ontological
multiplicities performed by knowledge-making and technical practices.220 Cloatre’s theoretical
vocabulary and her ethnographic methods are both heavily guided by a traditional ANT
approach, and her study into localized public health practices surrounding TRIPS and
pharmaceutical patents in Dijoubiti and Ghana are framed around ANT-inspired research
questions, including how legal texts are “black boxed” and stabilized through ongoing
translations, how controversies settle into beliefs, how nonhuman actors contribute to these
shifting relations, processes and events. The main object of her study is the performance of
TRIPS as a socio-legal assemblage. Building on a nascent literature that employs ANT to
explore the constitution of law, Cloatre asks what practices create effects that come to be
known as “legal”, how legal objects like patents materialize, and how legal texts become
entangled in broader sociotechnical assemblages.221 In particular, guided by Andrew Barry,
pharmaceutical drugs are characterized as being inscribed with and carrying multiple events
and legal scripts, which may or may not travel cleanly. “[I]n their most material form, in their
packaging, in their labelling”, including the differences between brand and generic forms,
Cloatre argues that drugs are “influential and symbolic actors”.222 Effectively, drugs are “legal
things” shaped by socio-legal relations and materializing regulatory practices.223
Guided by Mol’s praxiological ontology, and its resonances in the sociology of standards
and in work by socio-legal scholars, in the next chapter I describe my own practices, detailing
my historical research methods and how they materialized this account of toxic enactment.
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Chapter Two
Legal history, in theory: historical approach and research methods
“These conjoined insights—that nonhuman stuff can have some sort of determinative influence on (or
agency in relation to) humans, and that “the material” is a cultural construct—have particular implications
for how we understand law in both past and present societies. … In different times and places, then, legal
processes formed one of the means by which “objects” were created and policed. The particular material
forms that law inhabited (hedge, slave, deodand) were culturally variable. Law projected a certain kind of
materiality, and these projections manifested in material things.” – Tom Johnson (2015)

This study adopts historical methods to critically examine how estrogenic drugs emerged
together with new regulatory practices in Canada in the 1940s. While this project’s methods are
historical, however, it does not simply narrate one past. Without attempting to expound any
general theory of the relationship between law and toxicity, let alone law and matter, this study
still gestures towards a broader concept of toxic enactment. Conceptually, toxic enactment
rejects purely positivist conceptions of legal rules that respond (or fail to respond) to an already
fixed and stable matter, of governance techniques that try to control toxic substances or
technological innovations already fully formed in the real world. It also departs from strongly
constructivist accounts, in which social or legal norms, rules, and powers dictate the existence
or form of substances and technologies. Instead, inspired by praxiological and performative
ontology, toxic enactment theorizes an active and ongoing process in which toxics regulations
and legalized toxins become together. Yet, despite gesturing towards this general abstraction,
the history told here is of course not universalizable. Rather, using legal history methods, this
study gives a detailed empirical account of the intersections between estrogen and regulation in
mid-century Canada – of how regulatory practices enacted estrogen as drugs, as potent, as
unstable, as multiple; and how estrogen triggered new regulatory techniques, namely new types
of delegation and labelling, with implications for social relations and women’s health. Potent
though they were, these estrogenic enactments were the contingent and even peculiar results of
specific actors’ performances on particular institutional stages, done in their own time and place.

1.

An historical approach – but, to what?
While this study adopts an “historical approach”, identifying “to what exactly” this approach

applies demands further articulation. Does this project take an historical approach only in
service of a more abstract account of enactment, leveraging archival evidence to illustrate how
regulatory practices can materialize different versions of reality? It is true that this narrative of

43

the activities of regulators and estrogen is conceptually driven, however it does not attempt to
elucidate a general meaning of or parameters for the concept of “enactment”. Is this study better
understood, then, as legal history? After all, it seeks to describe temporally bound and shifting
approaches to drug regulation, their evolution with new scientific practices for sex hormones,
forgotten and abandoned regulatory directions, and unintended and unpredicted regulatory
effects. Further, in recounting how estrogen was enacted, it examines alternative practices
embedded in different lawyers’ assessments of the validity of subordinate legislation and subdelegation under the Food and Drugs Act, in the context of administrative law ideas at the time.
While these questions lack simple resolution, they are clarified in scholarship grappling with
how legal theory and legal history do, or should, relate to one another. In Law in Theory and
History: New Essays on a Neglected Dialogue, Maks Del Mar and Michael Lobban assemble
explorations of the interdisciplinary space of legal theory and legal history, a space they deem to
be “very young”. 1 In Del Mar’s contribution, after contrasting different cognitive and affective
modes embraced by historians and philosophers, and arguing that historical work must be
understood as always theorizing law, he advocates a strategy of entangling history in theory and
vice versa, by abandoning claims to universality in theory and to particularity in history. The goal
of this cross-disciplinary entanglement should be scholarship that “models the variability of law
across time and space”.2 Similarly, a 2015 special edition of the Virginia Law Review explores
commonalities in philosophical and historical inquiries into law. The introductory essay reminds
us that a primary use of history in legal scholarship is to cast doubt on current concepts and
values; in the same vein, Nicola Lacey’s contribution argues that the power of historical
scholarship lies in its ability to reveal the contingency of and denaturalize current legal practices,
especially when viewing law as a structured social practice embedded in specific institutions.3
Accepting that historicizing law need not and perhaps cannot be disentangled from theorizing
law, and that legal history can powerfully destabilize concepts viewed as “natural”, perhaps the
better question is whether this study is properly characterized as legal history? Is the object of
study law – or is it estrogen? As my research details how regulators’ practices fabricated a
potent, changeable estrogen, and how estrogen catalyzed new governance techniques for such
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substances, a more apt realization of my object might be “law in estrogen” or “estrogen in law”,
or better yet, both of these descriptors. Unlike “law and estrogen”, these phrases refuse to
render law and estrogen as wholly distinct phenomena. They challenge legal historians’
traditional approach of exploring law by putting it in (political, economic, social) context, and its
classic division “between law and what is extrinsic to it”.4 Instead, methodologically, they let me
compound my object as essentially conjugated – as “more than one and less than many”.5
Part of the challenge in pinpointing the precise object being approached historically is that
few legal historians frame their inquiries around “law and matter” or within new materialisms.6 In
his work, Christopher Tomlins proposes “materiality” as an alternative methodology. However
rather than “historicism”, which, after Walter Benjamin, he describes as an approach which
futilely attempts to see the past by differentiating law from its context, Tomlins argues for a
historical materialism that “stresses the formal intersection between law and legal thought and
technologies, artefacts and material practices; it considers how law might be expressed as
technology and artefact, how law as a differentiated category of action is fabricated”.7 While
legal historians engaging with materiality would surely also endorse moving away from law
primarily as discourse, autonomous from the “real” world yet bestowing meaning upon it, they
need not jettison the idea that something called “law” can be apprehended in history. As put by
Tom Johnson, one of the few legal historians to have taken up materiality,8 the material turn
allows us “to conceive ‘law’ as a quality that can inhabit physical stuff, as well as legal treatises
and social practices”.9 As Johnson concedes, in identifying law and the material world as
analytical realms, we perform “precisely the kind of ontological partition…that we are purporting
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to refute”.10 Still, this philosophical difficulty can help to ensure that legal historians’ turns to
matter are empirically and conceptually well-grounded.11 Thus, following Johnson
methodologically, this thesis conjoins legal history methods with the insights of ANT and
performative approaches to materiality, so as to apprehend law’s imbrication with matter.

2.

Research methods – or, how practices enact realities
Having situated this study in historiographies of sex hormones and drug standardization, and

having set out the conceptual and methodological issues at stake in this study, this section now
details the research methods that were adopted to answer these questions. Or rather: that
sentence is what I might write if it were entirely accurate to characterize my methods as flowing
in a smooth and linear progression from the methodology, the methodology as flowing inevitably
from the concept of toxic enactments, and that concept springing to life from the literature. I
might write that first sentence if I wished to create the impression that research practices,
habits, and methods were separate from, and subordinate and subsequent to, ideas, concepts,
and theories – if thinking were distinct from doing, if concepts dictated practices.
To avoid severing the relations between discursivity and materiality, that sentence can be set
aside. Rather than imply that my evidence-gathering practices were an afterthought to reading
theory and history (which implication may be unfortunately solidified by following, as I do here,
the standard practice of presenting methods after the literature review, almost as a postscript),
these practices were vital in conjuring my object of study. That object – law in estrogen,
estrogen in law – was not fully formed, waiting to be discovered in the archives. To the contrary,
estrogen and law have been performed together in an ongoing intra-action, to use Karen
Barad’s term,12 through a specific combination and sequence of legal and archival research.
Besides, a more candid account would be that I began this project with different research
questions in mind. Originally, I was interested in assembling an intellectual history of “estrogenic
substances” in Canadian food and drugs law, in light of present debates about that concept’s
meaning. However, as documented below, when I started searching for, wading through, and
comparing the contents of archival files from the 1940s – initially conceiving of this material as
“context” for regulations – the records took me by surprise. A cast of human actors and active
substances were engaged in a plethora of competing and ostensibly incommensurate
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discourses, professional traditions, representational strategies, and practices. This was not a
story of regulatory texts constructing estrogenic substances as a static legal concept through
which matter was corralled and disciplined. These actors were actively performing multiple kinds
of estrogen – through experimental regulatory techniques, chaotic scientific knowledges, stalling
industry practices, intransigent laboratory animals, and highly potent molecules. In the archives,
estrogen was never one thing. The archival material revealed that the regulations I had traced
were not the only or even core object of interest, and certainly not a representation of a fixed
and stable substance, but were the effects of scientists, physicians, pharmacists, bureaucrats,
and solicitors’ practices in trying to know, measure, and standardize estrogenic substances.
In this way, my research practices transformed my questions and the theoretical literature
guiding them, animating more elemental questions about the entanglement of law and
materiality. Likewise, my methods triggered the realization that the feminist historical and STS
literature addressing sex hormones, while foundational, was insufficient to understand how
estrogens materialized as drugs – as, with noted exceptions, this literature largely studies
laboratories, clinicians, patients, and industry, yet typically disregards regulators. This process
led me to histories of drug enumeration, standardization, and regulation in the mid-20th century.
Out of order though it seems, then, the archival evidence raised, in large part, the questions
that this study turns to answer. Still, stating that I “started with the evidence” is not quite right.
Only by reading Nelly Oudshoorn and Celia Roberts on sex hormones, Annemarie Mol and
Michelle Murphy on multiple ontologies, Sheila Jasanoff on co-production and Emily Grabham
on law and materiality, could I bring to those materials an awareness of estrogen’s history and
with questions beginning to brew. So perhaps there is some truth in that first sentence, too.

2.i.

Legislative and regulatory sources

I began my research by working to assemble the complete regulatory history of “estrogenic
substance” in regulations under the Food and Drugs Act prior to 1977. To do this, I searched the
Canada Gazette, primarily using the electronic database. Where there were gaps in digitization,
I consulted the hardcopy volumes in various libraries in Toronto. Additionally, knowing that
Health Canada’s interprets “estrogenic substance” as referring to sex hormones,13 I researched
the full legislative and regulatory history of “sex hormones” under the Food and Drugs Act.
In doing this research, I was able to start from some existing, albeit incomplete, attempts by
students and law librarians to help me piece together a regulatory history of “estrogenic
13

Health Canada 2011.
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substances” and “sex hormones”.14 Those efforts mistakenly identified one or the other of two
orders-in-council amending Schedule B, both made in 1949, along with a 1949 amendment to
Division II of Part C of the Food and Drug Regulations, (“the Sex Hormone Regulations”), as the
first time that “sex hormones” had been addressed in the scheme.15 Eventually, I located the
original version of the Sex Hormone Regulations, dated May 18, 1944, and a corresponding
earlier order-in-council adding sex hormones to Schedule B, dated May 4, 1944.16 Having found
the earliest enactments, I then mapped out a full history of all revisions and repeals, tracing the
evolution of the Sex Hormone Regulations and Schedule B to the Act, until 1980. As
amendments to these enactments were made by orders-in-council, my method was searching
electronic versions of the Canada Gazette and, where necessary, returning to bound volumes.
To ensure statutory context for Schedule B and the Sex Hormone Regulations, I researched
legislative history as well. Here my aim was to identify the genesis and evolution of statutory
sections authorizing these two enactments and their provisions, with especial focus on sections
authorizing the 1944 enactments (and authorizing their predecessors, like the biological
products regulations). The Food and Drugs Act was amended many times between 1920, when
it was first enacted, and 1953, when it was overhauled.17 For this research, I used the Table of
Public Statutes, and annotations in and appendices to the Revised Statutes of Canada (1953).
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2.ii.

Archival research

Concurrently, I searched the Library and Archives Canada (“LAC”) database for materials
regarding the 1944 Sex Hormone Regulations, Schedule B, and associated enactments. Two
files on the Sex Hormone Regulations were open: a lawyer’s file maintained by Elmer Driedger,
who provided advice on the draft regulations;18 and a file maintained by the Department of
Pensions and National Health (“National Health”).19 I obtained similar files, of either solicitors or
National Health officials, on the development of the 1944 amendments to Schedule B,20 and the
1944 Parenteral Regulations.21
As explained, using my legislative and regulatory research to inform my archival research,
and vice versa, redirected the project’s focus. Preambular recitals in the above-mentioned
regulations referenced the Canadian Committee on Pharmacopoeial Standards. As I soon
learned, the Committee was established in 1942 to advise – in practice, sometimes to decide,
sometimes to simply sign off – on many of Canada’s first drug standards. Based on the
preambles, I obtained LAC archival materials documenting the Committee’s activities. As these
Committee files were numerous and voluminous, I initially limited my review to late 1942 to May
1944,22 expecting to find “context” for the Sex Hormone Regulations. Context soon became
centre, and the scope expanded,23 after I learned in the archives that the Committee and
Department had enumerated four estrogens – oestrone, oestradiol benzoate, stilboestrol, and
stilboestrol diproprionate – in Schedule B,24 and had standardized these drugs in the Canadian
18
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Supplement.25 These two enactments had not appeared in my Gazette research. The archival
files raised new ontological questions, causing me to apprehend estrogen as legally multiple.
Further LAC holdings reviewed included two files containing newspaper and magazine
advertisements for food and drugs, along with related compliance discussions and activities,
maintained by National Health staff in 1938-1940 and 1949-1953.26 I also reviewed prosecution
and inspectors’ records from 1950-1953, to determine if estrogenic drugs or cosmetics were
ever the target of enforcement activities (and specifically if, in the process, the nature,
composition or identity of these products had ever been contested).27

2.iii.

Other primary historical sources

Building upon my regulatory and archival research, I reviewed all articles addressing
Canadian food and drug law published in the 1940s and 50s in the Food Drug Cosmetic Law
Quarterly and, later, the Food, Drug, Cosmetic Law Journal.28 Many are authored by National
Health officials, including Robert Curran, Dr. Leonard Pugsley, and Dr. Clare Morrell; some are
by American officials and counsel. A pamphlet and book published in 1949, authored by Linton
Davidson, a departmental official and the Secretary to the Committee, coupled discourses of
nation-building and Christian fervor with key developments in the growth of the Food and Drugs
Division (later the Directorate) and details on the Committee.29 In more restrained bureaucratic
prose, historical reviews by Pugsley and Dr. Gordon Cameron provided factual detail on the
Department’s evolution,30 and a book summarizing food and drugs law in Canada by Curran
gave insight into legal preoccupations.31
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With little history on estrogenic drugs or drug standardization in Canada, and needing
further insight into the background views likely held by the Canadian physicians, pharmacists,
drug manufacturers, and scientists on the Committee, I did some targeted research in medical
journals, relying most heavily on the Vancouver Medical Association Bulletin.32 This research
aimed to determine what estrogenic products were on the market in the late 1930s and 1940s in
Canada, what “diseases” were being associated with estrogenic therapies and medical views on
the therapies’ efficacy, and how estrogenic drugs were being advertised. Similarly, I did targeted
searches in endocrinology, pharmacology, and pharmaceutical journals, for studies examining
reference standards and assay methods for biological substances, including estrogens,
including for scientific studies published in the 1930s and 1940s by Pugsley and Morrell.
Finally, to situate departmental solicitors’ requests for advice and Driedger’s legal opinions
on the validity and form of enactments including the Sex Hormone Regulations, Part V of
Schedule B, the Canadian Supplement, and the order creating the Committee, I identified
leading administrative law scholarship and judicial decisions, in this period, addressing statutory
interpretation and (sub)delegation.33 I also reviewed some of Driedger’s own scholarly work.34

2.iv.

Secondary historical sources

In addition to the historical literature already introduced, I researched secondary sources for
further historical context and information regarding: scientific knowledge, at different times in the
last 90 years, on the composition, production, clinical uses, marketing, potencies, and effects of
substances including DES, Premarin, estradiol, and estrone; trends and controversies regarding
hormone replacement therapy; the politics of menopause and its medicalization; the evolution
and function of pharmacopoeias; and comparative developments in drug regulation in the US.
Having set out my methodological framework and my research methods, I now turn to Part II
of this thesis. In the next three chapters, I describe how law materialized estrogen and how
estrogen sparked new legal techniques in Canada in the 1940s and early 1950s.
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Chapter Three
Delegating standards, assembling regulators: new ways of regulating drugs in Canada at
the start of the 1940s
Delegation, as that word is generally used, does not imply a parting with powers by the person who grants
the delegation, but points rather to the conferring of an authority to do things which otherwise that
person would have to do himself … If it is correct to use the word in the way in which it is used in the
maxim as generally understood, the word “delegate” means little more than an agent. – Huth v. Clarke
(1890) 25 QBD 391 at 395, per Wills J.
Incompatibilities between objects enacted are no obstacle to medicine’s capabilities to intervene – as
long as the incompatible variants of an object are separated out…Distributions separate out what might
otherwise clash. – Mol 2002.

This chapter begins my historical account of how estrogen co-emerged with new regulatory
practices and techniques in Canada, between 1939 and 1953. It starts to demonstrate
methodologically and empirically what was set out more theoretically and conceptually in Part I.
Before describing the multiple ways in which Canadian regulators performed estrogen, however,
it is necessary to give some shape and definition to the regulatory assemblage in which
estrogen was enacted. As a prelude to showing how estrogen is a historically contingent
artefact of multiple regulatory practices, it is necessary to constellate my regulatory network.
Thus, this chapter draws together some critical legal formations that had assembled by 1940.
To insist on a rigid distinction between “regulations” and “regulators” can be artificial and
unproductive – both are actors, after all – and like regulators, regulations “both shape and are
shaped by the networks of which they are part”.1 Despite this, the chapter begins by setting forth
statutory and regulatory provisions and amendments under the Food and Drugs Act, from the
late 1920s to late 1930s, that, as will be shown in later chapters, would ground understanding
and action in the standardization, regulation, and multiplication of estrogen. Trying to avoid
toggling back and forth between something conceived as statutory “context” or “structure”, on
the one hand, and human “agents” or “actors”, on the other, some of the humans entangled with
these regulatory events, such as National Health officials A. Linton Davidson and Harry Mills
Lancaster, are also introduced in this first section. More specifically, the first section outlines the
distinct modes or ways of standardizing drugs under the Act, particularly pharmacopoeial
standards and delegated legislation, and how these modes relied on a growing turn to increased

1
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delegation. In the case of the Biologicals Regulation, these delegations were often unlawful, as
National Health officials in the Food and Drug Division and the Laboratory of Health developed
a deeply entrenched habit of delegating themselves power without statutory authority. This
section also examines how National Health excluded estrogen from the ambit of the Biologicals
Regulation, despite the original intention behind their empowering statutory provision, finding
that the ambiguous legal status of sex hormones in the 1930s did not simply reflect estrogenic
substances’ apparent lack of therapeutic action, but performed estrogen as a marginal therapy.
As estrogen was also an ingredient in cosmetics, the section ends by briefly noting the
legislative amendments covering cosmetics in 1939, which were passed but not brought into
force at that time.
The second and shorter section of this chapter describes the formation of a new regulatory
community for drug standards in Canada, one that expanded beyond and overlapped with some
departmental regulators. It details the inconsistent, contested advocacy efforts by senior
Departmental officials and academic scientists that lead to the establishment of the Canadian
Committee on Pharmacopoeial Standards (“the Committee”). Canvassing the political and legal
concerns with delegating drug standards to non-governmental scientists, the section shows how
National Health officials’ habit of legally doubtful delegation would be central to cementing the
Committee. After two years of debate and confusion, the Committee was created in the summer
of 1942 and its members appointed that fall. Reviewing this assemblage in the making, and the
activities through which interests and knowledges were aligned, will give a richer understanding,
in later chapters, of the regulatory practices that enacted estrogen-in-law and law-in-estrogen.2
In demarcating this socio-technical-legal assemblage, through this chapter, certain choices
have been made, and some of these choices are exclusionary. Most obviously, excluded from
the assemblage defined here are women – whether as patients, consumers, participants in
clinical trials, National Health officials, physicians, pharmacists, or citizens. When one begins
with regulatory practices in the 1930s, it is easy to lose sight of those not invited to the table.3
From the boardroom tables around which the Committee members would soon gather, in their
letters preceding and following those gatherings, in their deliberations about estrogen, women
were almost entirely absent (except for all the unnamed stenographers whose transcriptions
formed the basis for the Committee’s meeting minutes and thus for some of this research).4 As
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will be seen, only one Committee member expressed any concern about the safety of
estrogenic drugs, and his concern was ignored. While the archival evidence relied on admittedly
tends to render women invisible,5 it remains the case that, in most every way, women were
excluded from efforts to regulate and standardize estrogen in Canada in the 1940s.
Another implication of choosing to focus on the Committee’s and related Departmental actors’
regulatory practices in standardizing estrogen in the 1940s is that earlier events become
characterized as “context”. Of course, “context’ can all too quickly be regarded as sufficient
explanations of what is happening.”6 As Woolgar and Lezaun emphasize, in ontological
analyses, “the invocation, construction, and constitution of ‘the context’ are intimately implicated
in the situated determination of what the object is.”7 Thus, in beginning this history with an
account of regulations and regulators, apprehending estrogen as an object embedded in and
enacted by regulation is arguably rendered more straightforward. While it is impossible to
abstain from context, whether characterized as legal, political, bureaucratic, or economic, this
chapter endeavours to “set the scene” in a way that does not reduce the reason for subsequent
events to statutory frameworks, regulatory dynamics, or the identity or interests of Committee
members enlisted in the “estrogen regulation network” that I have chosen to assemble here.
Finally, throughout this chapter, certain regulatory practices are highlighted that were pivotal
to the emergence of new approaches to drug standardization in Canada. Generally, these
practices can all be understood as examples of delegation. Delegation, here, is experimented
with in two distinct though overlapping registers. In a sense straightforward to legal readers,
delegation refers to the practice of one body conferring its powers to a subordinate body,
whether this takes the form of a legislature conferring to the executive its powers to legislate, or
a minister conferring to her officials (or committees) her powers to make statutory decisions,

Dr. Cook of Ayerst, McKenna, & Harrison Ltd. She had “attended McGill, the only woman in her class, graduating in 1937 with a
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died in Toronto in 2015 on her 102nd birthday. See Davidson’s Committee Materials, 1943-1944; and Deaths: Rebecca Lee
Taylor (nee Scott)”, The Globe and Mail (7 March 2016), online:
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subject to doctrinal constraints in administrative law, such as limitations on sub-delegation.8 In
another register, delegation alludes to technological practices that assign or distribute a task,
action, or activity from one actor, human or nonhuman, to another.9 While this could include
legislators delegating the power to regulate to Cabinet members, as in the sense of delegated
legislation, it is a much broader concept that also captures, for example, how socio-technical
objects can serve as delegates.10 This second sense of delegation is developed in subsequent
chapters, as National Health materialized a potent estrogen by delegating responsibility for its
safety to other humans and nonhumans, and as that object in turn sparked new regulatory
practices. Yet it is introduced here as a reminder that National Health’s practices of delegation
were not merely legal but also socio-technical in nature, and to keep in sight that these
regulatory practices had material effects.

1.

Delegation and standard-setting under the Food and Drugs Act prior to 1940
The regulatory practices that brought estrogen to life in Canada were enacted with the Food

and Drugs Act.11 In this section, I set out the statutory backdrop to my regulatory history of
estrogen. In the 1930s, National Health officials practiced multiple regulatory modes of
standardizing drugs. All these modes of drug standardization relied on significant delegation, not
all were lawfully authorized, and, though they could have been, none were applied to estrogen.
Passed in 1920, the Food and Drugs Act is one of Canada’s oldest statutes. Its origins stretch
back to the Adulteration Act,12 which had targeted dishonest and fraudulent trade practices,
particularly through offences against adulteration and misbranding. By the early twentieth
century, with this focus challenged by the “age of advertising”, the law’s failure to protect public
health with food and drug standards was viewed as increasingly outdated.13 At that time, the
8
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federal government’s jurisdiction to legislate in relation to food and drugs was not obvious, as
the provinces had been assigned significant authority to legislate in relation to health and to the
medical professions.14 Thus, it was federal legislative authority over criminal law that provided
the necessary foundation for the Food and Drugs Act.15 In 1933 the British Columbia Court of
Appeal confirmed as much, holding in Standard Sausage Company v. Lee that the Act was
validly authorized by the federal criminal law power; the concurring opinion held that it was also
sustained by the federal legislative power over peace, order, and good government.16
By 1939, the Act’s purpose was seen as twofold: to protect public health and the consumer’s
pocketbook. As put by Departmental legal adviser Robert Curran,17 the Act, “as a consumer’s
statute, is concerned with the protection of the public, both as to safety and honesty”.18 By the
start of the 1940s, this twofold purpose was increasingly pursued through setting and enforcing
standards for food and for drugs, although these purposes were also promoted through labelling
requirements prescribed in regulations under the Act.19 As will be explained, drug standards
were set through various means, including pharmacopoeial standards and delegated legislation.
Canada’s turn to standards was generally consistent with American regulatory trends, as the
1920s and 1930s saw increased effort by the US FDA to lead, or influence, the development of
drug standards.20 Calls for uniformity came from many directions. US drug manufacturers
wanted standards to make it easier to compete for wholesale buyers, while consumers wanted
assurances of consistency and quality.21 The Pure Food and Drugs Act, passed by Congress in
1906, had provided American administrators with only an anemic ability, however, to make
delegated legislation; instead, it “in essence required all drugs and drug products listed in the
USP and the NF to conform to the specifications and standards” set out in these two
pharmacopoeial works.22 In 1933, a bill was introduced to reform that act, though it took five
14
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LJ 457.
21

Gwen Kay, Dying to be Beautiful: The Fight for Safe Cosmetics (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 2005) [“Kay 2005”]
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years – and the Elixir Sulfanilamide crisis in 1937 – before the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(“US FDCA”) was passed in 1938.23 The US FDCA generally maintained the existing focus on
misbranding and adulteration, and more strongly affirmed the role of pharmacopoeias in
supplying standards for drugs.24 The most notable distinction, then, between Canadian and US
legislation was that, under the US FDCA, US drug companies were required to provide
information showing the safety of a new drug before it could be sold in interstate commerce.25
The new drug approval process was first put to the test in a contested application to market
DES.26 By contrast, in Canada new drugs did not need approval, and DES and Premarin were
marketed here before the US FDA approved them. This absence of pre-market approval for
drugs in Canada markedly sharpens the significance of standards. To use a Premarin-inspired
metaphor: with no legal ability to close the barn door before the horse bolted, Canadian
regulators could nonetheless determine what a “horse” should be – and as will be seen, under
the Food and Drugs Act, there was more than one way to standardize a horse.
In Canada, drug standards were not set out in the Act. Rather, they were delegated. Indeed,
the Food and Drugs Act was, and remains today, a scheme heavily premised upon delegation.
Delegated authority to make regulations – by 1927, confirmed to have the same force and effect
as the Act’s provisions27 – was a relatively new,28 and sometimes controversial,29 feature of the
country’s legislative landscape. From the outset, the Act granted the Governor in Council (in
effect, Cabinet) broad powers to make regulations.30 Such regulations were often issued in the
form of orders in council and, depending on the source of authority, were published in the
Canada Gazette.31 In the 1930s and early 1940s, National Health officials routinely conceived,
drafted, and submitted regulations and orders to Cabinet, with a review by their departmental
23
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solicitor, and sometimes also by Department of Justice counsel, for legal validity and form. In
this period, National Health created a burgeoning suite of regulations aimed at standardizing the
quality, purity, and, importantly for this history, the potency of drugs. Further, in this period, the
development and adjustment of drug regulations started to become a constant, ongoing, and
iterative process. The approach to delegated legislation under the Food and Drugs Act
revolutionized Canada’s approach to public health and to public administration more generally,
becoming “very much the pattern and trend of legislation in Canada”.32
By 1939, the Act and its administrators had come to embrace multiple modes – both lawful
and unlawful – of delegating drug standards. Three key modes of delegation are summarized
here: pharmacopoeial standards, regulated drug standards, and regulated standards specific to
biologics. Pharmacopoeial standards were an ancient, traditional mode of governing the safety
and composition of drugs. Texts prepared by physicians (sometimes jointly with pharmacists) to
guide drug-making,33 pharmacopoeia can colloquially be thought of as “recipe books” for drugs
and therapeutic substances, originally for the benefit of druggists, with each drug identified and
described in a monograph through various technical specifications – that is, through standards.
While the Act did not endorse or adopt any pharmacopoeia, the default drug standards were
those set forth in the British Pharmacopoeia. One of the oldest, most respected pharmacopoeia,
the British Pharmacopoeia was the only pharmacopoeial work that was, or had ever been,
expressly referenced in the Act.34 To be clear, the Act did not require manufacturers or
pharmacists to comply with the British Pharmacopoeia; rather, the Act made it a default
pharmacopoieal authority for determining if drugs were adulterated. Section 6 deemed drugs to
be adulterated if they were sold under a name recognized in a pharmacopoeia or another
authoritative work on drugs, yet they differed “from the standard of strength, quality or purity laid
down therein”. While manufacturers or pharmacists could pick any pharmacopoeia to which
their drugs could conform,35 if they wished a drug’s quality to be judged under an authority other
than the British Pharmacopoeia, they were required to name that authority when selling the
drug. If they did not do so, then unless their drug conformed by default to the British
32
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Pharmacopoeia standard, it was deemed to be adulterated.36 Canada was not unique in relying
on pharmacopoeias in this way. Subject to institutional and statutory nuances, Britain and the
US also relied on pharmacopoeias to supply presumptively official standards, likewise applying
and enforcing those standards through adulteration or misbranding claims.37
The second way that the Food and Drugs Act contemplated the imposition of drug standards
may seem more “standard”, at least from a current vantage point. Paragraph 3(a) of the Act
delegated to Cabinet the power to make regulations prescribing “standards of quality” for food
and drugs.38 This authority was rarely invoked though, as by the 1930s, it had effectively been
overtaken and replaced by a new, third way to standardize drugs under the Act. This third mode
is especially significant to this story. In 1927, the Act was amended to create new regulatory
authorities for biological drugs. These amendments authorized standards that took precedence
over any other standards contemplated by the Act,39 and “for practical purposes, replace[d] the
necessity for the authority in section 3(a).”40 To achieve this, beyond widening the definition of
drug,41 the 1927 amendments authorized the standardization and control of biologics.42
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Following legislative developments in Britain,43 and in the US,44 these 1927 amendments
were specifically intended to facilitate the standardization and control of antitoxins, vaccines,
viruses, sera, insulin, and other substances positioned as biologics. Given the centrality of
potency to defining and standardizing biological drugs, and to ensuring their safety, potency was
addressed for the first time in the Act, which now empowered regulations prescribing potency
standards for drugs.45 Furthermore, the 1927 amendments envisioned that bioassays – official
methods for biological testing, by which potency was measured – would also be prescribed by
regulation.46 As explained in 1949 by A. Linton Davidson, long-serving Dominion analyst in the
Food and Drug Division and unofficial chronicler of the history of the Department,47 these
amendments were intended to allow “for the standardization of which animals had to be used”.48
The amendments also empowered the government to impose regulatory controls on the
manufacture of biologics, through licensing and inspections,49 as well as through batch testing.
Schedule B was also added to the Act through these amendments, or at least it was in intention,
if not in the legally required form.50 This made the regulations that followed, in 1928, technically

(4) Any drug mentioned or described in Schedule B to this Act shall be deemed to be adulterated if it has not been
manufactured, tested and labelled in accordance with regulations made by the Governor in Council under this
section, or if it differs in quality or potency from the standard for such drug established by such regulations.
43
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ultra vires, and just the first example of the many (often unlawful) delegations through which
National Health would standardize and enact biological drugs in the coming decades.51
As envisioned in the 1927 amendments, Schedule “B” comprised Parts I through IV. One can
cavalierly characterize these four parts as containing drugs derived respectively from vegetable,
animal, bacterial, or mineral sources. More accurately characterized, Part II – the part arguably
applicable to sex hormone products in the 1920s and 1930s – listed “Preparations of Pituitrin,
Thyroid, Adrenalin and any other animal tissue preparations”.52 When Part II was first drafted in
1927, the few estrogenic preparations available were all made from animal tissues, typically
ovarian extracts.53 Indeed, it seems that Part II may have been intended originally to cover sex
hormones. This view is bolstered by Davidson’s views on the origins of the 1927 amendments,
which drew upon his close working relationship assisting Harry Lancaster throughout their long
careers at National Health. Lancaster was the Chief Dominion Analyst from 1923 to 1945,54
head of the Food and Drug Division, and deeply involved in preparing the 1927 amendments.
These amendments, according to Davidson, were motivated by rapid changes in pharmacology,
biologics, and endocrinology in the 1920s, and challenges in standardizing existing biologics like
digitalis and ergot; overall, he felt that the “real reason for amending the Act” in 1927 was that:
“Again, drugs of animal origin, for example, pituitary, epinephrine and sex hormones were
coming into vogue and called for special legislative treatment. The great field of viruses,
serums, toxins, vaccines and other bacterial products were engaging increased attention in
the medical world … the need for control of such remedies in Canada was considered a
matter of urgency.”55
Though nothing suggests these developments did not motivate the bill, the amendments also
served to build the bureaucratic machinery at National Health. Davidson himself notes that the
bill received “much criticism” in the House of Commons and some opposition in the Senate.
Delegated legislation was a new feature of governance in Canada, and Parliamentarians were
apprehensive to extend these powers as they “raised the spectre of a still wider bureaucracy”.56
from purporting to exercise its authority in relation to “Schedule B drugs”, by making regulations governing the “Schedule
drugs”, in 1928. To avoid confusion, the remainder of this chapter refers to the 1927 Schedule to the Act as “Schedule B”.
51
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After the 1927 amendments were enacted, National Health officials immediately began to
draft the requisite regulations. Davidson, Lancaster, and Dr. Harris – the latter, as the Chief of
the Laboratory of Hygiene,57 would assume new responsibilities for researching and testing
biologicals – together “spent many afternoons on this in the late summer and early fall of
1927”.58 What became known as the “Biological Products Regulation”, or simply the “Biologicals
Regulation”, was made on February 6, 1928, as part of the wider Food and Drug Regulations.59
No provisions of the 1928 Biologicals Regulation referred specifically to sex hormones.
However, understanding how the 1928 Biologicals Regulation defined and standardized the
quality and potency of biological drugs is critical to appreciating the divergent approach that
would later emerge in the mid-1930s, and that would transmogrify yet further in the 1944 Sex
Hormone Regulations. The first part of the 1928 Biologicals Regulation addressed three plantbased drugs mentioned on Part I of the Schedule – digitalis, strophanthus, and ergot.60 These
plant-based drugs were legally defined according to their source material – for example, the
leaves of the digitalis plant – as well as according to the means by which they were extracted
therefrom. For each of these drugs, the Biologicals Regulation fixed standards of quality by
identifying a standard reference material, kept by the Laboratory of Hygiene and obtainable on
application. Furthermore, as envisioned by the Act, for these drugs, the Biologicals Regulation
also explicitly prescribed both quantitative potency standards and specific biological test
methods for measuring potency. Thus, for digitalis, the regulations prescribed detailed bioassay
methods set out in Appendix A to the regulations; for strophanthus, the regulations adopted the
bioassay methods used in the tenth revision to the US Pharmacopoeia (“USP X”); and for ergot,
the method prescribed for biological testing was either that described in Appendix B or that in
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the USP X.61 This same approach to prescribing identity and potency was taken for most of the
animal-based drugs and bacterial drugs described respectively in Parts II and III of Schedule B
– such as pituitary extract, thyroid, epinephrine, and antitoxins for diphtheria and tetanus – with
the regulations defining these drugs by source material, prescribing quality and identity through
standard reference materials, and prescribing biological methods for testing their potency either
by incorporating scientific test methods or referring to methods in existing pharmacopoeias.62
Within a few years of the Treaty of Westminster, in July 1934, National Health secured from
Parliament a further delegation of authority to create Canadian drug standards. In 1933,
Lancaster had unsuccessfully advocated, in tandem with academic pharmacologists, that the
Act should be amended to allow Cabinet to add any drug to Schedule B at the request of a new
committee comprising representatives of the Canadian Medical Association, the Canadian
Pharmaceutical Association, and the Canadian Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association.
Their goal had been to incorporate, holus bolus into the Act, the 1932 addendum to the British
Pharmacopoeia prepared by Canadian academic physicians and pharmacists.63 While this
proposed amendment was rejected before reaching Parliament, the Act was amended to better
enable ready use of Schedule B. Specifically, substances could now be added to or removed
from Schedule B by regulation, rather than by legislation, where the Minister of Pensions and
National Health deemed that addition or removal to be “necessary in the public interest”.64
On the heels of this amendment, the Biologicals Regulation was repealed and replaced, in
August 1934.65 In a move that, a decade later, would be rejected as unlawful sub-delegation in
the specific – and the limited – context of sex hormone products,66 National Health officials
changed their regulatory approach to measuring the potency of biological drugs. For the three
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plant-based products on Part I,67 and for some animal hormone products such as thyroid,
pituitary extract, and epinephrine on Part II,68 while they continued to prescribe quantitative
potency units,69 the 1934 Biologicals Regulation no longer set forth any official biological test
methods. Despite that paragraph 6(3)(b) of the Act contemplated that regulations would define
the official methods for biological testing, for these drugs, the 1934 Biologicals Regulation
instead subdelegated the selection of test methods to departmental scientists, providing that
official bioassay methods would be whatever methods were employed in the Laboratory of
Hygiene, details of which could be obtained upon application to the Chief of the Laboratory.70
As in 1928, none of the provisions of the 1934 Biologicals Regulation expressly applied to sex
hormones. Did National Health officials ever apply the general provisions of these regulations to
estrogenic products? Despite Davidson’s view that the “real reason” for the 1927 amendments
empowering these regulations included a need to regulate sex hormones, it appears not. In
governing the license, manufacture, and sale of animal-based drugs, the 1934 Biologicals
Regulation included a newly broadened licensing provision, requiring a license to manufacture
products that were “a virus, serum, toxic, antitoxin, a preparation of pituitrin or other animal
tissue preparation, or a product analogous thereto, and of established value in the prevention or
treatment of diseases of man, and intended for parenteral administration”.71 This echoed US
regulations, in 1934, that required satisfactory evidence of therapeutic efficiency before a
license could be granted to a new biological product, driven by concern to not bestow “worthless
drugs with the imprimatur of a governmental license”.72 Indeed, as historians have shown, in the
1930s, estrogenic products were arguably not of “established value” in treating diseases in man
(let alone in women).73 Leaving that important point aside, as of 1934, many estrogenic products
were clearly injectable “animal tissue preparations”, made from ovaries, and had they wished to
National Health officials could have required their manufacturers to obtain licenses.
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By this time, some estrogenic products were not made from ovarian extracts but from urine.74
Furthermore, materializing estrogen from urine, whether expelled by women or horses, was a
particularly Canadian undertaking. In 1930, McGill University endocrinologist Dr. James Collip,
in partnership with the new Canadian drug company Ayerst, McKenna & Harrison Ltd.,75 first
extracted estrogen from pregnant Canadian women’s urine. By 1933, Ayerst was marketing
Emmenin, one of the “first orally active estrogens, distributed in the palatable form of sugarcoated tablets”, for clinical uses.76 Did National Health officials consider urine-based estrogenic
drugs like Emmenin to be animal tissue preparations, or “a product analogous thereto”,77 for
licensing purposes? Again, it appears not. Digging into National Health’s licensing practices, it
does not seem that the Department ever issued a license under the 1934 Biologicals Regulation
for any sex hormone product. From time to time, the Department would publish, in the Canada
Gazette, lists of those firms that were licensed to manufacture drugs listed in Parts II and III of
Schedule B, accompanied by an identification of the types of preparations for which each such
firm was licensed. 78 While sex hormone manufacturers such as Ayerst, Abbott, and Parke,
Davis & Co. appeared on these lists, sex hormone preparations did not.79
Whatever was restraining National Health from applying the regulations to estrogenic drugs, it
does not appear to have been the statute. Admittedly, Schedule B of the Act was limited, in Part
II, to animal tissue products, and drugs like Emmenin were made from human urine. However,
National Health did not otherwise let this statutory wording limit its regulatory practices. For
example, in another instance of endemically unlawful delegation typifying Canada’s regulation of
biologics, the 1934 Biologicals Regulation were amended in 1942 to purport to cover not just
animal tissue preparations as authorized by Part II, but also human tissue preparations.80
Nor was this regulatory restraint reflective of satisfaction with the situation amongst Canadian
medical professionals. By the late 1930s, Canadian physicians were frustrated by the failure to

74

See supra note 53.

75

Ayerst was founded in 1924; see Raison 1969 at 15. It was granted letters patent in January 1925; see Government Notices,
Canada Gazette, Vol LVIII, No 81, p 2257 (January 25, 1925).
76

Li 2002 at 103; Haraway 2012 at 308, 314 (fn 5).

77

The 1934 Biologicals Regulation, in further defining “biological products”, appeared to consider analogous products as
analogous only to a virus, serum, toxin or antitoxin; see 1934 Biologicals Regulation (specifically, the Regulations for the
Licensing, Manufacture and Sale of Drugs Listed in Parts II and III, Schedule B of the Food and Drugs Act, RS 1927), s 11 at p 18.
While s 1 of this part of the regulations required licenses for products of established value in treating disease, in defining
analogous products, s 11 used a lower threshold of “applicable to the prevention or treatment of diseases”.
78

These notices do not appear to have been required by any provision of the 1934 Biologicals Regulation.

79

See e.g. Government Notices, List of Firms Licensed for the Manufacture of Drugs Mentioned in Parts II and III, Schedule “B”,
Food and Drugs Act, Canada Gazette, Vol LXXV, No 3, p 173 (July 19, 1941).
80

1942 Biologicals Regulation, s 11 at p 2172; see Chapter 4 at note 126.
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standardize estrogenic products, writing in journals about how much “confusion has arisen from
the many and varied trade names under which the oestrogenic preparations are dispensed, and
the fact that there are two international units of different potency complicates the picture”.81
National Health’s apparent indifference to estrogen in the 1930s was also not the result of
any lack of pharmacological expertise or knowledge of bioassay methods amongst its staff. In
the latter half of the 1930s, under Dr. Harris, the Laboratory of Hygiene was steadily expanding
its research activity, including through new research on the standardization and control of
biologics.82 Its pharmacological section was led by Harvard-trained pharmacologist Dr. Clare
Morrell,83 who had expertise in bioassays, including plotting and calculating dose-response
curves with statistical techniques.84 Morrell developed official methods of assay that could be
distributed to manufacturers and used to test their products, and collaborated on scientific
subcommittees of the British Pharmacopoiea Commission and the US Pharmacopoeia Revision
Committee.85 In 1936, Dr. Leonard Pugsley, a biochemist who had trained at McGill, joined the
Laboratory to do work on sex hormones. Sex hormones were at the center of much of the
Laboratory’s growing activity; according to Davidson, “[b]y the time the Second Word War broke
out, extensive work was being done on vitamins, liver oils and extract, and sex hormones.”86
Nor did Canadian regulatory inaction wholly track American approaches. Admittedly, in the
US, sex hormones (and other glandular preparations) had long been carved out of the
legislative and licensing regime that existed for biologics; legally speaking, hormones were not
biologics in the US.87 This did not diminish American compliance activities, however. In the
second half of the 1930s, the US FDA was busily enforcing the US FDCA and its predecessor
statute against estrogenic preparations. As explained by two scientists with the US FDA’s
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Division of Pharmacology, a sex hormones unit had been established in 1935 “for the purpose
of making investigations of these products by use of the recognized methods available for some
of them and for the purpose of the investigation of new methods for the assay of others.”88
Ensuing prosecutions enforced misbranding and adulteration prohibitions against estrogenic
products. Many preparations, particularly those in oil solutions, were found to have a potency
that was “quite high”. However, the most common legal allegation was essentially that
estrogenic preparations had a lower potency than labelled.89 For example, a prosecution
involving Follicovar, which “contained approximately 25 percent of the number of International
Units of ovarian follicular hormone declared on the label”, alleged adulteration as the product’s
strength fell below the professed standard under which it was sold.90 Apparently unimpeded by
the variance in manufacturers’ potency units and test methods, these prosecutions targeted sex
hormone preparations the potency of which was expressed in everything from “International
Units”, to “mouse units”, to “Rat Units Standardized by the vaginal smear method”.91
At base, National Health’s inaction simply reflected – and performatively enacted – the fact
that, in the 1930s, estrogenic drugs were neither very prevalent nor demonstrably effective for
identified diseases. This challenges conventional wisdom that if a technology is unregulated, its
sale and use will increase. As will later be seen in the context of the Sex Hormone Regulations,
however, National Health officials were concerned that extending regulation to sex hormone
products would equate to an endorsement. The same concern had driven, for three decades,
the US Public Health Service’s resistance to licensing hormonal products derived from glands
“because it thought that most of them were worthless, although basically safe, and that a license
would be seen as a governmental determination that they were effective.”92 Recognizing
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through regulation that a substance was a drug served as official sanction. Critically, from this
perspective, regulation as was much about enacting estrogen – calling it into action – as
constraining it. Despite repeated delegations of authority to standardize biologics between 1927
and 1942, National Health did not deploy these delegations to sanction sex hormones as
therapeutically effective drugs, and, in partial consequence, estrogen remained marginal.

Figure 1: List of 18 estrogenic preparations commercially available in Canada as of 1940
From EA Trites, “The Treatment of Functional Menstrual Disorders” (1940) XVI:4 Bulletin of the
Vancouver Medical Association 97 (UBC Open Collections, History of Nursing in Pacific Canada)

Indeed, by early 1940, according to a contemporaneous account, only 18 estrogenic
products, prescribed mostly for menstrual disorders, were available commercially in Canada.
Most of the 18 preparations were based on estrone or estradiol benzoate. Yet as the list above
shows, a couple were new creatures – not animal, vegetable, bacterial, or mineral, but
stilboestrol.93 Within less than a year of the synthesis of DES, these new DES products,
developed for parenteral and oral use, had arrived.94 In two years, Premarin would join them.
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Turning away from drug standards and to other statutory provisions relevant to estrogen, in
1939, cosmetics arrived on the legislative agenda. In 1938, US food and drug law had been
extended, for the first time, to cover cosmetics.95 In response to the US FDCA, in the spring of
1939, Parliament hastily passed amendments to the Food and Drugs Act, including a new
definition of drug (making “any cosmetic” a drug), a definition of cosmetics, a provision related to
cosmetic packaging, and a provision empowering the licensing of cosmetics manufacturers.96
While many of the 1939 amendments were proclaimed into force as of August 1, 1939, the
cosmetic provisions, which comprised half of the bill, were not.97 Davidson and others argued,
implicitly, that masculine war efforts were more important than feminine beauty products,
claiming that the reason the government refused to bring the cosmetic legislation into force was
because of WWII. Ironically, Davidson then continued his account by writing that “[t]he outbreak
of the Second World War in September 1939, had little immediate effect upon the Food and
Drug Division since its work is equally essential in war and in peace”.98 Cosmetics were surely
not the highest priority of the Canadian government in August 1939, yet the same could be said
of matters addressed by the amendments that were brought into force that month (like
preconditions to customs entry, or misleading advertisements).99 The better explanation may be
that, before the bill passed, there had been murmurs that its cosmetic provisions might not be
constitutional.100 Indeed, Davidson acknowledged that “questions of validity loomed” regarding
95
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the bill in the House and Senate.101 Moreover, the government declined to proclaim another
provision, unrelated to cosmetics, which one suspects may have attracted legal concerns.102
By 1939, estrogenic cosmetics were on the Canadian market.103 As Parliamentarians were
debating the cosmetics bill, departmental officials were discussing whether to act on estrogenic
preparations advertised for breast enhancement. In March 1939, Davidson brought his
supervisor’s attention to an advertisement for S-8 Brand Hormone Preparations, a product
represented as “restoring the breasts to the graceful contours and firmness of youth”. 104 While
characterizing the product as a cosmetic and not a drug – landing it outside the Department’s
statutory jurisdiction – Davidson nonetheless proposed investigatory efforts. In response, Aime
Valin, the Assistant Chief Dominion Analyst, advised Davidson to take “no action for present”.105
The start of the 1940s was a turning point in Canadian drug regulation. Despite the
economic depression of the previous decade, the pharmaceutical industry in Canada had been
expanding. New Canadian drug companies had opened in Toronto and Montreal; and British,
American, and even Swiss companies had set up subsidiary operations in Canada.106 With
demand high and supply low, drug manufacturing would expand in Canada during WWII.107
Relatedly, the 1940s would also witness a major expansion of National Health’s ambitions and
activities. In the wake of the Treaty of Westminster, senior officials seized the moment to make
Canada-specific food and drug regulations. Though there had been little regulatory activity
under the 1934 amendments and Schedule B in the 1930s, this was about to change. During
WWII, National Health took further opportunities to distance Canadian drug regulation from
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Britain, and expanded its workload and its bureaucratic machinery significantly; as just one
example, the sampling done by the Laboratory of Hygiene tripled between 1938 and 1944.108

Figure 2: “Venus de Milo” advertisement for S-8 Brand of Hormone Preparations, The
Montrealer, March 1, 1939
Library and Archives Canada, RG 29, Vol 258, File 347-6-6 (Part 2), reproduction copy number e011195706
108
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Figure 3: Analyst’s Report on S-8 Brand Advertisement, Linton Davidson, March 22, 1939
Library and Archives Canada, RG 29, Vol 258, File 347-6-6 (Part 2), reproduction copy number e011195706
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Indeed, by 1950, Dr. Clare Morrell, by that time the Chief Dominion Analyst and Director of the
Food and Drugs Divisions, would comment that, to avoid the confusion of drugs being put on
the Canadian market under “a great variety of names and strengths”, the drugs on Schedule B
had “been considerably increased in the last few years”.109 This situation would not materialize,
however, through any abstract power of the Canadian pharmaceutical industry nor through
some bureaucratic master plan. Rather, this growth in Canadian drug standards began in 1940
with messy, laborious, and contested activities to create the Canadian Committee on
Pharmacopoeial Standards. In the process, National Health deployed regulatory techniques – in
particular, questionable delegations of power supported by erasures of evidence of the invalidity
of those delegations – that would later characterize the regulatory enactment of estrogen.

2. The formation of the Canadian Committee on Pharmacopoeial Standards, 1940-1942
Having described the legal dynamics, this section introduces many of the human regulators
that would come to enact estrogen in Canada in the mid-1940s. Before estrogen could be
enrolled into different regulatory regimes, these actors first needed to assemble. The
Committee’s formation was bitterly contested, controversial, and confused, and as time would
show, the Committee itself would prove to be unstable. Yet, for a brief time in the mid-1940s, it
enacted socio-material realities in Canada – and when it came to estrogen, some of those
realities would be more durable. Uncovering the regulatory techniques that enacted the
Committee, and the interests of its future members, will ensure greater insight into the
regulatory players, practices, and techniques that later together enacted estrogen.
If one reads closely, one can identify three stories that have been told about the Committee.
The first is the “wartime shortages” story. One finds this explanation for the Committee’s
formation and its activities in articles and books by National Health officials, beginning in the late
1940s with Davidson’s accounts, in the 1950s and 1960s with sporadic articles by other officials,
and in the prefaces to Canadian pharmacopoeial or pharmaceutical works.110 A second story
also comes through, if more subtly, in these accounts, celebrating the Committee as one
weapon in a swelling arsenal of departmental machinery and regulatory prowess at National
Health. Sometimes this story is less subtle, as in the occasionally nationalistic, triumphant, and
Christian tones of Davidson’s work (including visual narratives of nation-building through
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pharmacy, as illustrated below). Finally, recent work in legal and policy history has touched
upon the Committee, summarily suggesting its formation reflected something akin to regulatory
capture of National Health by the pharmaceutical industry.111

Figure 4: Book cover for AL Davidson’s Canada Pioneers in Food and Drug Control, 1949.
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The story narrated here, about the Committee, has not been told before. I follow certain
scientists, regulators, and lawyers, within and outside the Department, as they schemed to form
(or deflate) the Committee and to shape its powers. This involves tracing relations among
departmental officials, physicians and pharmacists and their professional associations, and
representatives of the Canadian Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (“CPMA”). In
particular, this section traces the vigorous, year-long debate that occurred within National
Health, and between National Health officials and stakeholder associations, regarding the
political and legal validity of delegating authority to the Committee and the scope of that
authority. In the process, it introduces the idea that disputed delegation practices would be
central to how certain drugs were standardized and materialized in Canada.
In tracing these associations, this chapter also shows that, while the human actors were
influenced by forces of the interwar period, with its declining British colonial influence, and by
the outbreak of WWII, with its declining drug standards in Britain, and furthermore while these
actors drew on wartime exigencies and Canadian nationalism where rhetorically productive,
WWII did not cause the Committee to come into being. Nor was the formation of the Committee,
in its structure or duties, reflective of a successful “capture” of the Department by any person,
profession, or industry. Rather, archival evidence and other primary sources suggest that the
better metaphor to describe the Committee’s formation is a regulatory experiment. The actors
who generated the Committee did not begin with any overarching vision of its structure, powers,
or purposes, but were trying to move beyond failed attempts in the 1930s to create a meaningful
role for Canadians in drug standardization. Like many experiments, it had unintended and
ambiguous effects. Significantly, the creation of the Committee contributed to novel enactments
of power and legitimacy within National Health and the drug industry, and, ultimately, to a
diminished role for pharmacopeias as a way of regulating drugs. Furthermore, it would lead to
other innovations as, through and with its later activities, estrogen would become multiple.
Two people were most influential in establishing the Committee – Dr. Velyien Henderson, a
professor at the University of Toronto and Harry Lancaster, the Chief Dominion Analyst.
Henderson and Lancaster were long-time collaborators, and they seem to have been friends. By
1940, they had known each other for at least thirty years, going back to time studying and
teaching at the University of Toronto’s Faculty of Medicine. From 1908 to 1923, Lancaster had
been a demonstrator in that faculty, a professor of chemistry at the College of Dental Surgeons,
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and a Director of the Provincial Board of Health.112 About five years older, Henderson joined the
faculty in 1904, becoming a full professor of pharmacology in 1909.113 A recognized expert on
pharmacopoeial standards, he had many years of experience drafting pharmacopoeial
monographs in consultation with British scientists. Through the late 1920s and 1930s,
Henderson served in leadership roles with the Canadian Medical Association (“CMA”).
The two men’s interests in establishing distinctly Canadian drug standards originated long
before WWII, entangled with the decline of British colonialism in the interwar years. In 1925,
Great Britain communicated officially with academic faculties and licensing bodies in the
Dominion (and in other colonies) to seek suggestions on upcoming proposed revisions to the
British Pharmacopoeia; in 1927, the British Pharmacopoeia Commission also asked the
Dominion government to collaborate on these revisions. To coordinate a unified response,
leading professors of medicine and pharmacy decided to form a “Canadian Committee on
Pharmaceutical Standards”, which was chaired by Henderson and joined by Lancaster, and this
informal committee was the channel through which Canadian pharmacologists and pharmacists
assisted with the monographs for the 1932 revision to the British Pharmacopoeia. Over time,
and fuelled by nationalism, committee members became concerned that British revisions were
not meeting Canadian needs, as drugs still used in Canada were deleted from, or not added to,
new editions. Emboldened by the preface to the 1932 revision,114 this committee prepared a
detailed Canadian “addendum” to the British Pharmacopoeia, which was published as part of
the Canadian Formulary.115 Its legal status under the Act was ambiguous, and its effects on
Canadian medical practice were underwhelming. However, its more lasting impact was the idea
that such supplements or addenda were a direct means to Canadian-specific drug standards.116
While WWII was not the cause of new Canadian drug standards, it was a catalyst. Henderson
became especially agitated by a series of changes to the British Pharmacopoeia that began in
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1936 and continued at a greater frequency during the war.117 Due to wartime shortages in Great
Britain of various chemicals, such as glycerin, alcohol, and vitaminized oils, the British had been
substituting certain drug ingredients, through “wartime addenda” to their Pharmacopoeia.
Canada, by contrast, did not suffer shortages of these ingredients. Furthermore, the British were
no longer consulting the Canadian committee on these weakened drug standards. For
Henderson, these deficiencies were intolerable. Legally, the situation was lowering drug
standards in Canada (as explained, British Pharmacopoeia monographs had a default official
status in determining drug adulteration under Canadian law, except where replaced by
Canadian standards in regulations). Henderson wanted to create new standards in a Canadian
Supplement to the British Pharmacopoeia, and he insisted to Lancaster that new standards be
legally binding. Though the desire and groundwork for Canadian drug standards stretched back
to 1925, Henderson and Lancaster leveraged the wartime addenda to justify more urgently a
new, official Canadian Committee.118
Together the two men began to cook up a new way of regulating drugs in Canada. After
meeting together in Toronto, they started to refine their ideas over the fall of 1940.119 Henderson
felt it would be easy to enlist pharmacists’ support through the Canadian Pharmaceutical
Association and possible to obtain support of the medical profession, though “the question
remains – is it worthwhile making a fight and forcing the Department to put the Canadian
Formulary and its Addendum Section particularly on a more official basis?” Lancaster quietly
egged on the fight, promising backup by stressing how “it would be quite within the powers of
the Food and Drugs Act to establish both name and standard of quality” for drugs in Canada.120
Henderson was insistent that any reconstituted committee should have legal standing. A
decade later, Davidson suggested legal standing was needed to “enable the Government to pay
out-of-pocket expenses in connection with meetings”.121 Expenses were no doubt a relevant
factor, yet Henderson sincerely viewed making a committee legally official as a precondition to
117
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making new drug standards legally binding. In January 1941, he made a lengthy pitch to the
CMA, drawing on nationalist sentiment and pragmatism. Taking a kitchen sink approach, he
claimed that the existing addendum in the Canadian Formulary was already legally binding and
that National Health had always intended it be an official work under paragraph 6(c) of the Act,
yet simultaneously advocated that the CMA should support a new official committee to make
standards which would need to be “officially published in the Gazette” in order to be binding.122
As Henderson enlisted allies, Lancaster worked to identify a statutory basis for any standards
created by a new committee, that would award such standards legal precedence – as any new
pharmacopoeial work, whether or not published in the Gazette, would be trumped, by default, by
the British Pharmacopoiea.123 Drawing from his failed effort, in 1933, to incorporate holus bolus
the earlier committee’s addendum into the Act, he resurrected the idea that new standards by a
new committee could be incorporated through Schedule B, although he felt “only in exceedingly
important cases should this procedure be invoked”.124 Lancaster did not seek legal advice on
the idea, and did not always seem confident that the Act provided the requisite authority.
Nonetheless, by March, this idea had crystallized into a plan. By June, Henderson was urging
the CMA to support an official committee to make new drug standards that if “concurred in by
the Government, could be made legally binding by notification in the Gazette, under powers now
probably possessed in the Act”.125 That same month, Lancaster set about trying to persuade Dr.
Robert Wodehouse, the Deputy Minister,126 and his chief executive assistant, Dr. John
Heagerty.127 Presenting the use of Schedule B as the easiest option, he cautioned that rather
than give a new committee all of the powers that the physicians appeared to be seeking, which
would require an amendment to the Act – never a politically palatable option, especially as it
had been amended only two years prior – the better way to replace the British Pharmacopoeia
for drugs requiring Canadian standards would be to list those drugs on Schedule B. Within a few
months, Wodehouse and Henderson were meeting directly to discuss the plan.
However, by November 1941, the plan had stalled, and the physicians were growing anxious.
Lancaster attempted to assure senior departmental officials that the new committee would just
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be advisory, though he had a very robust notion of what qualified as advice. He clarified that the
committee’s decisions should not be given the force of law, except that the committee would
decide which drugs to list on Schedule B, and those drugs could then be the subject of special
regulations.128 The proposal had clearly evolved to encompass greater delegation. Earlier that
year, the proposal had envisioned that the committee’s main duty would be to advise the British,
through the Department, of proposed modifications to the British Pharmacopoeia; only as a
secondary activity would the committee recommend which drugs to add to Schedule B. Further,
in the earlier proposal, the committee was limited to recommending which drugs to enumerate
on Schedule B; it had not been contemplated that it would advise how to regulate those drugs.
Now, the proposal was that the committee would have the power to add drugs to Schedule B –
under a new Part V to be candidly entitled “Any drug which the Canadian Committee on
Pharmacopoeial Standards may designate for addition to the Pharmacopoiea, deletion from the
Pharmacopoiea, or for modification of name or of composition” – and also advise on regulations.
This triggered a major debate amongst senior departmental officials on the appropriate nature
and extent of delegation to the committee. Heagerty felt that the delegation contemplated was
excessive and impermissible. In annotations in red ink scrawled all over a draft of the proposal
in November, Heagerty wrote that “[t]his ties the hands of the department by giving the
Committee the right to set up standards which are binding upon the department. I am opposed
to this delegation of powers to vested interests.”129 The vested interests that concerned
Heagerty were those of physicians and pharmacists. From his experience labouring to create a
national health insurance program, Heagerty was strongly attuned to the excessive influence of
medical practitioners on public health planning, and alive to labour and agricultural groups’
concerns that physicians had too much political power in existing provincial health commissions.
Heagerty enlisted Mr. B.W. Russell, K.C., the Acting Departmental Solicitor. Russell opined
that sufficient statutory authority existed to empower a committee, but he needed more detail
about just what the committee was anticipated to do, before he could advise whether that
mandate was valid. Therefore, in December 1941, Lancaster prepared a draft order-in-council
empowering the committee. The draft order proposed that a committee would directly advise the
British Pharmacopoeial Commission.It also proposed that the Committee would recommend
what pharmacopoeial drugs to list in Schedule B, and would recommend standards of quality
and potency. In a postscript, Lancaster flagged that it would “be necessary to pass a further
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Order in Council amending Schedule B to the Act so as to include a new Part V”. His insistence
on the need for Part V became a running theme in all his communications with Departmental
officials regarding the committee.
Lancaster understood the legal interrelations between section 6 of the Act, Schedule B, and
its Parts I through IV. His continued insistence on the need for a new Part V is therefore curious.
He cannot have been unaware that Canada lacked statutory jurisdiction to regulate the
licensing, manufacture, and sale of Schedule B drugs unless those drugs were listed on Parts II,
III or IV. The only matters that could be regulated, for a Schedule B drug not on one of those
Parts, were quality and potency – and yet the very raison d’etre of a new committee was that its
members themselves would, in the process of recommending modifications to the standards in
the British Pharmacopoeia, define these drugs’ identity, quality, and potency. That is, in
recommending any new, improved or Canada-specific “recipe” for any given drug, the
committee would already have codified that drug’s qualities and potencies. One rather
unavoidable conclusion, therefore, is that Lancaster was contemplating Part V to be a separate
“holding zone”, a place where drugs newly defined by technical standards could be enumerated,
without the Department being required then to divide up those drugs amongst the existing four
Parts or to make any regulatory decisions about whether or how to control or license those
drugs. However, Lancaster does not appear to have considered the potential problem of
duplication; namely, what would occur if, as a result of the committee’s additions to Part V, a
drug ended up being mentioned twice in Schedule B? Was it not foreseeable that a drug might
be listed on one of Parts I through IV for the purpose of a regulation under subsection 6(3), and
then be listed again on a new Part V for the purpose of supplementing the British
Pharmacopoeia? In that situation, which would take precedence? To this, a lawyer might
respond that such a situation would never occur, because given the words and legislative
history of subsections 6(3) and (4), Schedule B was not intended to contain anything but those
biological drugs that might be standardized and regulated under subsection 6(3).
When Russell reviewed Lancaster’s draft order, he flagged to Heagerty that the Chairman
should be a National Health official and suggested that the committee be reduced in size.
Disagreeing on both counts, Lancaster felt that a larger committee would “avoid any suggestion
of domination by a small group”; despite his concern that the committee might be captured by
narrow interests, in January 1942, Lancaster solicited revisions from Henderson alone on the
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draft order and advanced the revisions to his superiors.130 The revisions gave the committee the
power to dictate additions, deletions, or modifications to Part V of Schedule B.
The Department’s solicitors were having none of this. Russell and Gunn each reviewed the
revised order, in early February, and they concurred that, in proposing to give the committee the
right to add any drugs that it saw fit to Schedule B, the order was ultra vires. Russell, now the
Departmental Solicitor, opined that “the proposed addition to Part V of Schedule B to the Food
and Drugs Act is unconstitutional” as it amounted to allowing Cabinet to subdelegate. In his
view, only the Governor in Council could add or remove drugs from Schedule B. Gunn went
even further, opining that if the committee’s input into the British Pharmacopoeia was intended
to bind Canada, then he was “very doubtful if the method proposed would be constitutional”.131
This exemplified Departmental officials’ practices, at this time, of consulting the legal division on
the validity of a regulatory proposal only after consulting professional associations and industry
representatives on the substance of that proposal. Predictably, one effect of this practice was
that legal concerns with regulatory proposals were identified late in the process, and solutions
focused on rendering the proposals technically valid rather than on substantive reconsideration.
Faced with his solicitors’ opposition, the Deputy Minister intervened. He brought Lancaster,
Heagerty, and Russell together for a meeting to review the draft order in council, and to address
concerns with the invalidity of a new Part V to Schedule B. The group decided that, as long as
the Department (and not the committee) made the decision to add drugs to a new Part V, and
as long as each drug was added to Part V individually (and not by blanket incorporation of the
committee’s addendum), the textual reference to Part V could remain in the order-in-council.132
This agreement was short-lived, however. In the next draft of the order, in March, the decision
was made to excise all textual reference to the anticipated Part V. The intention to employ a
new Part V remained but, with continuing skepticism on its legality, the technique adopted was
erasure – Part V was disappeared from the face of the order. The plan to allow the committee to
enumerate this new list of drugs, outside the statute’s existing structure, was made invisible. 133
As the drafting challenges simplified, the external relationships got more complicated.
Reflecting entrenched distrust between medical professionals and drug manufacturers, and
suspicion of a proposal instigated by Henderson, the CMPA opposed the Committee. First their
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leadership approached Lancaster; when that went nowhere, they set about lobbying other
senior officials. On February 27, 1942, three CMPA members “dropped in” on Heagerty, who
loaned them a receptive ear. Shortly thereafter, the President of the CMPA, Mr. Laverty, met
with the Minister, Ian Mackenzie, to again oppose the committee, to support the existing
department-lead process for drug standards, and to express “that the Committee would be an
embarrassment” to drug manufacturers.134 Faced with opposition, Lancaster and Henderson
turned up the rhetoric of nationalism and emergency, stressing how wartime addenda were
being made without regard to Canadian conditions and interests.135
Under the influence of the drug manufacturers, and cutting Lancaster entirely out of the
loop, on March 12, 1942, Heagerty wrote to Wodehouse with his own advice for the Minister.
While agreeing that a committee should be recognized the purpose of revising the British
Pharmacopoiea, he strongly objected to allowing the committee to advise on what drugs should
be listed on Schedule B or on new drug regulations. This he viewed as an unlawful delegation.
In this respect, he particularly opposed the proposal to add a new Part V to Schedule B, that
would include whatever drugs the Committee wished to add or remove. Heagerty had no love
lost for Henderson; he referenced a past conversation in which Henderson had suggested
National Health “was not competent to set up standards of food and drugs”. He recommended
that the Committee be authorized to draw up a Canadian Pharmacopoeia, which he felt would
make Canada “independent” with respect to drug standards, but that it should not be authorized
to advise the Department on drug standards under section 6 of the Act.136
Wodehouse advised Minister Mackenzie the next day. Ignoring the debate about delegation,
his advice was pure political pragmatism – how to respond to wartime challenges, while keeping
the most economically powerful actors happy. Sympathetic to physicians’ desire to clarify
standards, especially given the “peculiar” situation whereby multiple pharmacopoeias were
statutorily recognized under Canadian law and the “tremendous” wartime modifications to the
British Pharmacopoiea, Wodehouse nevertheless rejected the idea that Canada should
“shoulder the expenses” of its own Canadian Pharmacopoeia. The real dynamic underlying the
discord, in his view, was competition between retail pharmacists and drug manufacturers; in a
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postscript, he added statistics showing that, despite massive economic growth in drug
manufacturing in Canada between 1930 and 1940, pharmacists remained the larger
constituency (not only did the number of retail pharmacies vastly exceed manufacturers, but
investments and sales were higher).137 Rather than bootstrap broader regulatory changes to
wartime exigencies, Wodehouse suggested an alternative option of a temporary order in council
under the War Measures Act to prevent revisions to the British Pharmacopoeia from being
automatically effective in Canada. In any event, he recommended that the Minister convene a
conference of the interested parties, to “see just how far we want to go to meet the changing
war conditions”. Mackenzie agreed, and the conference was scheduled for April 28, 1942.
At first blush, the conference seemed to resolve the discord. The next day, National Health
revised the draft order in council, such that the Committee’s proposed duties were twofold: to
advise the Department “with regard to any modifications to the British Pharmacopoeia” thought
to be “necessary in the public interest”; and, upon request of the Department, to advise it “with
regard to regulations proposed to be made under section 6 of the Food and Drugs Act
respecting any drug included or be included in Schedule B”. Ironically, the revised draft went
slightly further than earlier versions in delegating power. Yet perhaps because it addressed the
concern that Schedule B should not be amended by the Committee, the drug manufacturers
approved it.
Unexpectedly, the physicians advised that they could not support the order. While the order
failed to give Henderson what he had long desired – the ability to dictate legally binding
standards for drugs in Canada – the CMA had accepted for months that the trade-off for legally
binding standards was that the Committee would be limited to recommendations. Rather, the
CMA’s objection was driven by Henderson’s outrage at the appointment processes. Having
anticipated that he would chair the committee, he was furious that the professional associations
were not empowered to nominate members directly and the committee would not elect its own
chairman. On these points, and on the advice of Gunn, National Health would not budge, as
they felt the Minister required “absolute discretion” as to whether associations’ nominees should
be appointed. Dissenters also remained within the Department, including its legal division.
However, Lancaster’s idea survived. On June 5, 1942, an order in council was made authorizing
the Committee, empowering the Minister to appoint its members, and fixing its duties.138
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Appointed were four professors of medicine and pharmacology, and two deans of pharmacy,
chosen by the Minister from nominees submitted by three professional organizations.139 Bitterly
disappointed that he had not been made Chair, Henderson accepted his invitation belatedly and
petulantly, saying he had “reluctantly come to the conclusion that it is my duty to serve”.140 He
had received the message – this was the Department’s Committee and not his. In the Chair
would be Lancaster.141 Lancaster struggled with a serious illness in 1942, and he was often
bedridden (and by 1944 occasionally hospitalized). His illness caused the inaugural Committee
meeting, scheduled for November 1942, to be postponed twice. That postponement did not stop
the Department from trumpeting to newspapers that Canada might soon achieve its own drug
standards independent from Britain. The other departmental officials appointed were Aime
Valin, the Assistant Chief Dominion Analyst, and Dr. Morrell, the senior pharmacologist with the
Laboratory of Hygiene. Davidson, a Dominion analyst and pharmaceutical chemist, was
appointed as the Committee’s Secretary. He would serve diligently in that role until his untimely
death in 1950.142 No solicitor was assigned to the Committee, a fact that would later prove quite
relevant to the practices of the Committee, and of the Department, in standardizing drugs.143
The Minister also appointed two industry scientists. The CPMA nominated four candidates
but identified two as “by far best qualified to represent us”. 144 One industry favourite was Dr. A.
Stanley Cook, Director of Research and Biological Laboratories at Ayerst, McKenna & Harrison
Ltd. At the time of Cook’s appointment, Ayerst had been selling Premarin in Canada for over a
year. The other favoured candidate, also appointed, was Mr. North of Canada Pharmacal Co.
In their negotiations over the Committee’s formation, and in the approach that they later took
when nominating members for the Minister to appoint to the Committee, CMPA officials
consistently advanced the position that the role of “their” two members was to represent the
CMPA. Unlike Henderson, who saw himself as independent of his nominating organization, the
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CPMA repeatedly would position Cook and North as representatives of drug manufacturers’
interests. To be fair, National Health senior officials had initially implied, as part of their efforts to
solicit CPMA’s support for the proposed Committee, that the CMPA’s appointed members would
play precisely this representative role. Depending on the circumstances, National Health’s
position fluctuated on whether Committee members, especially the industry scientists, were
appointed as independent experts or to represent their associations’ interests. Left unresolved
in the negotiations in the spring of 1942, the following year, the question flared up repeatedly. In
the spring of 1943, Wodehouse advised Laverty that the CMPA should raise protests about
Committee matters directly to the Committee through the two industry members rather than to
him; yet, in the fall of 1943, when the CMPA tendered resolutions to the Committee through
North, Wodehouse shifted gears, insisting that the CMPA should write to him personally about
such “special interests” and arguing that Committee members were independent.145 Much of the
CPMA’s concern with the Committee’s activities, over 1943, was triggered by Henderson and
other academic members’ strong advocacy for establishing, through regulations, the proper or
official names of drugs to appear on labels, and by the physicians’ general hostility to patents
and trademarks for drugs.146 Arguably, these disputes about intellectual property rights would
make it easier for Committee members to agree on matters deemed “technical” rather than
regulatory – or at least, they agreed that they should be able to agree on technical matters.147
***
In playing this prelude of the formation of the Canadian Committee on Pharmacopoeial
Standards, I have offered an entry point to an integrated Canadian history of the standardization
of estrogen. When studying drug regulation, as Cambrosio puts it, “the analysis of the different
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forms of regulation should not be separated from the analysis of the constitution of the entities,
processes and activities that are the subject of regulation”.148 By reviewing recurring practices
giving rise to the Committee – the pugnacious negotiation, drafting techniques that supported
legally dubious delegations, a holding together of diverse ways of regulating drugs in hybrid
configurations – one is better placed to grasp how estrogen was later enacted in practices.
Through the formation of the Committee, a new “way of regulating drugs” emerged in
Canada.149 What were formerly distinct practitioners, logics, and modes of standardization were,
for the first time, lumped together in and around this new collective. Previously, elite physicians
and pharmacists, associated with universities or other teaching institutions and represented by
individuals like Dr. Velyien Henderson, had shaped the contents of the British Pharmacopoeia
and other pharmacopoeial works. Through pharmacopoeia, these professional regulators
determined the potency and dosage of drugs. In essence, elite physicians like Henderson had
been the sous chefs helping to write the colonial cookbook, and they saw, in a new committee,
a chance to become Canadian chefs de cuisine. Canadian drug manufacturers perceived this
incursion by Henderson and his enlisted professional supporters as an embarrassment, as
ethical manufacturers endeavoured to regulate drug standards through rigorous quality control
of drugs, including through bioassay methods standardized within firms, if not within states.
Rather than pre-scripted recipes that interfered with innovation, industry expected its pre-made
products to be endorsed (or, for bad actors, rejected) through government-issued licenses.
Within National Health, regulatory practices had become ever more divaricated. On the one
hand, National Health had emulated professional ways of regulating, as empowered by the
1927 statutory amendment, through efforts to codify drugs’ identities and potencies in the
Biologicals Regulation. Initially, this effort had involved the formal adoption of pharmacopoeial
standards and bioassay methods directly into law. Later, in the 1934 Biologicals Regulation, this
effort involved purporting to delegate to Departmental officials in the Laboratory of Hygiene the
power to select their own methods for measuring and materializing drugs and their potencies.
Fuelled by growing scientific capacity and bioassay expertise within the Laboratory of Hygiene,
and less beholden to external professionals, the Department had shifted from endorsing the
experts’ cookbooks to adopting its own secret recipes (or more fairly, its own changing and
unwritten recipes, apparently available upon request). On the other hand, again sparked by the
1927 amendments and effected through the Biologicals Regulation, National Health also began
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controlling drugs through licensing. In this mode, standards advanced a different logic; rather
than a guide to drug compounding, standards were a means to test if a pre-made product
measured up – although what pre-existing products should measure up to was not always clear.
These varying modes of regulating drugs in Canada were all embedded into the Committee’s
structure and mandates. The establishment of the Committee further naturalized the notion, still
quite new in 1942, that Canada should enact its own drug standards. Just as notably, the
structure of the Committee reinforced that manufacturers should have a say, though whether
that “say” was to be voiced by members serving as scientific experts or industry mouthpieces
was left open-ended. The Committee would also continue to advance professional modes of
regulation through pharmacopoeia, though professional judgement was officially positioned as a
merely advisory input to ministerial decision-making. Through its design and membership, the
Committee would thus hold together multiple, overlapping modes of drug standardization.
The Committee clearly had other unintended political and structural consequences. In
cooking up a new, official committee that would create uniquely Canadian drug standards,
Henderson successfully secured the support of the CMA and the CMPA, and Lancaster similarly
enlisted his Deputy Minister despite the objections of other senior Departmental officials. Yet,
the resulting Committee was not what either had envisioned. Seemingly blind to the trade-offs in
soliciting the state’s imprimatur for scientific work, Henderson had sought to enlist governmental
authority to empower a mode of professional regulation; yet, through interactions mediated by
bureaucrats and lawyers, the ultimate outcome saw professional judgment and expertise
officially subordinated to state control. With the anticipated Part V of Schedule B to be made
subject to the Minister’s decision, pharmaceutical fact would be proclaimed by the state – drugs
would be what Canada said they were. Rather than sous chefs to the British, elite physicians
and pharmacists would instead, increasingly, serve to legitimate the plans of National Health
bureaucrats. Indeed, taking a broader view, one can argue that Henderson’s efforts backfired
spectacularly. The structure and functions of the Committee contributed not only to diminishing
academic scientists’ independence in drug regulation, but to augmenting drug manufacturers’
regulatory influence. In part, this unintended outcome resulted from how Canadian medical
elites had framed the problem – to return to the earlier equine metaphor, they continued to focus
on what horses should be, yet displayed little interest in whether barn doors should be closed.
Meanwhile the drug industry, focused on keeping barn doors open, took its seat at the table.
This chapter has also described the regulatory practices and techniques through which the
Committee, with its myriad intended and unintended consequences, were accomplished. In a
theme that will continue to resound within the next two chapters, the Committee was enacted
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through various practices of delegation. A regulatory culture and ever-deepening habits of
delegation permeated drug standardization in National Health, both within Lancaster’s Food and
Drug Division and within the Laboratory of Hygiene. The Food and Drugs Act itself was strongly
premised upon the delegation of powers to standardize drugs. Statutory modes of delegation
included the effective delegation to pharmacopoeial works with primacy given to the British
Phamacopoiea, and the formal delegation to Cabinet to regulate standards of quality and
potency for biological drugs. In performing these powers for biologics, National Health officials
developed a long-standing habit of delegating themselves regulatory power without lawful
authority. In 1928, they purported to standardize drugs listed on Schedule B before any
Schedule B had been brought into existence; in 1934, they purported to supplant official tests
authorized to be prescribed in regulations with the internal bioassay methods practiced by staff
in the Laboratory of Hygiene; and in 1942, they purported to regulate human tissue preparations
when only animal tissue preparations were listed on Part II of Schedule B. Notably, these
practices of building bureaucratic power, without deferential regard to statutory constraints, were
never extended to sex hormones. With licensing viewed as an endorsement, National Health
regulators chose not to perform estrogen as a therapeutic substance. However, this habit of
legally dubious delegation would prove central to the creation of the Committee. Despite
opinions of the Department’s solicitors that adding a new “Part V” to Schedule B,
uncontemplated by the Act, would be an unlawful sub-delegation, Lancaster’s insistence that
drug standards created by the Committee should be housed in a new Part V prevailed.
Administrative lawyers past and present might, of course, reasonably disagree on the legality
of the 1942 order-in-council that established the Committee and its duties. They might say that
the intent, at least on the face of the order, was clear – the Committee would only give advice.
In this chapter, however, the goal has not (simply) been to assess the legality of the order, nor
of the Department’s earlier enactments. For the purpose of establishing that National Health’s
drug standardization practices embraced routine delegation of a regularly unauthorized nature,
it is enough to set out the legal concerns of the Department’s own solicitors at the time. Rather,
the objective is to describe the practices and techniques by which the Committee was achieved.
In this respect, the order performed several critical acts of “coordination”. First, the suggestion
that the Committee would serve an advisory role was essential in bringing together diverse
actors. A careful read of the order, and its silences, would have raised questions about the
nature, extent, and direction of such advice. Nonetheless, a nominally advisory role, with
vagueness on the limits of delegation, allowed the Committee to cohere. Still, as will be seen
with later actions on estrogen, the fragile understandings on the nature and extent of delegation
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to the Committee, that had plagued negotiations, never settled. As Mol observes, in practice,
controversies about an object are often dissolved or diffused, rather than stabilized or closed.
The order in council also performed multiplicity. Fundamentally, it held together two different
ways of regulating drugs. On its face, it assigned the Committee two duties: the duty to advise
the Department with regard to any modifications to the British Pharmacopoeia considered to be
necessary in the public interest; and the duty, upon request of the Department, to advise it on
proposed regulations respecting any drug included or to be included in Schedule B. The order
made this multiplicity “hang together”, in Mol’s words. It did so through addition – by adding two
modes of regulatory practice without regard to their overlapping aspects or potential tensions.
Finally, and critically, the order erased any traces of the legal dispute over Lancaster’s plan to
create a new Part V and allow the Committee to decide its contents. After months of internal
debate, and without anybody within the Department mounting a coherent legal defence of the
plan, National Health had little way to render the plan compatible with the Act. Therefore, the
regulatory technique adopted, to ensure the plan and the statute could hold together, was to
simply ignore and bracket out the incompatibility, by erasing any evidence of the plan from the
face of the order in council. This erasure would preclude the raising of any red flags, at the
Department of Justice or amongst stakeholders. Relatedly, another practice facilitating
delegation to the Committee was National Health officials’ habit of consulting Departmental
lawyers only after solidifying their regulatory intentions, a practice which skewed advice away
from developing legal options and towards finding ways to allow invalid proposals to proceed.
To conclude, this chapter has highlighted practices by which the delegation of drug standards
was done at National Health. Rather than apprehend delegation solely as a doctrine, delegation
can be considered a technological practice. The chapter has thus sought, tentatively, to bridge
an analysis of delegation in its doctrinal sense, with a more STS-inspired approach to how
realities are performed. Whether a committee born through a chain of translations initially
sparked by two persons’ desire to create national drug standards yet resulting in increased
industrial and bureaucratic power, or the drugs themselves that were later the subject of
standardization, new socio-material realities were done.
Indeed, by the fall of 1944, the Committee would effectively dictate standards of quality and
potency for over 200 drugs in a Canadian Supplement to the British Pharmacopoeia, including
for estrone, estradiol benzoate, and DES.150 In exchange, National Health officials would secure
the Committee’s technical input – and importantly, its legitimacy – on their upcoming regulatory
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Curran 1946 at 501.
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proposals, including its Sex Hormone Regulations. Many of the practices and techniques that
had enacted the Committee would soon be revived to enact estrogen. Furthermore, the multiple
ways of regulating drugs, reflected in the Committee’s composition and mandates, would
reverberate in how this new regulatory assemblage apprehended estrogen. Through diverse
institutional, epistemic, and regulatory practices, estrogen would be materialized multiply.
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Chapter Four
“At some loss as to the precise object you have in mind”: enacting estrogen multiply,
1943-1944
“The provision of reference standards for these preparations has been a difficult problem. At the time
physiologically active sex hormone preparations were introduced for sale on the Canadian market most
manufacturers appeared to be satisfied in expressing the potency of the product in terms of animal units,
with little regard to the design of the test, dosage response relationships, precision, reference standard or
any means of regulatory control of the activity of the product. Some manufacturers used small animals,
others large animals, depending on the method of assay used, and possibly there was a competitive
element for the greater number of units per dose. The chaotic state of affairs was well summed up by
Professor Burn of Oxford University when he stated that "the field of tame laboratory animals
has been nearly exhausted and it remains now for the bolder spirits to discover methods in which a lion or
elephant unit may be described.” – Leonard Pugsley (1951).
“May they multiply.” – toast given to pituitary hormones by Leonard Pugsley and others in Dr. Collip’s lab,
in the early 1930s.1

This chapter provides an account of how estrogen was standardized in Canada in the mid1940s. It follows a group of scientist-regulators, from within and outside the Department of
Pensions and National Health and centred on the Canadian Committee on Pharmacopoeial
Standards, assembled in the preceding chapter. This chapter also adds to that network those
government lawyers, in National Health and at the Department of Justice (DOJ), that joined this
cast of actors late in 1943 and provided legal advice on proposed regulations throughout the
first half of 1944.
When it came to standardizing estrogen, the Committee proceeded along two parallel – yet
rarely intersecting – regulatory tracks. On the first track, its members were creating new drug
standards in what would become the Canadian Supplement to the British Pharmacopoeia,
continuing the long-standing professional way of regulating drugs discussed in the last chapter.
On the second track, Committee members were simultaneously enlisted to review and comment
on National Health’s proposed Sex Hormone Regulations, part of an emerging administrative
mode of regulating drugs in which government agencies rather than physicians or pharmacists
would set standards. Section 1 of this chapter recounts disputes in and around the Committee,
in 1943, detailing how academic physicians and pharmacists, representatives of drug
manufacturers, and National Health officials debated the standardization of estrogen. The most

1

As referenced in Li 2003b at 94.
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sustained debate related to whether and if so what bioassay methods, aimed at testing potency,
should be adopted to identify sex hormones. These actors also debated how to apprehend
estrogens – as pure substances or as industry-made products – as well as questions of how
estrogen should be standardized, by whom, at what point in time, and in what (if any) doses.
These two regulatory tracks led, by the summer of 1944, to a series of new enactments.2
However, before each of the new regulations were made, National Health officials and
government lawyers raised concerns about their legal validity. Section 2 of this chapter explores
some legal techniques that were deployed by these regulators, and especially by DOJ counsel
Elmer Driedger, to work through and around the ultra vires aspects of these regulations. In
focusing on the details of technical practices that DOJ and National Health counsel regularly
employed to render as valid those draft regulations that they believed were legally dubious, this
thesis refuses the idea that drug regulation can be understood by reducing it solely to a
reflection of the power or interests of dominant social and economic actors. Instead, by looking
at the routine moves taken in the making of these regulations, one sees how socio-technical
orders were also performed with, and inseparable from, the personal, institutional, and
professional practices and habits of government lawyers. What estrogen would be and do, at
this time in Canada, was contingent on these legal “techniques of validating”, entangled as they
were with the government’s ability to purport to lawfully enact regulatory standards for estrogen.
Section 3 analyzes one specific enactment. Made in May 1944, the Sex Hormone
Regulations were unique as an exercise in drug standardization. They delegated to drug
manufacturers the power to choose assay methods, to prepare their own reference standards,
and, crucially, to decide on the doses of estrogen products. Additionally, the regulations
contained an unusual definition of “sex hormones”’; eschewing the usual references to biological
sources, physiological effects, or therapeutic functions, estrogen was defined as a product
“purporting” to have estrogenic properties. Perhaps the most historically noteworthy feature of
the Sex Hormone Regulations, however, and an element that would ultimately travel to other
regulatory areas such as cosmetics, was their novel approach to labelling. In devising new types
of potency labels and caution labels, the Regulations effectively replaced standards with labels,
aiming not to protect women consumers but rather to ensure that National Health was supplied
with industry information on test methods while avoiding responsibility for unsafe use or dosage.

2

Summarized here, the Canadian Supplement was dependent upon the creation of a new Part V of Schedule B to the Act, and
was itself ultimately made Division III of the general Food and Drug Regulations, in 1944. The Sex Hormone Regulations were
premised upon Part II of Schedule B to the Act, and would ultimately be made as part of Division II of those general regulations.
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Throughout the chapter, estrogen is shown to have been enacted as multiple varieties of the
same substance. Section 4 describes how this was most clearly realized and articulated by Esli
Woods, the Dean of Pharmacy at the University of Saskatchewan, at the Committee’s final
meeting of 1944. At this meeting, members addressed other frustrations with the effects of their
regulatory performances, including their concerns with drug manufacturers’ unresponsiveness
to National Health’s proposed methods for standardizing sex hormones. Unsurprisingly perhaps,
firms preferred the freedom to enact estrogen with varied and incommensurable potency tests.
Natural and synthetic, biological and chemical, pure substances and ready-made drug
product, pills and injections, prescribed by doctors and purchased over the counter, valuable
and worthless, safe and hazardous. As Dean Woods explained, these multiple varieties of
estrogen were material. They were not (just) scientific, cultural, or legal representations of
estrogen, but ontologically distinct entities, performed through legal-material practices with
sensitive rodents’ bodies, sticky caution labels, diverse dosage ranges, and deleted regulatory
preambles. In becoming therapeutic, estrogen emerged not just in laboratories, pharmaceutical
firms and clinics, but, in Canada in the 1940s, through regulators’ performances of material
distinctions in their efforts to define, enumerate, test, classify, and label estrogenic drugs.

1.

The Committee attempts to standardize estrogen, 1943
In three meetings and much more correspondence, over 1943, the physicians, pharmacists,

drug manufacturing researchers, and the Department’s own pharmaceutical chemists and
pharmacologist, aided by its sole endocrinologist, discussed dozens of new drug standards. No
drug proved more contentious than estrogen, in its various forms and modes.

1.i.

“Canadian Standards should specify methods of assay around which
everything seemed to centre”: the Committee meets, January 1943

The Committee members assembled for the first time on January 15 and 16, 1943, in the
library of the now-demolished Daly Building in Ottawa. From the outset, National Health officials
strategically centred the Department. With members gathering around a large U-shaped table,
the Chief Dominion Analyst, Harry Mills Lancanster, took up his position as Chair at the base of
the U. Lancaster was flanked by his assistant Aime Valin and by long-time analyst and
Committee Secretary Linton Davidson. Dr. Wodehouse, the Deputy Minister, attended much of
the meeting. On the Friday morning, he welcomed the Committee members with an assurance
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that they would be free to make any motions or recommendations, without restriction,
emphasizing that they were there because the Department sought the Committee’s direction.
Following Wodehouse’s warm welcome, Lancaster reset the tone. He gave extended opening
remarks in which he strongly intimated that members should defer to the Department on
challenging regulatory issues, giving as his example the regulation of sex hormones. It would be
necessary, he cautioned, “to avoid mistakes arising from the taking of snap judgments”, and the
Sex Hormone Regulations would call for the Committee’s “careful and mature” consideration
after it had heard from Dr. Pugsley.3
Pugsley was a biochemist who had worked with the Department’s Laboratory of Hygiene
since 1939. In the early 1930s, he had done master’s and doctoral studies at McGill,4 where he
had specialized in endocrinology. His doctorate had been supervised by Dr. Collip – the
acclaimed endocrinologist who, backed by Ayerst, had extracted and isolated the human and
equine estrogens that lead to the development of Emmenin and Premarin respectively.5 As the
Department’s only endocrinologist, in addition to conducting research,6 Pugsley was charged
with developing the Sex Hormone Regulations. In doing so, he worked closely with Dr. Clarence
(Clare) Morrell, the Laboratory of Hygiene’s senior pharmacologist.7 Morrell had joined the
Laboratory in 1930, after earning bachelor’s and master’s degrees from the University of
Toronto and a Ph.D. from Harvard, including time spent at Yale and the University of London,
and then working for two years with the West African Yellow Fever Commission in Nigeria.8

3

January 14-15 meeting minutes and materials, in Lancaster’s File, 1940-1943 and Davidson’s Committee Materials, 1943-1944.

4

“Reports to the Reader: About the Authors” (July 1951) 6 Food Drug Cosm LJ 483 [“About the Authors, 1951”] at 483-484.

5

Leonard I Pugsley, “Studies on Calcium and Phosphorus Metabolism” (PhD dissertation, McGill University, 1932)
[unpublished]. Pugsley worked in Collip’s lab during his graduate studies, publishing studies with him; see e.g. JB Collip, LI
Pugsley, H Selye and DL Thompson, “Observation Concerning the Mechanisms of Parathyroid Hormone Action” (1934) 15:6 Br J
Exp Pathol 335. See also Allison Li, “COLLIP, JAMES BERTRAM” in Dictionary of Canadian Biography, Vol. 19, University of
Toronto/Université Laval, 2003–, online: <http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/collip_james_bertram_19E.html>; and Li 2003b at
91. Allison Li tells a story about how Pugsley and other graduate students, travelling to a conference in the US during the
prohibition era, filled a number of bottles of Scotch for the trip and labelled them “emmenin”; see Li 2003b at 94.
6

After joining National Health, Pugsley published a number of scientific articles on hormones and bioassay methods; see
Leonard I Pugsley & Clare Morrell, “Variables Affecting the Biological Assay of Estrogens” (1943) 33:1 Endocrinol 48; Leonard I
Pugsley, “Application of the Principles of Statistical Analysis to the Biological Assay of Hormones” (1946) 39:3 Endocrinol 161; S.
Bird, LI Pugsley & MO Klotz, “The Quantitative Recovery of Synthetic Estrogens from Tissues of Birds (Gallus Domesticus), the
Response of the Birds’ Testis, Comb and Epidermis to Estrogen and of Humans to Ingestion of Tissues from Treated Birds”
(1947) 41:4 Endocrinol 282; CG Willis, SE Rampton & LI Pugsley, “Variables Affecting the Assay of Testosterone Propionate Using
the Seminal Vesicle Response of the Juvenile Castrated Male Rat” (1949) 44:3 Endocrinol 251. He also published a law journal
article on the regulation of endocrinal products; see Leonard I Pugsley, “Canadian Control of Endocrine Products” (1951) 6 Food
Drug Cosm LJ 532 at 533-534 [“Pugsley 1951”].
7

On Morrell’s scientific work, see Chapter 3, section 1 at notes 84-85.
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“About the Authors” (1954) 9 Food Drug Cosm LJ 500 [“About the Authors, 1954”] at 500; and “Reports to the Reader: About
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On the second day of the meeting, with Pugsley now also in attendance, the Committee
members were presented with his complete draft of the Sex Hormone Regulations. In effect,
members were being asked to comment on the Department’s settled regulatory conclusions,
rather than being invited to engage in any foundational or frank discussion about policy
objectives or a range of potential regulatory approaches.9 This effort to constrain and shape the
Committee’s input was not somehow justified by the simplicity of the regulatory task at hand. To
the contrary, as summarized by Pugsley himself a few years later, as seen in this chapter’s
opening quote, in the early 1940s in Canada, the nascent market for sex hormones was in a
“chaotic state of affairs”. Estrogenic products were being manufactured using wildly variant
means of expressing and testing potency, creating challenges for their regulatory control.
In briefing the Committee on the proposed regulations, Pugsley and Morrell explained that
they would define “sex hormone” to include all products, synthetic or natural, purporting to have
androgenic, estrogenic, gonadotrophic, or progestational properties. But how would National
Health officials know whether a product that purported to have “estrogenic properties” actually
did? In biological standardization, hormones were commonly defined by some characteristic
biological activity in a biological system – in a snappier ontological version, hormones were what
hormones did – so how would National Health know if a product was a sex hormone?
The solution presented by the draft regulations seemed, at least superficially, to reflect what
was then a quite uncontroversial approach to characterizing, testing, and standardizing
biologics, including estrogenic drugs. Pugsley had considered, in drafting the regulations, the
two central questions: how to measure if a substance was estrogenic, and what to measure this
substance against. Put more precisely, the draft regulations mentioned methods of assay for
measuring and expressing in quantitative units a drug’s estrogenic activity (also referred to as
potency or strength), and they prescribed certain physical reference materials that would serve
as standards of reference for measuring the potency of preparations.10 The theory of estrogenic

9

At this first meeting, Pugsley proffered no explanation as to why the Department proposed to regulate sex hormones separate
from the Biologicals Regulation, most recently amended in 1942. At that time, for all other biologics regulated under the Food
and Drugs Act, National Health had prescribed their standards of quality and potency in a substance-specific part of the existing
Biologicals Regulation. By contrast, for sex hormones, the Department was proposing a discrete, standalone regulation.
10

The standards referenced in the Sex Hormone Regulations were not textual standards but rather physical reference material.
In biological standardization, the word “standard” has two meanings: “It usually refers to a batch of samples of a reference
material – a ‘biological standard’ – with which other preparations of similar material are quantitatively compared. The
properties on which comparison are made are various; usually it is one or more kind of response of biological activity in a
biological test system – the biological assay. A measured amount of a biological substance is assigned to define a quantity of
that activity, in terms of a number of ‘units of biological activity’. In this sense, the International Unit (IU) to quantify biological
activity is analogous to the metre as the physical unit of length… the other common, qualitative, meaning of ‘standard’ is a set
of criteria or specifications to characterize quality, as in a monograph of a drug in a pharmacopoeia.” Derek R Bangham, A
History of Biological Standardization: the characterization and measurement of complex molecules important in clinical and
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identity underlying the draft regulations was therefore consistent with a physiological and
pharmacological conception of estrogen, namely that a product’s “estrogenic properties” would
be a function of bioassay testing for activity, rather than a chemical conception of estrogen in
which analytical chemical assays confirm the purity and amount of a constituent compound.
Combined, the reference material and the assay method would identify a sex hormone.
While in principle this was straightforward, Pugsley had struggled to prescribe potency
standards and reference standards in the draft regulations. With respect to reference standards,
as discussed further below,11 while the pure substances had standardized in the 1930s through
the League of Nations, finished drug products and mixtures had not been widely standardized.12
With respect to potency, the draft regulations became even less precise. Pugsley’s draft
stipulated that sex hormone products would be measured in “International Units, where those
existed”, to be estimated by test methods employed in the Laboratory of Hygiene. This potency
provision went on to state that where “International or Canadian Standards have not been
established and stable standards cannot be furnished by the manufacturer, the methods of
assay and of expressing potency shall be acceptable to the Chief of the Laboratory of
Hygiene”.13 As of 1943, endocrinologists understood that there were two International Units for
estrogens,14 which in manufacturing and regulatory practices had often been confused. As
summarized by two US government pharmacologists in a 1941 article, the “existence of two
international standards with the correlated two international units, not equivalent in biological
potency, has caused misunderstanding and confusion in the minds of many individuals…The
erroneous concept that an international unit of estrogenic potency is a single standard is widely
accepted.”15 Confusion was augmented in Pugsley’s draft by his slide away from biological units
and towards chemical assay. This occurred in a labelling provision – dropped from the final
regulation – that required packaging to state a product’s potency expressed either in
International Units or on a weight volume basis for pure products.16 Furthermore, although by

research medicine (Bristol: Society for Endocrinology, 1999) [“Bangham 1999”] at 7. See also Chapter 1, section 1.ii; and Lezaun
2012.
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Draft Sex Hormone Regulations, January 15, 1943, in Library and Archives Canada, Department of Health fonds, RG 29,
“Canadian Committee on Pharmacopoieal Standards”, 1942/06-1943/10, volume 252, file no. 339-4-8 (Part 1) [“(Possibly)
Morrell’s Committee file, 1942-1943”].
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Draft Sex Hormone Regulations, January 15, 1943, s 4(d), in (Possibly) Morrell’s Committee file, 1942-1943. A unit measured
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1941 the potency of estrogenic preparations was “almost universally estimated by some
modification of the Allen-Doisy vaginal smear technique on rodents”, the regulatory control of
estrogenic drugs involved modifications to this technique to reflect the fact that preparations, not
pure substances, were being tested, and “to allow statistical evaluation of the results.”17
Moreover, increasing uniformity in research and regulatory laboratories was not paralleled in
manufacturing practices, where assay procedures remained diverse and even firms using the
Allen-Doisy method often modified it. Finally, consistent with National Health’s approach since
1934 to many Part II biologics, Pugsley’s draft regulations did not attempt to stabilize methods
directly in law. His draft was silent on the potency test methods that should be used to identify
sex hormones, and subdelegated to departmental officials the power to decide on test methods.
Pugsley’s effort to address the potency of sex hormone products did not sit well with the
Committee. Committee members felt that Canadian regulatory standards for sex hormones
fundamentally would need to specify methods of assay, around which, in the words of the
minutes, “everything seemed to centre.”18 As experts in biological standardization understood,
the measurement made the material: “the identity of certain hormones is virtually ‘defined’ by
the reference material and the particular assay method used to quantify activity.”19 A regulation
purporting to govern sex hormone preparations, that failed to prescribe the methods by which
sex hormones were identified and defined, was no sex hormone regulation at all. In Committee
members’ minds, the chaotic diversity of estrogenic potency should be circumscribed through
careful selection of assay methods, defined unitage, and reference materials.
The National Health officials strongly resisted the idea that test methods should be
prescribed in the regulations themselves. With his 13 years of experience with the Biologicals
Regulation and with the amendments made, in 1934 and 1942, allowing for sub-delegation of
methods to bureaucrats, Morrell argued for departmental discretion. He characterized the
Department’s concern as financial. Inevitably, he noted, methods of biological standardization
would change, such that prescribing test methods in the regulations themselves would require
constant and expensive regulatory amendments. To break the deadlock, he offered that the
Laboratory of Hygiene could instead informally distribute its internal bioassay methods, upon
application by universities or manufacturers. Their interests satisfied, the professors backed
down. With a motion moved by Henderson and seconded by Cook, the Committee
recommended that the Department multigraph its biological test methods and supply them
17

Curtis & Witt 1941 at 364.
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loose-leaf form “to as large a group as necessary, including teachers in Colleges of Medicine
and Pharmacy and University Libraries.”20 This would not be the only time, in their discussions
of standardizing estrogen, that in performing their mandate to provide advice on drug standards,
the academics would conflate their teaching and research interests with the public interest.
Always keen to ensure access to test methods, the professors frequently regarded regulations
prescribing drug standards less as a means to protect public health and more as codified
teaching aids. One member went so far, at the next meeting, to criticize the draft monographs
intended for the future Canadian Supplement as too “cold and legalistic in their phraseology”
and as not elaborate or detailed enough for teaching pharmacy students.21
Though methods of standardization received the most sustained attention at the meeting,
they were not the only aspect of the draft regulations considered by the Committee. Shedding
light on a perceived purpose of the regulations, Committee members also discussed the classes
of products that the regulations should “recognize”.22 Far from aiming to restrict the composition,
manufacture, sale or use of sex hormone products, the regulations were premised on giving sex
hormones official government recognition, in effect endorsing them as drugs. Revealing
manufacturers’ support for the regulations, Cook advocated that their coverage be extended to
apply to additional types of estrogenic drugs. With an eye to Ayerst’s strategy for differentiating
Premarin from other estrogenic drugs, he suggested that the regulations should be amended to
recognize hormone preparations into two distinct categories: one for oestrogenic substances,
administered by injection; one for conjugated substances, given by mouth. With no dissention,
Pugsley agreed to amend the draft regulations accordingly, thus ensuring greater regulatory
recognition and market differentiation for Ayerst’s conjugated brew of equine estrogens.23
During this discussion of the draft regulations, only one Committee member expressed
concern with the hazards of sex hormones. Wing Commander Dr. Ray F. Farquharson, of the
University of Toronto medical faculty, took the position that sex hormone products should only
be sold on prescription. Prescriptions were one of the few means, absent prohibition, by which
dangerous drugs could be controlled in Canada. The idea that potentially injurious drugs should

20
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be sold only on prescription was quite new in Canadian law;24 the first regulation under the Act
that enumerated a list of potent drugs, prohibited for sale to the public without prescriptions, was
made in 1941.25 As Davidson commented in his departmental history, drugs added to the 1941
prescription list either had “a narrow margin between an effective and a poisonous dose or may
produce undesirable effects if taken for long periods without competent supervision.”26 Over a
decade’s worth of studies had suggested a correlation between estrogen dosage and toxicity,
so Farquharson’s recommendation was not scientifically controversial. However, no Committee
member supported his recommendation, and the suggestion was never raised again.
At the very first meeting of the Committee, the ontological precariousness of estrogen thus
came into view. Estrogen’s status as socio-technical and legal object – rather than a purely
natural object – is underscored by the debate on the need to regulate bioassay methods in
order to apprehend estrogens.27 From the outset, National Health and the Committee appear as
a regulatory site where, beyond laboratories and clinics, estrogen would be materialized.

1.ii.

“At some loss as to the precise object you have in mind”: apprehending
estrogen as pure substance or as ready-made drug product, early 1943

Over the course of 1943, and as anticipated by the order in council establishing it, the
Committee was engaged in two parallel regulatory activities. On the one hand, the Committee
was reviewing and providing comments on Dr. Pugsley’s draft Sex Hormone Regulations. In
entirely separate discussions, it was also developing a new Canadian Supplement to the British
Pharmacopoeia. Both regulatory activities would immediately come to engage estrogen. Just as
rapidly, it would become evident that the estrogen performed in the practices of bureaucrats,
manufacturers, and professors of medicine and pharmacy was not the same estrogen.
After its first meeting, the Committee members continued to flesh out their list of candidate
drugs for inclusion in the Canadian Supplement. As Davidson had responsibility for drafting all
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the monographs, in March, Henderson sent Davidson a revised list of drugs.28 Newly on his list
were estrone and estradiol benzoate,29 as, at the end of 1942, both substances had been added
to the US Pharmacopoeia (“USP”).30 After discussing the substances with Pugsley,31 Davidson
wrote back to Henderson. Pugsley, he advised, “seemed to be at some loss as to the precise
object you have in mind”.32 Rather than see the two estrogens as drug entities appropriate for
pharmacopeial monographs, Pugsley saw them as manufactured, pre-made, industry products.
As estrone and estradiol benzoate preparations would be controlled under his forthcoming Sex
Hormone Regulations, Pugsley saw no need for them to be included in the Supplement.
Henderson was befuddled. While he did not hold “any very strong brief” for including estrone
and estradiol benzoate in the Supplement, and he appreciated that hormone products would be
controlled by future regulations, he nonetheless felt that “surely it is advantageous to have a
definition of such pure and active substances as these” included in Supplement. In his view,
these definitions would “doubtless form the reference substances for hormonal testing and a
complete description of their characteristics should be available for workers and practitioners”.33
This was not reducible to divergent views on how these substances should be represented.
Rather, multiple versions of estrone and estradiol benzoate were realized – made real – in
relation to diverse scientific and regulatory practices. Oudshoorn has shown how divergent
material practices, in different and networked disciplines, shaped concepts about sex hormones:
“hormonal drugs are neither ready-made laboratory products that are subtly marketed to their
audiences, nor are they compounds simply discovered in nature. The specific “nature” of the
drug and the interests that become embodied in it are shaped in the networks of the different
groups that called hormonal drugs into existence”.34 Gaudillière has similarly shown how
divergent testing logics and practices existed within different manufacturing firms’ laboratories.35
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Likewise, within biological testing practices, difference was performed by testing done in
regulatory control of drug products or in pharmacological characterization of pure substances.
Working in the Laboratory of Hygiene, which had regulatory responsibilities for controlling
industry products by testing them on laboratory animals to determine if their activity and identity
corresponded with their labels, Pugsley was occupied by whether an estrogenic preparation did
(and therefore was) what its manufacturer claimed. As of 1942, when Pugsley first drafted the
regulations, estrogenic preparations had emerged on the market in three basic forms: in oil
solutions, in aqueous solutions, and as tablets, capsules, or powders. Of these, most
preparations on the market were oil solutions with “quite high” potency intended for parenteral
administration, while the various aqueous extracts by contrast tended either to have little activity
or quickly deteriorated, and the oral tablets were only just appearing.36 Not only did the product
form change regulatory tests, but the specific formulants were also highly material. These
nontherapeutic agents played many roles, whether “to emulsify, stabilize, suspend, preserve,
dilute, solubilize or flavour”,37 and were essential partners in any dosage form or preparation.
Indeed, these agents lived up to their names. They acted to sometimes radically change
potency test results; as Doisy explained, “[d]epending on the solvent and on the division of the
dose, estrone may be four or two hundred and sixty-six times as potent as estriol”.38 Thus, for
Pugsley, estrone and estradiol benzoate only became “estrogenic” when mixed with
nontherapeutic agents like oils, fats, or milk, presented in a liquid solution, tablet, or ointment,
and delivered in various doses to various animals. In the Laboratory of Hygiene, an enforcement
chemist was required to “rely entirely on the results of his analysis of the finished product”, and
to “use analytical procedures which give him accurate information on the amount of the drug
present and assure him that the values obtained have not been influenced in any way by the
presence of other substances in the formulation”.39 This challenge was pronounced with orallyadministered conjugated estrogen products, for which there was no generally accepted assay
method nor official reference standard, and which, when tested with existing methods, proved
that labelled potencies were wildly imprecise.40 For Henderson, a university-based
pharmacologist, estrone and estradiol benzoate were estrogenic and could be known as such,
36

Curtis & Witt 1941 at 364-365; and Trites 1940 at 100. Trites indicates that, as of January 1940, a single topical estrogen
preparation, marked as “Progynon-DH Lanel” and manufactured by the German firm Schering, had appeared on the Canadian
market. However, it is unclear whether this product remained available in Canada by 1943.
37

Blake 1976 at 279; see also generally 279-84.

38

Edward Doisy, “The Estrogenic Substances” (1941) 16:6 JAMA 501 [“Doisy 1941”] at 504.

39

Frank H Wiley, “The Analysis of Drugs” (1961) 16 Food Drug Cosm LJ 733 [“Wiley 1961”] at 735.

40

William Homer Lawrence & CW Chapman, “The Bioassay of Some Commercial Conjugated Estrogens” (1952) XLI:11 J Am
Pharm Assoc 624 [“Lawrence & Chapman 1952”].

101

regardless of product mixtures. Not engaged in the regulatory practice of testing manufacturers’
claims, his laboratory practice would primarily involve working with “pure” substances and
extracts. In regulatory testing in the Laboratory of Hygiene, and in pharmacological research at
the University of Toronto, estrone and estradioal benzoate were simply different things.
Though not put in such terms by Pugsley or Henderson, one might also reduce their dispute
to the question, as much legal as ontological, of whether these two estrogens were “medicine”,
to be administered to patients, or were “drugs”, a concept encompassing drug ingredients,
substances, or materials. The Act was not particularly helpful in answering such a question.
Legally speaking, after the 1939 amendments, “drugs” were defined as a broader category of
substance than “medicines”. A drug included inter alia “all medicine for internal or external use
for man or animal” and “any substance, mixture of substances and any article that may be used
for the diagnosis, treatment, mitigation or prevention of disease in man or animal”. Medicine, on
the other hand, was itself defined to mean “any substance or mixture of substances that may be
used in restoring, correcting or modifying organic functions”.41 That is, a drug was defined to
mean both a medicine ready for administration to humans and also a medicinal ingredient or
article. Further, the Act simultaneously provided that “drugs” could be mentioned or described in
Schedule B,42 and that “any material” could be added to or removed from Schedule B.43 When
considered through the lens of the statute, estrone and estradiol benzoate were drug and
medicine, substance and mixture, article and material.44 When considered in the hands of
practitioners, the laboratory practices and tests that performed these estrogens were multiple.
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Changing industrial dynamics were also at play. Henderson’s understanding of the role of
pharmacopoeia was that which had predominated in decades and indeed centuries past, when
pharmacopoeia guided drug making. By the 1940s, at the beginning of what some would call
the therapeutic revolution, the function of pharmacopoeia was evolving, as they increasingly
became reference rather than recipe books, and as pharmacists increasingly became suppliers
of pharmaceutical firms’ products rather than drug makers.45 Canadian pharmacists were not
whipping up complex estrogenic drugs in pharmacy backrooms, yet nonetheless Henderson
held to the principled position that all drugs should be defined in pharmacopoeia.
When the Committee gathered for its second meeting, in June 1943, and it turned to the draft
list of drugs for the Canadian Supplement, the estrogens proved to be the most controversial.
Their inclusion on the list triggered a deeper and sustained debate among Committee members,
one that engaged fundamental epistemic and ontological issues of how to apprehend, construct,
reflect, and respond to the troublesome and temperamental estrogens.46 From the outset,
Ayerst’s scientist Dr. Cook challenged the proposed inclusion of estrone and estradiol benzoate.
Resonant with Pugsley’s earlier views, Cook felt that these standards simply were not needed.
Of the commercially available drug products containing oestrone and oestradiol benzoate, 95%
were manufactured in the United States to standards under the USP, arriving in Canada in
ready-made, mass-produced dosage forms (whether tablets, capsules, suppositories, or singledose injections). With Ayerst having just been acquired by a US drug firm in March 1943,47
Cook adopted a discourse of Canadian regulatory impotence. He argued that Canadian
regulators had no ability to influence potency standards embedded within imported drugs, or
relatedly, the doses in which those drugs would be offered on the Canadian market.
The medical professionals, in contrast, insisted on the need for National Health to be as
comprehensive as possible in its drug standardization efforts. Henderson insisted that these two
substances be standardized to assist physicians, and Esli L. Woods, the young new Dean of the
University of Saskatchewan’s pharmacy faculty, also emphasized that the Supplement should
be as complete a guide as possible for pharmacists. The discourse that Henderson and Woods
leveraged hinged on a principle of “no special treatment” and on the assumed value of providing
as much information as possible to practitioners – regardless of whether that information would,
practically speaking, make any difference to Canadian physicians prescribing imported drugs.
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National Health officials slid between and combined discourses of futility and pragmatism.
The department’s senior pharmacologist, Dr. Morrell, agreed with Cook that, because estrone
and estradiol benzoate were not administered “in pure form” but typically arrived on the
Canadian market in ready-prepared dosages, that rather than try to standardize these
substances through the Supplement, they could instead be controlled post-manufacture under
the future Sex Hormone Regulations.48 Intriguingly foreshadowing the shift from standards to
labelling that would ultimately be achieved in the Sex Hormone Regulations,49 Lancaster
suggested that instead of promoting drug standardization per se, these new regulations would
nonetheless ensure drug uniformity by requiring the use of proper names. When the Ayerst
scientist doubled down, arguing that tethering manufacturers to standards would remove
incentives to improve products, Morrell interjected to remind everyone that, unlike in the U.S.,
there was no process in Canada for regulators to test the safety of new drugs. In this way,
National Health adopted industry’s futility discourse while deploying that same message to
stress, subtly, that Canadian regulators should still take whatever action was open to them to fill
any gaps left by the US FDA. Unspoken in this debate, but surely hovering over it, was the fact
that Premarin had been marketed in Canada before the US FDA ever deemed it to be safe.
Also unspoken in the debate, at least expressly, was women’s health. Patients went
unmentioned. So did consumer protection. Nobody expressed any views on the perceived value
of these two estrogens to treat any disorders. The physicians and pharmacists emphasized that
estrogens should not be exempted from standards; manufacturers asserted the realities of US
market control and the underlying industrial standards built into imported drugs; and National
Health officials accepted the difficulty of influencing manufacturers while identifying other
regulatory avenues towards uniformity. All participants were concerned with standardization, if
from diverse logics. Yet the women who would consume these drugs disappeared from view.
At a stalemate, the Committee members broke for lunch at the Chateau Laurier. That
afternoon, without further discussion, they decided to include estrone and estradiol benzoate in
the Supplement.50 Rather than squarely resolve the dispute by forcing a decision as to which
logic or practice of standardization should take priority when determining whether a drug should
be added to the Supplement, the members appear to have bracketed their disagreement.
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The same debate re-opened the next day. This time, though, it involved DES. Morrell queried
whether stilboestrol and stilboestrol dipropionate should be included in the Supplement, as had
been proposed by Henderson. Surprisingly, Cook reversed his position from that taken the
previous day, and advocated that stilboestrol and stilboestrol dipropionate be included, although
he advocated that the two monographs not be completed until the British Pharmacopoeia
Commission finalized its next addendum. The Committee agreed, and Cook assumed personal
responsibility for reviewing the draft DES monographs before the Committee’s next meeting.51
Thus Ayerst would have significant influence in determining what DES would be and would do.
Charged with advising on how DES should be enacted, Cook delayed giving any advice.
Over the summer, Davidson persistently sought his input on the draft DES monographs. For
stilboestrol, Davidson had based his work on the draft USPXII monograph, but for stilboestrol
dipropionate, with little guidance material available, Davidson had prepared a “more or less
skeleton draft”, 52 and asked Cook to fill in the details.53 To the great frustration of National
Health officials, Cook ignored these repeated entreaties (including Davidson’s effort to enlist
Cook’s secretary in securing his reply).54 With the Committee’s fall meeting approaching,
Lancaster had to intervene, by making a long-distance phone call that spurred Cook to return
the DES monographs with his revisions. However, they were not returned in time to circulate in
the package of materials that Committee members were expected to review before assembling
that fall. With no other members ever engaging in such non-responsive behaviour, National
Health officials came to view Cook’s delay as a deliberate tactic rather than an oversight. 55
Premarin was being actively positioned by Ayerst as the main competitor to DES, yet nobody
contemplated whether asking Ayerst’s research director to draft standards for the quality, purity,
and potency of DES might pose a conflict of interest. The technical details of these standards
were by no means neutral – they had political, economic, and ethical consequences. DES had
been characterized, in laboratories and in advertisements, as the most potent of the estrogenic
51
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drugs. When it came to potency, Premarin was at a competitive disadvantage. Yet Davidson
advised Cook that, if Cook saw fit to exclude a unit of potency for stilboestrol in its monographs,
then the Committee would surely agree with Cook’s advice.56 When Cook finally sent comments
on the DES monographs, despite that they followed the USPXII monograph “rather closely”, he
nonetheless suggested changes. He recommended that the DES monographs should “omit the
statement of potency in international units, as these standards are applicable strictly only to
oestrone or to oestradiol monahenzoate (sic)”.57 Beyond concealing DES’ potency, he also
advocated to widen the dosage range, and to mention two modes of administration.58 Sensitive
to the greater potency of DES, Ayerst was working to brand its Premarin tablets, characterized
by oral administration and flexible dosage, as more convenient and less nauseating.
The Supplement monographs were not the only matter of debate. Continuing to engage in the
disjointed practice established at its very first meeting, at its June 1943 meeting, the Committee
again considered the Department’s draft Sex Hormone Regulations entirely separately from the
question of whether to standardize estrogens in the Supplement. Not only did they address
these regulations at different moments in their meetings, but in different terms. In contrast to
their discussion of the Supplement, during which Committee members referred to estrone,
estradiol, stilboestrol, or other such common names, when discussing the Department’s Sex
Hormone Regulations, they shifted to speak of “sex hormones” or “sex hormone preparations”.59
Their discussion of the draft regulations continued to centre heavily on what methods of assay
should be adopted by National Health. That spring, Pugsley and Morrell had written down the
bioassay methods then being used in the Laboratory of Hygiene to test three substances – the
“male hormone”, the “oestrus-producing hormones”,60 and chorionic gonadotrophins – and
Davidson had circulated these methods documents to the Committee. While most members
reviewed the internal test methods favourably, Cook claimed that the methods were not actually
used by any manufacturers; if manufacturers were materializing estrogenic drugs using variant
potency tests, that could undercut National Health’s ability to test and control those products.
Once again, the Committee’s proceedings featured onto-epistemological divergence on the
question of what “oestrus-producing hormones” were, what they did, and how to measure them.

56

July 5, 1934 letter from Davidson to Cook, in Davidson’s Committee Materials, 1943-1944.

57

September 16, 1943 letter from Cook to Davidson, in Davidson’s Committee Materials, 1943-1944. Cook’s recommendation
was consistent with some of the leading literature; see e.g. Doisy 1941. His recommendation was adopted both for stilboestrol
and for stilboestrol dipropionate. Both prescribed the Doisy-Allen test but neither used International Units to express potency.
58

In the final Canadian Supplement, the first of these two recommendations by Cook was rejected and the second accepted.

59

For the historiography on the scientific shifts in the names assigned to the steroid “sex” hormones, see Chapter 1, section 1i.

60

This was the collective name assigned in the Department’s bioassay methods document for estrone and estradiol benzoate.

106

And once again, the debate was not resolved but rather deferred. Rather than counter Cook’s
claims about the industry’s practices, a sex hormone sub-committee was formed. Comprised of
Cook, Morrell and Henderson, the sex hormone sub-committee was tasked with consulting US
commercial laboratories on their assay methods, and with reporting back at the next meeting.

1.iii.

“It was not for the officers of the Department to take a stand …until they
were satisfied that there was danger to the public”: the Committee meets,
October 1943

Perhaps over the summer of 1943 Cook was busily consulting US drug manufacturers on
their bioassay methods; perhaps he had lacked the time to review the DES monographs;
perhaps, as he said, it had been an unusually strenuous summer.61 Or, perhaps, knowing that
the Canadian Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (“CMPA”) was planning an
intervention, Cook’s delay was meant to ensure that he acted consistently with the CPMA.
At the Committee’s fall meeting, held over October 1-2, 1943, and without prior notice, the
CPMA submitted four resolutions.62 One resolution expressed concern that industry was not
being afforded sufficient time to study the Committee’s proposed recommendations that
involved changes to regulations.63 The CPMA intervention was less than well received. The
Deputy Minister intervened swiftly and forcefully with the CPMA president. Wodehouse claimed
that Committee members were not to lobby for industry interests, and that the CPMA should
instead communicate with him. As mentioned, Wodehouse had taken largely the opposite
position the previous year, when he was seeking the CPMA’s support for the Committee.64 With
the Committee an ongoing site of struggle between medical professions, government, and
industry, the ongoing tactical efforts to position industry scientists simultaneously as
independent advisors and industry representatives were to be expected.
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Aside from this drama, this meeting in October 1943 proved pivotal in enacting estrogen.
The first item up for discussion was bioassay methods in the Sex Hormone Regulations. On
behalf of the sex hormones sub-committee, Cook provided an interim report, drafted on a
Chateau Laurier notepad right before the meeting. He reported that he had now contacted U.S.
commercial laboratories - and, as it turned out, there would be little criticism from US firms of
the Department’s bioassay methods for the estrogens. However, one US firm had suggested
that more study was needed on the bioassay methods for gonadotrophins. Thus, reflecting
Morrell’s desire to avoid prescribing methods of assay directly in the Sex Hormone Regulations,
Cook concluded his report by advising that the sub-committee would expedite its study of
bioassay methods so that National Health could later publish a “book of official methods”.65
By the October meeting, then, a clear question was emerging for the Committee’s decision:
who should decide how to measure the potency of sex hormones, and when should this occur?
This question was squarely at issue when the Committee returned to the Sex Hormone
Regulations on the second day of the meeting. Noting that it was “rather futile” to finalize
regulations before settling on methods of assay, Henderson advocated that the Department
should wait until the methods were ready before it made the regulations. At this point, a member
shifted the discussion away from methods and towards reference standards, allowing Morrell to
emphasize his long-favoured means by which sex hormone preparations could be standardized.
Rather than wait for methods, Morrell suggested, National Health would create reference
standards based on manufacturers’ submitted samples of their hormonal products. Henderson
agreed that where no reference standards already existed, the Department should accept a
manufacturer’s standard, however this did not resolve who should determine the test methods
for potency, and whether this should occur before the regulations were made.
Discussion was shut down by the Deputy Minister. Robert Wodehouse was attending the
meeting during the discussion of the Sex Hormone Regulations. He expressed his view that:
“…the Department should not discourage, through lack of knowledge, any company or
laboratory from continuing research and attempting to bring out new products so long as
no harm was being done. It was not for the officers of the Department to take a stand, in
any new field, until they were satisfied that there was danger to the public.”66
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With this remarkable intervention by Wodehouse, who was merely a guest and observer, the
Committee backed off any further scrutiny of the Sex Hormone Regulations. Immediately
following his intervention, Committee members voted to defer the question of whether sex
hormone products should be licensed. They would never return to this question. Furthermore,
the Committee decided to give advance approval to the regulations, passing a motion that it
would “agree in principle to the proposed Sex Hormone Regulations after they had been
redrafted and received, but before being submitted to council”. A few weeks later, in the course
of routine correspondence seeking approval of minutes, Davidson enclosed the revised draft of
the regulations, casually noting that he was “assuming” that members approved.67 No member
ever provided any further comments on the draft regulations.68 The Deputy Minister had aligned
with Ayerst’s position that Canada should not standardize the potency of estrogenic drugs,
which would be allowed to multiply with many doses, test methods, and standards. Estrogenic
drugs could be as potent as industry preferred, manufactured in whatever doses it desired.
From here, estrogenic multiplicity snowballed even further. Maintaining its disjointed and
bifurcated approach, the Committee considered, again separately from the Sex Hormone
Regulations, the estrogens proposed to be listed on the Canadian Supplement. It gave final
approval to all the monographs that would be included in the Supplement, and to the full list of
drugs that it was recommending become Part V of Schedule B to the Act.69 The monographs
and the Part V list included estrone, estradiol benzoate, stilbestrol, and stilbestrol dipropionate.
On the face of it, these estrogens were about to be standardized in Canada. Or were they? On
closer review, the monographs embedded many ambiguities, delegations, and diversities. First,
in the estrone and estradiol benzoate monographs, the assay method for potency was left to the
discretion of the Laboratory of Hygiene. That is, while these monographs adopted International
Units for expressing potency, they did not set out a method for measuring the potency of
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estrone and estradiol benzoate.70 Furthermore, the stated dose ranges described were fairly
wide. The monographs for stilboestrol and stilboestrol dipropionate were silent both on the
unitage and the method of assay for potency. This silence on bioassay methods was atypical in
pharmacopoeias, although it did align with the Department’s (unlawful) approach to
subdelegating to the Chief of the Laboratory the power to prescribe how potency would be
expressed and tested for numerous biological drugs under the Biologicals Regulation.
Another ambiguity, also related to assay methods, was whether these four substances were
biological substances or chemical compounds. At this meeting, members had debated whether
to include any structural chemical formulae at all, in any of the monographs.71 At Dean Hurst’s
motion, the diagrams were generally included. The monographs for the four estrogens enact
these substances, to differing degrees, as both biological and chemical. Each featured a
chemical diagram, and the DES monographs included chemical tests for identity and purity.
Finally, intriguingly, neither the estrone nor the estradiol benzoate monographs identify any
“estrogenic properties” of the substances. By contrast, under the “tests for identity”, the two DES
monographs each state that these two substances produce “vaginal oestrus in ovariectomized
adult female albino rats following the subcutaneous injection of 0.002 mg in oil”. No such effects
or properties are identified for estrone or estradiol benzoate (nor did the monographs identify
any symptoms, diseases, or disorders that these estrogens were meant to treat). Yet, as will be
discussed further, in the Sex Hormone Regulations, the definition of a “sex hormone”, its very
identity, was stated to hinge on its purported estrogenic properties. In the Regulations, what an
estrogen was depended on what it was purported to do. Here, in the Supplement, the very place
that Henderson originally envisioned would provide definition of these pure substances, the
monographs declined to define these two estrogens by how they would act with bodies.

2. Techniques of validating: enacting Part V, the Canadian Supplement, the
Parenteral Regulations, and the Sex Hormone Regulations
At its meeting in October 1943, the Committee ultimately endorsed a heterogenous group of
laboratory, manufacturing, and enforcement practices that, taken together, served to materialize
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estrogen in many different forms, potencies, and properties. However, legal vehicles were
needed to drive these practices and potencies forward. Specifically, the government of Canada
still needed to formally enact, as law, the Canadian Supplement (and a new Part V of Schedule
B) and the Sex Hormone Regulations (and amendments to Part II of Schedule B). Before they
could be made, National Health solicitors and DOJ counsel were required to perform these
enactments as intra vires. This section describes the “techniques of validating” that were
employed by these officials to materialize these enactments and their estrogens.
As described in the last chapter, Harry Lancaster, the Chief Dominion Analyst, had long
insisted that the necessary precondition to enacting the Canadian Supplement was to amend
Schedule B of the Act by adding an entirely new “Part V” to the schedule, only after which could
legally binding drug standards of quality and potency, in the form of the Supplement, be made
for those drugs.72 As seen, however, his plan had received a rough ride from National Health’s
other senior officials and its solicitors Gunn and Russell, which was only resolved with the
erasure of this plan from the order in council creating the Committee. Still, in 1943, the fact
remained that on its face the Act spoke of Schedule B as comprising four discrete parts – Parts I
through IV. It did not mention any Part V, nor did it explicitly authorize adding new Parts.
Moreover, National Health solicitors remained unconvinced of the plan’s validity. On
December 15, 1943, Gunn sent National Health’s draft order in council proposing to amend
Schedule B to DOJ. The proposal was twofold – it added the Committee’s list of drugs, including
oestrone, oestradiol benzoate, stilboestrol, and stilboestrol dipropionate, in a new Part V; and it
revised Part II of the schedule by, among other changes, adding “Sex Hormones”.73 When
transmitting the proposal to the Deputy Minister of DOJ, Gunn expressed his doubts that
Cabinet had the jurisdiction to add the new Part V.74
The matter was assigned to Elmer Driedger, at that time a relatively junior counsel, but
already with expertise in legislative drafting. Before preparing his advice, he met with Lancaster.
In their meeting, Driedger suggested that the significance of the four Parts may have been
removed by the statutory amendment adding s. 3(1)(i) in 1934, a suggestion finding no obvious
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support in the text or legislative history of the 1934 amendments.75 Together, they concluded
that Part V could be justified as authorized by s. 3(1)(i) of the Act. Yet, lacking confidence in the
legality of this conclusion, they decided to erase mention of s. 3(1)(i) from the face of the order
amending Schedule B. Just as with the creation of the Committee, where the foundation of the
order amending Schedule B was legally dubious, the solution was to render the order silent.76
Driedger then provided a written opinion that was equally difficult to square with the Act.77
He framed the question as whether the Governor in Council had authority to add a new Part to
Schedule B. In answering this affirmatively, he relied primarily on s. 3(1)(i). As he noted, this
provision empowered the Governor in Council to add such “material” to Schedule B as the
Minister deemed necessary in the public interest; he argued that, construed literally, s. 3(1)(i)
authorized the Governor in Council to “add or remove anything from the schedule”. However, to
“add any material” had a different literal meaning than to “add anything, including new parts.”
Indeed, his construction of “any material” was inconsistent with National Health’s own position a
few years later (after Lancaster had retired). As explained in a 1949 journal article by its then
legal advisor Robert Curran, “the Department interpreted the word ‘material’ to mean drugs or
classifications of drugs”.78 That interpretation of “any material” to mean any material substance
in the form of drugs is, literally, more defensible than “the parts comprising the schedule”.
Driedger sought to bolster this questionable literal construction with a purposive one, opining
that the purpose of the 1934 amendment adding s. 3(1)(i) to the Act was “to provide flexibility
necessary to meet changing conditions resulting from advancements in science and alterations
for trade conditions”. Anticipating the question of why flexibility would somehow be frustrated by
having to add the Canadian Supplement drugs to existing Parts of Schedule B, he wrote that the
“Department does not wish to include them in the existing parts because then it would be
necessary to revise completely the existing regulations.” Without any further elaboration, this
logic is flawed, as listing drugs in the existing parts of Schedule B did not trigger any regulatory
action – listing was just a precondition for those drugs to be regulated later, if so desired. As he
had discussed doing with Lancaster, Driedger also removed most preambular recitals from the
draft order amending Schedule B, ensuring it was silent on its doubtful source of authority.
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Through ongoing and routine interactions with departmental and DOJ solicitors on the everincreasing volume of subordinate legislation being enacted under the Food and Drugs Act,
National Health officials were coming to register the significance of this emerging technique of
stripping enactments’ preambular recitals of references to sources of authority.79 For example,
when later briefing Aime Valin, then in his role as the new Chief Dominion Analyst after
Lancaster’s retirement in 1945, Davidson carefully emphasized that the recitals in the order
amending Schedule B had intentionally referred only to the Act generally and not to any specific
sections of it. Silencing the recitals was, in this time, becoming a quotidian practice increasingly
employed by National Health to enact delegated drug standards and thus to materialize drugs.
With no consultation within the wider Department on the contents or purpose of Part V, the
(silenced) order amending Schedule B was made on January 11, 1944.80 Before that date, sex
hormones and estrogens had never been mentioned in Schedule B. After that date, with the
addition of sex hormones to Part II, and of oestrone, oestradiol benzoate, stilboestrol, and
stilboestrol dipropionate to Part V, the statutory scene changed from one of estrogen-deficiency
to hormonal excess. The enactment of estrogenic multiplicity was not accidental; or, put more
accurately, Lancaster and other departmental officials on the Committee were aware that
estrogen was assuming multiple identities in Schedule B.81
National Health was now ready to incorporate into law the Canadian Supplement, with its
pharmacopoeial monographs for each of the drugs listed in the new Part V. On April 11, 1944,
the Canadian Supplement to the British Pharmacopoeia received legal imprimatur as Division III
of the Food and Drug Regulations.82 Once again, the order in council enacting the Supplement
as part of the regulations was stripped of any content referencing its dubious source of statutory
authority.83 Henderson and Lancaster’s plan had finally come to fruition. Nonetheless, as with
the orders creating the Committee and Part V of Schedule B, departmental and DOJ solicitors
79
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considered that much of the Canadian Supplement was legally invalid, and to obscure this, they
deployed the same technique of erasing uncomfortable information from preambular recitals.
Davidson approached National Health’s solicitor in February 17, 1944, proposing to insert
the Supplement and its monographs as a new Division III of the Food and Drug Regulations, for
the purpose of creating legally binding standards for the drugs recently listed in Part V.
Davidson explained to Gunn that the monographs first defined each drug substance, followed
by a description of what each substance “must contain when assayed by a certain method”. Still
doubtful of the approach, Gunn suggested it might be better to amend the Act, but recognizing
this was not desirable, he began working to finalize Davidson’s proposed regulation.84 It is
unclear whether Davidson told Gunn, though, of the recent developments in Britain regarding
estrogen; by this time, Davidson had received the British Pharmacopoeia Commission’s draft
monographs for its seventh addendum, which included draft monographs for oestrone and
oestradiol benzoate. While taking pains to note its considerable agreement with the Canadian
Supplement’s monographs, the British Pharmacopoeia Commission stressed that Britain had
“definitely abandoned” biological methods of defining and testing oestrone and oestradiol
benzoate, and were treating them as “pure chemical substances”. Likewise for DES, while
noting Canada’s use of a biological test, it advised that the “intention of the Commission is to
continue treating this substance as a pure chemical compound and to rely on chemical tests.”85
Perhaps unaware of this development, Gunn forwarded to DOJ his draft regulation for
enacting the Canadian Supplement. His draft preambles stated, among other things, that these
regulations defined official methods for biological testing of the drugs listed in Part V. In early
March 1944, DOJ signed off on these proposed regulations.86 Yet, likely spurred by reflection on
the British Pharmacopoeia Commission’s letter, National Health officials identified a validity
concern soon thereafter. On March 15, 1944, the Assistant Chief Dominion Analyst, Aime Valin,
alerted the Departmental Secretary that, while the Act empowered regulations mandating
biological testing methods for drugs,87 the “great majority” of the substances described in the
Canadian Supplement monographs were “not susceptible to biological assay, but are tested by
chemical methods only”. Having absorbed the practice of erasing evidence of invalidity from the
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face of delegated legislation, Valin concluded his letter by suggesting that the word “biological”
be deleted from the regulation’s preambular recitals.88
Despite that the Act expressly conferred power to prescribe only biological testing methods,
DOJ agreed to this deletion.89 Thus, spurred by National Health officials’ reflection on divergent
testing methods for estrogens, Canada knowingly enacted regulations that defined chemical
testing methods for many Canadian Supplement drugs (if not for estrogens themselves),
pursuant to a provision that empowered it only to define biological testing methods. In 1944,
National Health’s practice of erasing, from delegated legislation’s preambles, reference to
statutory provisions that provided only questionable legal authority was becoming entrenched.
Another regulatory practice relied on by National Health officials, surprising from today’s
vantage point, was their habit of engaging solicitors very late in the regulatory day. As with the
decision to create the Committee, discussed in the last chapter, Gunn was consulted at the end
of the process, rather than at a stage when officials were identifying and developing options for
incorporating the Canadian Supplement into law. Only after these officials had settled on their
desired option, and prepared a rough draft of the regulation, did they seek their solicitor’s
approval. Such practices risked solidifying path-dependence, fostering hesitance on the part of
departmental solicitors to scuttle long-identified but legally invalid regulatory plans, and creating
resistance among bureaucrats to legal advice that arrives late and is perceived as an
impediment. This practice was viewed as enough of a barrier to coherent policy development
and regulatory drafting that, by 1946, DOJ would create a new Legislative Section, with
Driedger at its head, to discipline the preparation of all legislation. By the early 1950s, in an
apparent effort to solidify this practice, Driedger was publicly emphasizing the need to involve
departmental lawyers in policy decisions and for earlier involvement of legislative counsel.90
In February 1944, at the same time that National Health food and drug officials were working
to enact the Canadian Supplement, they were also facing requests from other units within the
Department to further revise Part II of Schedule B, which had just been amended in January.
The Part II amendments were short-lived due to wider Departmental reaction to how parenteral
products had been addressed.91 As noted, senior Departmental laboratory officials had been
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taken aback and confused by the surprise amendments to Schedule B.92 In particular, the Chief
of the Laboratory of Hygiene, Dr. G. Donald W. Cameron, advocated for replacing the two
paragraphs in Part II – the first on animal tissue preparations (now including “sex hormones”),
the second on parenteral products serving as anti-allergens and antibacterials (in particular,
penicillin) – with one paragraph capturing all parenterals, including sex hormones. 93 It is hard to
discern what motivated Cameron’s position, beyond perhaps frustration at not being consulted.
It seemed counterproductive to his own staff’s simultaneous efforts to finalize the draft Sex
Hormone Regulations, which were meant to control not only parenterally administered products
but the newer oral products made of DES or conjugated equine estrogens. Whatever the
motivation, Cameron’s reaction and Lancaster’s counterreaction render visible yet further
multiple versions of estrogen, as a substance to be taken orally or injected intramuscularly.
Aiming to correct Cameron’s impression that Part II covered only parenteral products, on
February 4, 1944, Lancaster dictated a memo to Davidson from a hospital bed at the Ottawa
Civic.94 Emphasizing that each of the two paragraphs of Part II covered drugs with many modes
of administration, he explained that some kinds of sex hormones were not administered only by
injection, and further that some penicillin preparations were anticipated for topical use. With that
clarification, senior departmental officials then reached agreement that Part II should be revised
such that the first paragraph would still list animal tissue preparations (including sex hormones)
however administered, and the second should control all parenteral preparations.95 Accordingly,
Part II was amended again, in May 1944.96 While not National Health’s intention, it became
arguable that both paragraphs of Part II covered injectable estrogenic drugs.
These efforts to revise Part II, in the spring of 1944, can be viewed as a simple matter of
clarifying legislative text or of remedying insufficient internal consultation. Beyond this, however,
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they illustrate conceptual confusion about “sex hormones”, and furthermore, the ontological
plasticity and adaptability of estrogen in its multiple modes. The Chief of the Laboratory of
Hygiene viewed hormones as animal tissue preparations to be administered by injection. Yet, by
this time, estrogens were being summoned synthetically. Further, the many modes of
administering estrogen to human bodies – oral, parenteral, topical – were growing as diverse as
their many modes of bureaucratic administration. These multiple drug forms were different
estrogens. Even when products contained the same active ingredients, diverse modes of
administration arose from and fostered divergent clinical, manufacturing, advertising and
regulatory practices, and elicited varied effects in human and nonhuman bodies. 97
Resistant to simple categorizations and materializations, estrogens continued to multiply
with the enactment, in 1944, of the Sex Hormone Regulations. Since January 1943, these
regulations had been National Health officials’ desired means to define and control sex hormone
preparations, although they had backed down and acceded to the view of Henderson and other
Committee members that oestrone, oestradiol benzoate, stilboestrol, and stilboestrol
dipropionate should be standardized through monographs in the Canadian Supplement. In
contrast to the Supplement and Part V, though, the Sex Hormone Regulations faced the reverse
reception from DOJ. As will be seen, not only did concern with the legal validity of these
Regulations multiply estrogen’s potencies, but these regulations also ushered in a new type of
label that laid the groundwork for an early experiment with risk regulation in Canada.
The vires debates to this point, regarding Canadian drug standards proposed in 1944, were
about the scope of authority to regulate. There had been no express and arguably no implied
authority to add Part V to Schedule B, and similarly no authority to prescribe chemical rather
than biological test methods in the Canadian Supplement. The Sex Hormone Regulations raised
a new vires concern, regarding the validity of subdelegating standard setting. The peak of WWII
proved, not surprisingly,98 to be a critical moment in Canadian legal history for bolstering power
to subdelegate to officials.99 In January 1943, the Supreme Court of Canada decided the
Chemicals Reference. The federal government had referred questions to the Court regarding
the validity of regulations, made by the Governor in Council under the War Measures Act,
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allowing civil servants to regulate the wartime control of chemicals, and the validity of an order
thereunder, by the Controller of Chemicals, controlling production and consumption of glycerine.
The Court held that, under the War Measures Act, the regulation granting civil servants power to
legislate was valid.100 Despite that the statute did not contain express authority to sub-delegate
this power to administrators, reading across the opinions, it appears this authority was found to
be implicit in the broad statutory delegation granted by Parliament to the Governor in Council.
On the heels of the decision, John Willis, at that time a professor at Dalhousie University’s
Faculty of Law, quickly wrote Delegatus Non Potest Delegare.101 Published in March 1943, his
short article effectively synthesized the “rule” against sub-delegation, which, in a “nutshell”,
provided that delegated powers cannot be further delegated.102 In Willis’ articulation, the subdelegation rule was at best a presumption or maxim of statutory construction, which could be
displaced by express statutory language or the wider context or purpose of the statute. He
argued that lawyers and judges would need to balance the maxim against a recognition of the
complexities and virtues of “modern government agencies”, adopting constructions that “best
accord with the facts of government” and that enabled expert civil servants to do their jobs.
For Willis, a legal realist and defender of an expanding administrative state,103 the
Chemicals Reference decision was a godsend. Willis “took the case as his point of departure
and used it as a principal buttress for his conclusions”, and in no small measure due to his
article, the case has since been cast as a leading authority on sub-delegation.104 However, and
as persuasively shown by John Mark Keyes, armed with the unusually broad and explicit power
of the War Measures Act, in fact it seems that “the majority of the court considered the maxim to
be entirely irrelevant”. Of the five concurring opinions, Chief Justice Duff “did not even mention
it”; Justices Rinfret, Davis, and Kerwin “found the Governor in Council's powers to be so broad
that there was no need to consider the maxim”; and only Justice Hudson gave any detailed
consideration to the delegatus rule.105 As Keyes concludes, “[t]he only generally applicable
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principle that can be extracted from the decision is that the delegatus maxim is merely a rule of
construction that can be excluded by express or implied authority to subdelegate.”106
Published in the Canadian Bar Review, the article certainly would have come to Driedger’s
attention. Although no doubt greatly sympathetic, as government counsel, to Willis’ political
project, it is less clear that Driedger would have agreed entirely, in 1944, with Willis’ analysis of
the Chemical Reference. Writing in the same journal almost two decades later, and without
citing Willis, Driedger drew a bolder conclusion that “there is no rule or presumption for or
against sub-delegation”.107 He drew this conclusion even in the face of the Supreme Court later
decision in Brent, which had invalidated regulations under the Immigration Act that unlawfully
delegated to civil servants the Governor in Council’s powers to limit admission to the country.108
Relying on the Chemicals Reference as his sole counterweight to Brent,109 he expressed the
view that, rather than any presumption, “in each case it is a question of interpretation of the
language of the particular statute.”110 Assuming that his views remained consistent over time,
Driedger was not likely to rely on the delegatus rule in analyzing the validity of draft regulations.
At the end of March 1944, following uneventful consultations with industry, the Sex Hormone
Regulations were ready for that analysis. As with previous enactments, the departmental
solicitor believed that elements of the regulations were ultra vires – although there is no record
of him so advising food and drug officials at National Health. He raised his concerns more
surreptitiously. When sending the draft Sex Hormone Regulations to DOJ for review, Gunn
apparently sought to neuter the Canadian Supplement monographs for estrone, oestradiol
benzoate and DES, and subtly characterized the regulations’ potency standards as ultra vires:
I would ask you to consider whether it might not be desirable to have a definite
statement in the recital to the effect that the standards of the drugs concerned are not
otherwise dealt with by the Food and Drugs Act or the Meat and Canned Foods Act. May
I direct your particular attention, too, to the last line of the Regulations under the caption
“Potency”. I wonder whether Parliament would pass legislation giving to the Chief,
Laboratory of Hygiene, this power?111
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The potency provision that Gunn took issue with, in section 3, provided that:
The units of the sex hormones for the purpose of these regulations shall be
International Units, wherever they exist, as estimated by the methods employed in the
Laboratory of Hygiene. In the case of products where International or Canadian
Standards have not been established and stable standards cannot be furnished by the
manufacturer, the methods of assay and of expressing potency shall be acceptable to
the Chief, Laboratory of Hygiene.112
Predictably, DOJ sent a question back to Gunn: were the Sex Hormone Regulations
intended to permit the Chief to prescribe potency standards?113 When that question was
referred to the Assistant Chief Dominion Analyst, Valin tried to justify the clause as aiming to
ensure that manufacturers’ methods of “expressing potency or activity” of sex hormone products
were acceptable. The clause “was inserted to prevent manufacturers using unreliable methods
of assay and to prevent misleading and unwarranted statements as to potency for a class of
products which are difficult to control on account of no stable or satisfactory reference standard
being available.” Valin explained that, as the control of hormone products was “very
complicated” and as it was “not thought advisable for the present to put them under a license”, it
was felt necessary to give the Chief some discretionary power to scrutinize and if necessary to
disagree with manufacturers’ methods and claims about their products’ potency.114
Unlike with earlier enactments, this time, Driedger’s opinion was negative. In his view, the
potency clause was invalid. Rather than the Governor in Council prescribing potency standards,
as envisioned by the Act, the regulation subdelegated this power to a departmental official.115
Faced with this wrinkle, National Health officials improvised. Valin proposed a solution for those
products for which International or Canadian standards did not exist, and for which
manufacturers could not furnish a stable standard. What if, he suggested, rather than requiring
manufacturers to meet the Chief’s standards for measuring the activity or potency of a sex
hormone product, Canada instead required pharmaceutical firms to attach a label to the
product? Such a label could furnish “full details of the unit of potency employed and of the
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method of assay used” by the firm in manufacturing the drug product.116 Driedger and Valin
discussed the proposed solution on the phone. A few days later, Driedger gave a written opinion
advising that the revised potency clause, which they had discussed on the phone as a “quickie
amendment”, was unobjectionable.117 Or perhaps it was the “junkie amendment” – Valin’s
handwritten note of the phone call is hard to decipher:

Figure 5: Portion of Aime Valin’s notes of phone call with Elmer Driedger, May 1, 1944
Library and Archives Canada, “Canadian Committee on Pharmaceutical (Standards – Proposed
Regulation – Sex Hormones”, RG 29, Vol 250, File 339-4-3, reproduction copy no. e-01119340

Whether quick or junk, it was made.118 On May 18, 1944, Cabinet enacted the Sex Hormone
Regulations, complete with the clause requiring potency labelling in lieu of potency standards.119
Pharmaceutical manufacturers were not at all displeased by this novel turn to potency
labelling. When consulted earlier that spring on the draft regulations, some firms had sought
additional labelling requirements. As one example, British Drug Houses (Canada) Ltd., a
manufacturer of potent DES products, had advocated that the regulations be revised to require
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that a product’s potency be indicated, both on ampoule labels and on outer box labels.120 Every
manufacturer that commented on the draft regulations was content, in principle, with labelling
requirements, proposing only minor adjustments.121 Manufacturers wanted to be able to market
their products as highly potent, regardless that the methods they used to ground such claims
might be variable, unreliable or contrary to test methods underpinning International Units.
This turn to labelling in no way aimed to promote what, in modern parlance, might be called
the consumer’s “right to know”. If anyone’s right to know was at issue, it was the Department’s.
The information to be summoned by these potency labels discloses what the Department
viewed as the problem: finding a means by which to assess pharmaceutical firms’ claims about
their drugs. With quantitative information about potency test methods and units, National Health
could continue its long-established way of regulating drugs through misbranding or adulteration
rules. Labels would therefore be Department’s intelligence agents, the technology by which
National Health officials could keep informed about what was materializing in industry’s labs.
Born of a desire to avoid unlawfully delegating to government scientists, National Health
instead, ironically, delegated to industry the power to set its own potency standards. By thus
delegating the power to decide how to apprehend estrogenic activity, it was left to industry to
decide what estrogen would be and what it would do. Furthermore, approaching delegation as
more than an administrative law doctrine, labels also had a job to do. National Health delegated
to industry the power to materialize potency and delegated to the new potency label the duty to
report back on what industry was up to. Obviously, firms were required to print and affix this
label. But the label would be an active participant in the Department’s efforts to test these firms’
products and claims, creating the possibility of mediation between industrial test methods and
regulatory test methods. This form of “delegation” was also, of course, perfectly lawful.
What is most striking about Driedger’s legal opinion on the Sex Hormone Regulations is not
his reasoning or conclusion. Though his reasons were summary by present standards,122
they appear unimpeachable, given the prevailing views on sub-delegation and his own more
statutorily-driven interpretive approach. Rather, what is remarkable is the persistent silence, in
Driedger’s and National Health’s files, on the consequences of his opinion for other biologics. In
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the preceding decade, under the same enabling provision, Canada standardized the potency of
biological drugs, from digitalis to thyroid to epinephrine, using a clause very similar to that which
Driedger concluded was invalid for sex hormones.123 In the Biologicals Regulation, as it had
been amended in 1934 and again in 1942,124 Cabinet had repeatedly delegated its power to
prescribe methods for testing drugs’ potencies to the Chief of the Laboratory of Hygiene.
Perhaps Driedger was unaware that a similar clause was in place for many other drugs on
Schedule B. But Lancaster, Valin, Davidson, and the Food and Drug Division knew. Having
received an opinion indirectly confirming that National Health’s approach to potency standards
for many drugs was unlawful, they did nothing. They did not bring the issue to the attention of
Driedger or the departmental solicitor. They did not bring it to the attention of the Committee.
They did not fix the invalid aspects of the Biologicals Regulation. Sex hormones – mostly
estrogenic products and administered almost exclusively to women – were put in a class of their
own. These “drugs for women” were the only drugs for which National Health would claim that it
could not require industry to meet departmentally determined methods for testing potency.
That estrogen was singled out for lesser regulatory treatment is confirmed when
considering other regulations made within weeks of the Sex Hormone Regulations. In the spring
of 1944, these other regulations either maintained government supervision over industry’s
methods of testing potency or continued to subdelegate power to prescribe potency tests to
departmental scientists. In 1944, National Health recommended and Cabinet regulated new
dose and potency standards for injectable liver extract.125 Initially, the regulatory proposal was to
limit the potency of liver extract sold in Canada to three strengths, and to make the usual subdelegation to allow the Laboratory of Hygiene to set the test method.126 The final regulation, in
March 1944, continued to set three doses of liver extract injectable;127 with respect to potency
testing, it now required manufacturers to demonstrate acceptable potency as a condition of
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license, to submit bioassay protocols every two years for approval, and to notify and obtain
approval of the Deputy Minister of changed manufacturing methods that could affect potency.128
In short, without prescribing test methods, National Health was still required to approve or reject
the potency of liver extract products. Even more blatantly, in June 1944, National Health
subdelegated to departmental scientists the power to set bioassay tests for penicillin. Critical to
treating injured soldiers during WWII, penicillin attracted significant regulatory attention from
National Health in 1943-1944, with draft regulations first considered by the Committee in June
1943,129 and with penicillin added to Part II of Schedule B of the Act in January 1944.130 To
obtain advice on a regulatory approach to penicillin – and in particular to determine how to
regulate dosage, reference standards, and potency testing – the Department called a special
meeting of the Committee and other experts on June 10, 1944.131 Despite the opinion received
from Driedger a month earlier, the Committee, including National Health members,
recommended that the methods for testing potency of penicillin be delegated to the Laboratory
of Hygiene.132 Made in September 1944, the penicillin regulations did precisely what DOJ and
departmental solicitors had only just concluded was unlawful with respect to sex hormones.133
This chapter’s thick description of Canadian regulators’ standardization practices, in 19431944, displaces conventional understandings of drugs. Rather than stable substances with
inherent properties that produce predictable effects, estrogen and its effects acted, and were
enacted, in relation to other actors and practices. The drug standards resulting from these
practices were themselves recipes for potent socio-material realities. Returning to the idea that
biological standardization performs what a drug is by apprehending what a drug does – its
activity, capacity, potency – the ontic potential of potency labels becomes evident. Estrogen was
what estrogen did. And deciding what estrogen did was delegated to industry. Going back to an
earlier equine metaphor, despite having no ability to close the regulatory barn door before the
pharmaceutical “horse” bolted, Canada nonetheless handed over to industry its extant powers
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to decide what a horse could do. Estrogen was subject to different regulatory practices than any
other drug in Canada in the 1940s. This differential treatment is troubling when one considers
that, in contrast to those biological drugs that regulators worried would lose their potency or that
were the subject of exaggerated potency claims by industry, estrogen was known to be highly
potent and harmful at high doses.
Besides, it is not as if industry was given power to test the potency of estrogenic products
for which National Health had nonetheless set mandatory doses.134 As will now be analysed, the
Sex Hormone Regulations were unusual in their definitions, vague on reference materials, and
silent on dose. If the dose made the poison – as it was thought to for estrogen – the Regulations
gave exclusive rights to pharmaceutical firms to make and measure their poison.

3. Substituting labels for standards: the Sex Hormone Regulations, May 1944
The provision that delegated power to materialize potency to industry, requiring labels in lieu
of prescribing test methods, was not enacted alone. Section 3 had relatives, three to be precise,
in the form of three other provisions. How did this provision relate to the rest of the Sex
Hormone Regulations? How did the regulations, as a whole, enact estrogen and its effects?
Empowered by the regulations, what could estrogen become – what was it activated to do – in
bodies, clinics, laboratories, factories, markets, or homes, in the 1940s in Canada?
There are two directions from which such questions can be productively contemplated. First,
I address some of the coordination efforts at work in the Sex Hormone Regulations, through the
unusual definition of “sex hormones” and the vague requirement for reference standards, and
how these provisions aimed to secure sex hormones as fixed, given, and natural. Second, I
identify some critical absences, namely a lack of certain regulatory controls commonly used to
protect Canadians from potent or unstable biologics in the 1940s. In light of these novel
regulatory elements, I evaluate whether the Sex Hormone Regulations actually created any
“drug standards” at all, which I approach by considering their “special labelling provision” and
labelling’s role in creating market access for products “standardized” through naming practices.
The section concludes by addressing the “caution label” rule. Historically noteworthy as the first
example under the Food and Drugs Act of labels being deployed to responsibilize consumers,
the caution label functions as a cautionary fable, reminding us that mandatory labels on
consumer products can originate as substitutes for or alternatives to safety standards.
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As will now be evident, the Sex Hormone Regulations were made under statutory provisions
empowering the Governor in Council to set standards for quality,135 and potency, of biological
drugs. As an exercise in standardization, however, these Regulations were curious. In fact,
compared to Canadian drug standards of the time, whether with respect to definitions, reference
standards, dose, licensing, or labelling, the Sex Hormone Regulations were unique. Returning
to Busch’s typology, as already seen, the regulations did not create filter standards for potency,
meaning estrogenic drugs were not required to meet any quality-driven test for estrogenic
activity, as expressed using any specific potency unit. Nor, relatedly, did these regulations rely
on typical logics underpinning what Busch calls industrial standards, which aim to ensure
products as all “the same”. Leaving aside potency, what other standards were enacted by the
Sex Hormone Regulations? On their face, the regulations might be said to standardize estrogen
through two means: a definition of sex hormones,136 and the provision of reference standards.137
Definitions perform critical ontological and political work in regulatory regimes. They do not
just reflect but also provoke and spur into action the objects being regulated, which in turn
stimulates policy choices on how to control those objects.138 Ontological description drives
regulatory prescription and vice versa.139 In the Sex Hormone Regulations, “sex hormone” was
defined, and marshalled as an object for regulation, to “include all products synthetic or natural
purporting to have oestrogenic, androgenic, gonadotrophic and progestational properties”.
Under the Food and Drugs Act, biological drugs had been commonly defined with reference
to their plant, animal, or bacterial source material; sometimes these definitions were augmented
by indicating a requisite method of extraction from that source.140 Furthermore, a few biological
drugs included in their definitions a reference to the disease that the drug was used to treat; for
example, insulin was defined as the active principle of the pancreas that affects the metabolism
of carbohydrates in the animal body and is of value in the treatment of diabetes.141 By contrast,
sex hormones were defined only in reference to their purported properties – an estrogenic sex
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hormone was something purporting to have estrogenic properties. This was a wholly novel
approach to defining a drug under the Food and Drugs Act.142 In the food and drug context, the
regulatory genesis of the word “purporting” was the January 1944 amendment to Part II of
Schedule B. To that list of animal tissue preparations, this amendment had added the clause “or
any synthetics purporting to have physiological action similar to any of the foregoing”.143 Thus,
the construction of sex hormones as products with purported properties is a direct legacy of
DES. DES was the reason for the synthetics clause added to Part II of Schedule B, and, as of
1944, DES appeared to be the only synthetic hormone being marketed as a drug in Canada.144
To modern ears, the word purporting has a pejorative ring, evoking falsehood or pretense.
To National Health officials in the 1940s, however, the word articulated the concept of
“represented” or “claimed” properties.145 An industry-made product would become a “sex
hormone” if its manufacturer represented it to have estrogenic properties, and estrogenic
properties were those capacities apprehended through a continued legacy of diverse bioassays
for potency. Pugsley himself had described this as “a chaotic state of affairs”.146 However, with
the choice of potency tests now confirmed, by law, to be delegated to manufacturers, this chaos
would continue. Bringing the ontological politics of the Sex Hormone Regulations into clearer
perspective, the definition of “sex hormone” reaffirmed that power over what an estrogen was,
and what it could do, would be held by industry. National Health’s concern was not “what should
sex hormones be”, but “how can we measure whatever industry claims is a sex hormone?”
The second way that the Sex Hormone Regulations appeared, superficially, to standardize
estrogen was through reference standards.147 For most drugs standardized by the Biologicals
Regulation, an official standard was prescribed to be the reference material stored at the
Laboratory of Hygiene and available upon request.148 Although the Sex Hormone Regulations
similarly indicated that reference materials would be kept by the Laboratory of Hygiene, they
142
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went on to provide, unusually, that either “International standards or Canadian Standards must
be used wherever they exist”. Further, the provision stipulated that if neither of these materials
existed “the manufacturer shall be required to submit a suitable quantity of his product to be
used as a standard for checking the uniformity of that product”. This was vague, to say the least.
Translated, the legal standard was one of two reference materials without saying which one;
and where neither existed, the standard would be whatever a manufacturer chose to submit.
What was enacted by such “standards”? If anything, they provoked multiplicity, uncertainty,
irregularity, even ungovernability. Seven years later, Pugsley would admit as much,
acknowledging that under the Sex Hormone Regulations, “[t]he provision of reference standards
for these preparations has been a difficult problem”.149 Though claiming that many problems had
been solved by manufacturers supplying reference material for their products,150 he nonetheless
conceded that this problem continued for Premarin and other conjugated estrogenic drugs:
The problem of adequately describing the unit of potency for products currently
described as oestrogenic substances, and prepared as a concentrate of human or
equine pregnancy urine, has not been solved to date. In the absence of significant
amounts of material, considered by most authorities not to occur naturally in the urine,
the stand has been adopted that the potency of these products is best described with
reference to the International Standard Oestrone.151
Pugsley was by no means the only scientist to acknowledge this problem, as researchers
struggled to propose defensible bioassay methods for standardizing orally-administered
conjugated estrogens and revealed that very few manufacturers’ products corresponded to their
labelled potency.152 Unbeknownst to Pugsley, this problem would remain a challenge long into
the future; even today, there is no defined reference standard available for Premarin.153
The Sex Hormone Regulations are all too easy to identify as a failure of standardization.
What if, however, one takes estrogen seriously as a bio-social actor? As an active participant in
149
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the always cultural, historical, and gendered performance of socio-material realities?154
Springing from many sources, functional through many forms, estrogen was hard to pin down.
Materialized through the measurements of bioassays, estrogen’s effects within nonhuman and
human bodies – and thus its very identities – were performed in encounters and in intra-actions.
Refracted this way, through Barad or Haraway, estrogen does not precede or pre-exist its bodily
or regulatory relations.155 Might this cause one to see the Sex Hormone Regulations differently?
Well, perhaps. After all, in defining a sex hormone as that which purports to have estrogenic
properties, the question of estrogen’s effects was left open, and this accords, in many ways,
with a material-semiotic account of pharmaceuticals’ “properties” as constituted through their
social, legal, economic, informational, and bodily relations.156 At the risk of presentism, it is now
known that oestrone, oestradiol benzoate, DES, Premarin, and all the other estrogenic products,
in their myriad forms – let alone all the (other) industrial chemicals that mimic estrogen – have a
huge range of bodily effects, some of which lie latent for decades or are transgenerational.157 To
a lesser extent, though, estrogen’s diverse effects were also understood in 1944, as shown in
the historical accounts. Indeed, growing knowledge of diverse effects resulted directly from the
same multiplicity of bioassay methods that, in the Sex Hormone Regulations, the Department
chose not to stabilize. Further, the plethora of bioassays, while characterized some laboratory
scientists who desired homogeneity as chaotic, had benefits for pharmaceutical innovation
“since they became almost indispensable for assessing the diversity of functions – and therefore
the diversity of indications – that potent physiological agents could display”.158
In performing estrogen as open-ended, and with multiple and relational effects, the
regulatory definition of “sex hormone” also declined to enact any clear nature-culture divide.
Instead, it held “natural” and “synthetic” estrogens tightly together. Discourses on endocrine
disruption that insistently separate natural hormones from synthetic chemicals have no
resonance in these regulations; those desensitized to the ontological politics of DES or
Premarin might even proclaim that they enact an estrogenic natureculture.159 Alternatively,
following Oudshoorn and Mol,160 this estrogenic unity is best understood as an accomplishment.
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The multiple bioassays and the chemical tests, the synthesis in labs and the collection of urine
in horse stables, the injections by doctors and tablets from drug stores, these practices that
enacted estrogens were numerous, varied, and often incompatible. To make diverse estrogens
hang together, as “sex hormones” rather than as a swelling miscellany, National Health tried
through this definition to present estrogen, natural and synthetic, as one singularity. Such
coordination efforts performed sex hormones as stable, ahistorical, given by nature.
Whether reflecting naturecultures or naturalizing drugs for diseases that did not yet exist, the
Sex Hormone Regulations did not only rely on novel standardization techniques and definitions.
They also relied on two absences: silence on dose, and a refusal to license sex hormones. In
Canada, dose specifications were a relatively common approach used to protect consumers
from potent or unstable drugs. For pharmacologists and physicians in the 1940s, the safety of a
potent drug was a function of its dose (and relatedly, of dosage administered over time).
Discovering the relationship between dose and response was the magic key that would unlock
the mystery of when a drug stopped being safe and instead became a hazard. Researchers
strove mightily to determine and to document the safe therapeutic dose range for a drug; as
seen, the Canadian Supplement monographs for oestrone, oestradiol benzoate, stilboestrol,
and stilboestrol diproprionate all set dose ranges for intramuscular injection.161 Likewise, for
many other biologics regulated in the 1940s, whether in the Canadian Supplement or the
Biologicals Regulation, dose was defined.162 Dose was so central to safety that, in 1942,
Canada enacted new regulations prescribing minimum and maximum dosage limits, in tablets,
capsules, ampoules, and other forms of administration, for some 70 drugs.163 However, sex
hormones did not make the cut, then or in later amendments to the dosage regulations.164
Why did National Health not prescribe dose for sex hormone products, in the Sex Hormone
Regulations? One might be tempted to conclude that Committee members assumed physicians
would supervise dosage, tinkering with the amount of estrogen that they administered as their
patients responded or had undesired “side effects”. That might be a safe assumption by the
mid-1950s, when sex hormones became prescription drugs, but in 1944, it was not. One lone
Committee member had advocated that sex hormones be sold only on prescription, yet his
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recommendation had been ignored. While some Canadian physicians in the 1940s were
administering estrogenic drugs, women could also buy them over the counter.
Recalling the Committee’s debates during 1943, situated alongside industrial, political, and
statutory developments, the answer seems clear. Ayerst – and perhaps also the CPMA – was
opposed to standardizing dose, as this would limit its freedom to devise new products. Thinking
again of Premarin, estrogenic drugs were recently being produced on assembly lines, arriving in
Canada as tablets, capsules or other pre-made forms. Prescribing doses would therefore
frustrate manufacturers’ ability to produce new forms, no insignificant concern when Premarin’s
“flexibility of potency and dosage” was one of its major selling points.165
Without engaging here in any detailed semiotic analysis of Premarin advertisements,166 in
the years after the Sex Hormone Regulations were enacted, Ayerst targeted Canadian doctors
with advertisements emphasizing Premarin’s growing ranges of available doses and
potencies.167 In 1945, Ayerst was selling Premarin tablets (No. 866) “for the most severe
symptoms”, pitching a new “Half-Strength” Premarin tablet (No. 867) for “when symptoms are
moderately severe”, and promoting its ageing, placentally-derived product Emmenin as being
“for mild symptoms”. By 1950, Ayerst no longer needed to expressly convey, with text, that
Premarin was a drug for menopause. Containing the infamous tagline that Premarin “imparts a
feeling of well-being”, an ad that year also conveyed the drug’s ontologically precarious status
as “highly potent” and “essentially safe”. More to the point, this ad shows that dose had further
diversified by 1950, moving beyond the full strength and half strength pills to include a double
strength tablet (No. 865), quarter strength tablet (No. 868), new liquid dosage form (No 869),
and, for the especially anxious woman – or her husband – the option of Premarin combined with
a sedative. Messaging again to male physicians that Premarin would promote, in their female
patients, “a feeling of well-being and a revival of interest in normal activities” – visually depicted
as sewing, gardening, and painting – an ad in 1951 again emphasizes a range of potencies and
dosage (now also bundled with methyltestosterone to boost wives’ flagging libidos). In this
period, the freedom to manufacture multiple doses and potencies was critical to the market
differentiation strategy that Ayerst was pursuing to enroll physicians to medicalize menopause.
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Figure 6: 1945 ad for Premarin and Emmenin, Ayerst, McKenna & Harrison Ltd.
Vancouver Medical Association. The Vancouver Medical Association Bulletin: March 1945.
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.14288/1.0214401 (Original work published March 1945).
UBC Open Collections, History of Nursing in Pacific Canada, online:
<https://open.library.ubc.ca/collections/historyofnursinginpacificcanada>.
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Figure 7: Ad for Premarin, Ayerst, McKenna & Harrison Ltd, 1950
Vancouver Medical Association. The Vancouver Medical Association Bulletin: February, 1950.
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.14288/1.0214411 (Original work published February 1950).
UBC Open Collections, History of Nursing in Pacific Canada, online at
https://open.library.ubc.ca/collections/historyofnursinginpacificcanada
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Figure 8: Ad for Premarin, Ayerst, McKenna & Harrison Ltd, 1951
Vancouver Medical Association. The Vancouver Medical Association Bulletin: November 1951.
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.14288/1.0214637 (Original work published November 1951).
UBC Open Collections, History of Nursing in Pacific Canada, online:
<https://open.library.ubc.ca/collections/historyofnursinginpacificcanada>.
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A cognate reason that the dose of estrogenic drugs was not regulated, though never made
explicit in any of the Committee’s deliberations, was that estrogen’s diseases were still in the
making. A therapeutic dose needs a disease. With Premarin and DES freshly unleashed and
menopause not yet stabilized as a medical ailment, dosage remained uncertain. Finally, despite
over a decade of research connecting estrogens to cancer, National Health continued to enact
sex hormones as innocuous and ineffective. Safe and worthless drugs could be taken in any
dose. At one level, this performance was personal. Pugsley, the departmental lead on the sex
hormones file, was a former protégé of Ayerst’s partner Dr. Collip and had worked in Collip’s lab
when Emmenin was at the peak of its success. At another level, scientists were beginning to
perform Premarin as harmless; in 1943, the Journal of Clinical Endocrinology published a series
of studies lauding Premarin, solidifying the idea that menopause was a disorder.168
Beyond scientists’ predilections and practices, ineffectiveness and safety were also
reproduced through a second key absence in the Sex Hormone Regulations. Though listed on
Part II of Schedule B, sex hormone products were not made subject to licensing requirements.
This meant that the regulations eschewed all controls on the manufacture and sale of estrogenic
drugs: precluding inspection of plants, equipment, products, and records; preventing review of
technical qualifications of staff; and pre-empting both batch testing and the approvals of batches
for import or sale. Regardless of the emergence of DES, Premarin, and other new products, the
regulations therefore maintained National Health’s fifteen year-long practice of carving
estrogenic products out of licensing. It should not be forgotten that the US did not license sex
hormone products,169 which undoubtedly created resistance to licensing within National Health.
Nevertheless, to point only to American practices on sex hormones – when in other respects the
Canadian regulatory regime on sex hormones diverged – would underdetermine the influences
on National Health officials. This lingering licensing practice also flowed from a longstanding
performance, by senior officials, of sex hormones as therapeutically ineffective and of licenses
as endorsement. “Considering that many things have little or no value”, Lancaster had told
Davidson from his hospital bed in February 1944, it “would be a pity to require a licence for such
things because a licence carries implicitly some form of approval by the Department.”170
Regulators were catalyzing sex hormones while refusing to sanction them, doing estrogens as
simultaneously potent and weak, complicated and easy, effective and worthless, all the while
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bracketing and ignoring the differences between versions of estrogen. To return to an old
metaphor: with no ability to close the barn door, and having failed to standardize horses to be
less potent creatures, National Health could have repaired the pasture fence or made the barn
more inviting. But thinking of all tamer beasts in the barn – the goats, sheep, chickens – and not
wanting to overreact for those more domesticated creatures, National Health did nothing.
Hold these regulatory elements together: purported properties, vague reference standards,
delegated potency tests, disavowal of licensing conditions, lack of dose specifications. In effect,
the Sex Hormone Regulations fostered more rather than less variability, greater rather than
fewer products, altogether an expanding range of doses, potencies, and bodily effects. Did the
Sex Hormone Regulations create “drug standards” at all? Thinking again with Busch’s typology,
which has already caused rejection of the notion that these regulations either created “filter”
standards or promoted a logic of industrial standards, did these regulations nonetheless create
another type of standard? Recalling Busch’s unranked “division” standards, exemplified by
McIntosh and Granny Smith apples, did the regulations codify product differentiation, letting
estrogenic products to be positioned as “different” from each other and thus assigned different
market values and prices? At first blush, as the definition holds all “sex hormones” together as
things of like kind, the regulations did not seem to create unranked categories. However, turning
to the final section of the Sex Hormone Regulations, division standards suddenly emerge.
Section 4 governed labelling.171 Contrary to the other provisions, this “special labelling
provision” for sex hormones imposed more extensive requirements than did labelling rules for
other biologics in Canada.172 In addition to the typical requirements that labels identify the name
and address of manufacturers, a product’s proper name and potency, lot number, and expiration
date,173 the Sex Hormone Regulations created what in essence were division standards.
Specifically, paragraph 4(c) required outer packages, and inner labels,174 to state:
(c) The descriptive or proper name of the product distinct from the trade name.
In the case of pure synthetic or natural crystalline products, the proper name
shall be: -- Oestrone, oestradiol, oestriol, stilboestrol, androsterone, testosterone,
progesterone, and esters and derivatives of these.
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In the case of mixed or impure products, the proper names shall be: -Conjugated oestrogenic substance (S), oestrogenic substance (S), androgenic
substance (S), progestational substance (S) and esters and derivatives of these.
In the case of gonadotrophins the proper name shall be gonadotrophin with a
qualifying statement to indicate the source, e.g., chorionic gonadotrophin,
gonadotrophin from pregnant mare's serum.
Section 4 thus prescribed proper names for both “pure synthetic or natural crystalline”
estrogenic drugs and for “mixed or impure” estrogenic drugs. For mixed or impure products –
DES in a sugar milk tablet, estrone with peanut oil in an ampoule for injection – the proper name
would be “oestrogenic substance”. At Cook’s request, Premarin was given its very own proper
name of “conjugated oestrogenic substance”. Thus, while the coordination practices underlying
section 1 joined all estrogens together as “sex hormones”, the naming practices underlying
section 4 enacted unitary and bounded estrogens.
Arguably, then, the Sex Hormone Regulations inverted the traditional relationship between
standards, tests, and indicators, as mapped out by Busch.175 In that traditional relationship, a
label would indicate that a test for meeting a certain standard has been satisfied. Here however,
the labels mandated by section 4 could not pronounce that any particular test for any particular
standard was met. Rather, the primary effect of the requirement to assign proper names to sex
hormone products was to crystallize these products as ontologically real, to call sex hormone
products into being as distinct, all the while without knowing or indicating their beings or doings.
Assigning proper names constituted an estrogen, legally and economically, as its own “thing”,
separate from other kinds of estrogens.
As Johnson beautifully analyzes in his legal-material medieval history of shipwrecks off the
coast of Suffolk, naming shapes the real – the name assigned to a wreck “shaped the
possibilities of its use, worth, distribution, and meaning”.176 In this legal-material history of
estrogen in Canada in the 1940s, the conditions of possibility were likewise shaped by naming
practices. These divisions allowed doctors, consumers, manufacturers, advertisers, retailers,
pharmacists, and other market actors to enunciate what an estrogen “was” and to delineate
differences with other estrogens. In this respect, the Sex Hormone Regulations would facilitate
product differentiation, price discrimination, physicians’ prescribing practices, pharmacists’
dispensing and compounding practices, and pharmaceutical firms’ marketing strategies. The
divisions created by the requirement to label with proper names reflect the logic of merchant
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standards, acting to gain estrogen access to markets through distinctions that solidified a
product’s unique identity while ensuring its comparability to other estrogenic products. Although
other Committee members and National Health may have had quite different intentions than did
Cook, requiring these proper names on product labels surely served to smooth market entry.
To be clear, using regulations to assign proper names to drugs was not a wholly novel
practice at National Health.177 Much more unique was the innovation in paragraph 4(h), which
later attracted the characterization, by the Department’s legal counsel Robert Curran as a
“special” labelling provision for sex hormones that was appropriate “having regard to the
dangers which may be inherent in their use”.178 Paragraph 4(h) required manufacturers to
include the following statement on outside labels: “Caution Label–to be used only on the advice
or on the prescription of a physician”. For the first time in the history of Canadian drug
regulation, a label was deployed to discipline consumers, almost all of whom would be women.
In devising this mandatory caution label, Pugsley, Morrell, and other National Health officials
undeniably accepted that sex hormones posed a hazard. However, with the Committee rejecting
Dr. Farquharson’s suggestion that such products should only be sold on prescription, any
pharmacist or retailer could lawfully sell an estrogenic drug to anyone. That this caution label
would cause women to refrain from buying or using estrogenic products, without securing their
physician’s supervision, was magical thinking. As an American food and drug lawyer observed,
in criticizing Canada’s regulatory approach to sex hormones: “a label statement directing a
person to see a physician about whether he should use a drug he has already bought is a futile
gesture”.179 In this regard, the purpose of the caution label appeared to be less about protecting
women and more about protecting National Health (especially as estrogen continued to remain
exempt from prescription requirements). Thus, as a regulatory device, the caution label nakedly
sought to make women consumers responsible for National Health’s decision not to subject
estrogenic drugs to classic drug standards, license conditions, or medical supervision.
When read in the context of the Sex Hormone Regulations as a whole, the caution label
makes legible the fundamental trade-off at the heart of the regulations. As with the potency
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labels that substituted for potency standards, the caution labels were not motivated by
empowering consumers with information, nor by steering towards good market choices.180 They
were not intended to shape manufacturing practices, nor to convey or augment existing
regulatory standards of safety. The special labelling rules for sex hormones were not adopted to
supplement standards – rather, they were adopted as an alternative to standards. Rather than
building safety into estrogen, the caution labels acted in lieu of regulatory standards of identity,
potency, and dosage. Rather than assuming responsibility for ensuring that estrogenic drugs
were crafted in doses and potencies that avoided toxicity, or delegating that duty to prescribing
physicians, National Health delegated to the caution label the task of disciplining women
consumers to avoid hazards. Scripted into products marked with this caution label was a mixed
message to middle aged women, communicating that while the drug was safe enough to buy
without a prescription, they should still follow their doctor’s orders. Embedded is the further
assumption that, given the social class and economic status of the women buying these drugs,
the caution would reinforce their inclinations to be good girls and run along to their doctors. If
less educated or imprudent women failed to exercise such common sense, any resulting harm
could not be pinned on Canada. The caution labels could thus “standardize” subjectivities of
women and prescribing physicians, and performatively enact the contradictory realities – “highly
potent” yet “essentially safe” – materializing estrogenic drugs in clinics and markets.181
It was foreseeable that non-compliance with the Sex Hormone Regulations would go
unenforced. Of its substantive provisions, arguably only the labelling section was enforceable.
Presumably, violation of labelling requirements – representing one’s product as more or less
potent than it was according to the manufacturer’s own test methods, misrepresenting the type
of estrogen or the liquid formulant in the product – could be prosecuted, if not as a direct
violation of section 4 of the Sex Hormone Regulations, then as the statutory offence of
misbranding or adulteration.182 On at least one occasion in the 1940s, National Health officials
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warned a pharmaceutical company that it was in breach of the regulations’ labelling rules.183 By
contrast, the reference standard rule was too vague on what the requisite standard was, in any
given situation, to enforce. Besides, this rule caused such a “multiplicity of standards” that, by
1951, National Health officials had largely abandoned the law and instead entered “working
arrangements” with manufacturers on the “adequacy of standards available for their product”.184
On the regulations’ potency standards, with drug firms left to their own devices when measuring
and expressing their products’ potency, unless potency labels were missing, it is conceptually
challenging to conceive of a violation of any potency “standard”. These barriers to enforcement,
combined with a National Health policy “to avoid court action if at all possible”,185 make it
unsurprising that there were apparently no prosecutions during the 1940s or early 1950s.186

4. Confronting multiplicity and duplicity: the Committee meets, September 1944
In 1944, this assemblage of scientist-regulators would create Canadian standards for almost
200 drugs and biological products.187 This was an accomplishment – though perhaps not in the
sense intended by the Committee. One of its most thoughtful members spent time, over the
summer of 1944, mulling over the consequences of Canada’s new drug standards. After
reflection, Esli Woods wrote to the Secretary of the Committee.188 In an incisive appraisal, the
Dean of Pharmacy diplomatically detailed the recent proliferation of “sources of official
standards and methods”, which he believed had unintentionally undermined the uniformity of
drugs in Canada.189 Troubled by the challenges that proliferating standards posed for training
However, Driedger also noted an English decision, in Willingdale v Norris, [1909] 1 KB 57, that held that a statutory provision
prescribing a penalty for a statutory breach extended also to a regulatory breach; see Driedger 1960 at 5-6.
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pharmacy students, Woods was also worried about the legal and moral implications for
practicing pharmacists, as without fixed, stable, and readily available methods of determining
conformity to standards, pharmacists could not meet their responsibilities to ensure the quality
of their preparations. In his view, drug quality and professional responsibility would necessitate
a greater “degree of stabilization of standards and methods”. Woods was observing, in candid
and careful fashion, what departmental officials were coming to acknowledge privately. That
summer, Lancaster and Davidson had also discussed how the flurry of enactments had
multiplied standards, including for sex hormones. Lancaster felt the best solution would be to
amalgamate the Division II biological drug standards with the Division III Supplement
monographs, through an eventual consolidation of the Food and Drug Regulations.190
When Committee members returned to Ottawa that September for the year’s final meeting,
assembling again in the Daly Building’s comfortable library, Dean Woods explained with “some
anxiety” how the “multiplicity of sources” of standards would materialize multiple versions of the
same drug. This situation would presumably worsen after the war when, with the anticipated
rescindment of orders under the War Measures Act, the addenda to the British Pharmacopoeia
would once more apply in Canada. For example, there would be “two varieties of ephedrine”
and “two kinds of thyroid”. 191 Woods could have added “two varieties of oestrone” and “two
types of oestradiol benzoate”, let alone the other modes of estrogen that had been enacted.
Lancaster mounted a half-hearted defence, maintaining that the Committee’s activities had
not made the situation more confusing than it already was before, and stressing that, whatever
standards might exist in foreign pharmacopeia, Canadian regulations took precedence. This
was certainly correct, and yet, with respect to estrogen,192 his answer dodged the issue.
Canadian regulations themselves created two sets of standards. Estrogen was enumerated as
sex hormones in Part II of Schedule B, with accompanying regulatory standards, and as four
molecules in Part V, with accompanying regulatory monographs – but which trumped? For five
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years, Lancaster had sidestepped that question, and no government solicitor had ever
confronted it either.193 By leaving it unresolved, estrogenic reality in Canada had multiplied.194
Dr. Cook did not attend the September meeting. Emboldened by the absence of Ayerst’s
scientist, Committee members voiced frustration with industry foot-dragging on test methods for
sex hormones. Normally receptive to industry interests, Morrell was especially scathing. On
behalf of their subcommittee on sex hormones, yet without Cook’s input, Morrell tabled a status
report. After recalling how the subcommittee had entrusted Cook with consulting US commercial
laboratories regarding National Health’s proposed bioassay methods for sex hormones, his
report put on the record that, but for Parke Davis’ constructive criticism of the method for
gonadotrophins, manufacturers had failed to respond. Given that this effort had “extended for
over a year and with very little response from manufacturers”, he recommended its termination,
as “[c]ontinuation of this procedure in respect to all new methods would, in our opinion, unduly
delay our adoption of official methods.” He proposed that National Health proceed to officially
adopt its methods for oestrone and oestradiol benzoate, advising that the Laboratory of Hygiene
was preparing what he referred to as a “book of official methods”.195 A portion of this book was
already typewritten, and Morrell suggested that it would be complete by the end of 1944.196
Yet delay tactics were not exclusive to industry. The idea of a book of official methods had
its genesis in the Committee’s debate, at its very first meeting, regarding the centrality of test
methods to the regulation of sex hormones. At that meeting, bureaucratic opposition to codifying
methods in regulation, industry resistance, and academic willingness to concede the issue in
exchange for teaching and research support had combined to pave the way for regulatory
sanction of sex hormones without conventional standards. This compromise had been brokered
through a promised book of methods, which would act as a companion to the regulations. But
the book never materialized. In meetings and letters over the next seven years, Morrell and
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others would routinely promise a printed book of methods, at no distant date.197 Although the
Laboratory was developing and applying internal methods, National Health did not finalize or
circulate any such book at any time before the early 1950s. By then, the Laboratory’s resistance
to publishing its methods no longer appeared motivated, as Morrell had professed at the
Committee’s first meeting, by administrative concerns about printing costs. Rather, consistent
with Deputy Minister Wodehouse’s intervention during the development of the Sex Hormone
Regulations, in 1950, the Chief of the Laboratory of Hygiene candidly connected resistance to
disclosing its methods to the Department’s distaste for holding drug manufacturers to standards:
“We are rather loath to outline procedures … since there is a marked tendency among
manufacturers to look upon a method described … as the only method. This would be a
backward step since there would be no incentive for manufacturers to develop their own
techniques … We are most anxious to avoid becoming a party to any directives which
could have the effect of stifling the initiative on the part of the manufacturers. That is why
in the Biologics section of the Food and Drug Act, specific tests have been omitted.”198
In this way, estrogen initiated new regulatory practices and, eventually, legislative change.
Fuelled by estrogen, techniques of validating burrowed deeper into the bureaucratic culture of
National Health. Not only did methods of standardization continue to be unlawfully subdelegated
to departmental officials, but the Department’s methods were not distributed to drug makers or
made transparent. Eventually, the statutory provision requiring official test methods to be
prescribed in regulations was simply dropped from the revised Food and Drugs Act in 1953.199
***
This chapter has composed a Canadian history of the standardization of estrogen. In
assembling the heterogenous activities, debates, and decisions of a group of scientistregulators – including the physicians, pharmacists, industry researchers, and National Health
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officials on the recently formed Canadian Committee on Pharmacopoeial Standards, and
extending this network to include the Laboratory of Hygiene and the Department of Justice – it
has shown how, in the mid-1940s in Canada, estrogen was enacted with a variety of epistemic,
institutional, and regulatory practices. Thinking with Mol’s relational materialism,200 I have
illustrated that estrogen was done multiply in this regulatory network. Further, working with a coproduction framework,201 I have also begun to show how estrogen, with its variable potencies,
unfixed doses, and unpredicted dose-response relations, in turn engendered new techniques in
Canadian drug regulation. This second theme will be developed, in the context of estrogen’s
influence on cosmetics regulation, in Chapter 5. Thus, this composition builds two contrapuntal
themes within one arrangement – as regulatory processes enact potent substances, and as
potent substances catalyze legal change.
The concept of toxic enactment captures these two intertwined dynamics, approaching
toxicity and law as enmeshed through practices. Toxic enactment rejects ontological
understandings of substances – whether drugs, cosmetics, or other industrial chemicals – as
fixed entities with inherent properties, varying only in how they might react within individual
human bodies.202 Instead, toxic enactment conceives of substances, and their potencies and
effects, as performed in relation to regulatory actors, practices, and processes. This chapter has
sought to further denaturalize the notion that estrogen existed in stable form outside of its sociomaterial relations with other substances, with lab instruments and animals in bioassays, with
manufactured dosage forms, with advertising messages, and with human actors’ attempts to
define, enumerate, test, classify, and label estrogen as drugs – all of which were reflected in
and produced by regulatory processes in the mid-1940s. Since then, estrogen has been
thoroughly naturalized as a drug, indeed as one of the most prescribed drugs in the history of
medicine. Yet this chapter has shown that estrogen is not an ahistorical or static substance, but
a thing in the making, an object in the doing. Relatedly, it has challenged the conventional view
that regulation reacts to innovation, responding to technological artefacts or to pre-existing
material realities. That view often fosters critiques that law has failed to reflect established or
emerging science, but without recognizing thicker entanglements of regulation and materiality.
Just as laws can respond to techno-material realities, so can regulatory practices enact matter.
Taking relational materialism seriously, law substantiates toxicity, in the epistemic sense of
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providing a means by which toxicity is represented and proven in various regulatory fora and,
concurrently, in the ontological sense of making toxicity real.
In the specific context of historically contingent enactments of estrogen, historians of sex
hormones have persuasively described how measurement practices, in university laboratories
and pharmaceutical firms, were central to calling estrogen into being.203 More generally, STS
scholars have long shown how, as a technique of definition, measurement makes matter and
meaning.204 This chapter builds upon this scholarship by uncovering the role of regulators and
their enactments in materializing estrogen and its potency. The physicians and pharmacists on
the Committee themselves apprehended that, in standardizing estrogenic drugs, “everything
seemed to centre” on bioassays. However, reflecting and producing these professionals’
declining influence on drug standards in mid-century Canada, the multiple regulations ultimately
enacted in 1944 effectively endorsed diverse standardization, allowing industry to submit its own
reference standards and to select its own test methods. These regulations effectively split
bioassay methods into two types – those used by firms when manufacturing drugs, and those
adopted in the Laboratory of Hygiene to control those products. If the purpose of standards was
to ensure estrogenic substances in industry and government labs met a quality threshold and
were the “same things”, then by this measure, the regulations made in 1944 were a total failure.
Instead, this chapter shows that, with the suite of regulations in 1944, estrogen was becoming
multiple. Taken together, the Canadian Supplement and the Sex Hormone Regulations
simultaneously performed estrogen as ready-made preparations and as pure substances, as
biological and chemical substances, as synthetic and natural, and as drug substances that
could be measured and materialized in different potencies, forms, and doses, without licensing
oversight. These regulations also left open what estrogen did, and thus what it was, by refusing
to define “purported” properties of estrogenic products or identify diseases for which they were
indicated, creating space for industry, physicians, and women to experiment with its effects.
By another measure, however, the Sex Hormone Regulations succeeded in “standardizing”
estrogen.205 In the first of many moves to supplant traditional standards with labelling, these
regulations devised proper names for various estrogenic drugs and required these names to be
stated on product labels. In effect, this rule enacted distinctive classes of estrogen. Unwilling or
unable to prescribe potency measurements or units, properties, sources, or diseases as their
techniques for defining estrogen, regulators instead sought to define estrogen, and to make it
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standard, through naming. As Fausto-Stirling and others have shown, the naming of various sex
hormones was hotly debated by scientists in the 1930s, and was a powerful technique for
defining steroid hormones as sexed substances with particular functions. As suggested by
Ayerst’s advocacy for naming “conjugated substances” under this rule, naming was also a
precondition for effective marketing and prescribing practices.206 Conjugated substances thus
became standard, even when the recalcitrant mix of estrogens comprising Premarin were
strongly resistant to biological standardization. Using Busch’s typologies, requiring estrogenic
products to be labeled with distinctive names created the divisions that are commonly enacted
in merchant standards, which aim at enhanced market access. Listing “different kinds” of
estrogen aligned strongly with pharmaceutical firms’ emerging marketing and advertising
strategies, helping these drugs to circulate.
How had labels in lieu of standards been achieved? What tacit practices, tactics, and
techniques had materialized estrogenic drugs to be potent and variable? One common practice
was stalling.207 Ayerst’s scientist on the Committee repeatedly delayed efforts to standardize
bioassay methods in the Sex Hormone Regulations and the Canadian Supplement, and the
Department’s Laboratory of Hygiene likewise dragged its feet, failing to release its own internal
test methods for estrogen among other drugs. Other delay practices included National Health
officials engaging legal counsel on proposed regulations at a late stage, after regulatory options
had been developed, discussed in the Committee, sent out to industry, and drafted.208 While
stalling contributed to the enactment of regulations that left standards open, the more systemic
and significant regulatory habit was a deepening culture of delegation within National Health.
The multiplicity enacted in 1944 flowed from the Department distributing and diffusing its
regulatory powers. For those tasks that National Health was unable or unwilling to perform itself,
it effectively delegated to industry or consumers. For tasks that National Health officials wished
to perform themselves (such as determine bioassay methods), while retaining the flexibility to
change their minds or avoid publicity, they subdelegated responsibility down into the
bureaucratic depths and kept commitments out of regulations.
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As the regulatory assemblage expanded to encompass government lawyers, so did the
legal techniques evolve. Thinking with Shapiro,209 this chapter has drawn out certain legal
techniques that actively operated to install a potent and multiple estrogen into Canadian laws
and bodies. In reviewing and revising the Department’s draft regulations for form and validity,
DOJ counsel routinely rendered these regulations as intra vires through what I have called
techniques of validating. As also described in Chapter 3, one such technique used to work
around concerns that enactments lacked validity was to “silence the recitals”. Where it was
doubtful that lawful authority existed to make an order in council, as with adding Part V to
Schedule B and approving the Canadian Supplement where it primarily relied on chemical test
methods, DOJ simply removed mention of any statutory provisions thought to (not) authorize the
enactments. Originally a technique used where validity was uncertain, soon National Health and
DOJ were stripping out or making vague any reference to authorizing provisions in regulations.
The Sex Hormone Regulations could not benefit from this technique. As a result of a legal
opinion that only Cabinet had the jurisdiction to set standards for testing and expressing potency
of sex hormones, National Health was uncharacteristically constrained in trying to enact an ultra
vires regulation. In this case, the Department had to improvise. It did so by amending the Sex
Hormone Regulations, before they were made, to require manufacturers to supply information
on their potency test methods through labels. In its unpredicted potencies and unfixed doses,
materialized as simultaneously safe and potent, estrogen would continue to provoke an evolving
strategy of regulating drugs through labels. It spurred the Department to devise a novel “caution
label” for estrogenic drugs, warning consumers who had bought these products not to use them
except on a physician’s advice. Rather than confine estrogen to sale on prescription, or set dose
limits, National Health assigned responsibility for ensuring safety to women consumers.
As current day scientists know, whether “natural” or “synthetic”, estrogens regularly resist
the dose-response logics embraced by conventional pharmacology.210 They know that effects
can be as much a function of timing as dose, and that low doses may be more toxic than high
doses. They know there is no safe threshold – no safe dose – for many estrogenic substances.
However, in the 1940s, a simpler dose-response paradigm was almost universally accepted,
including by the scientists appointed to the Committee or working at National Health. Viewing
toxicity through monotonic dose-response curves, faced with potent substances that had been
associated with cancer and reproductive problems in laboratory studies, these actors

209

See Chapter 1, section 2.ii, particularly the content associated with notes 139-142.

210

See Introduction particularly that content associated with notes 9-19.

147

nonetheless decided to allow the pharmaceutical industry to decide in what potencies and
doses estrogen should be made and sold. In so doing, conventional dose-response logics were
written out of estrogen regulation under the Food and Drugs Act. Potency was obscured through
proliferating reference standards and test methods, and dose was erased entirely. As will be
seen in Chapter 5, by rendering safe doses of estrogen largely imperceptible, the regulations
would make it difficult to apprehend estrogen in cosmetics. Shortly after National Health evaded
dose-response considerations for estrogenic drugs, it would re-introduce such considerations
back into the regulation of “safe doses” of estrogenic cosmetics, once again by turning to labels.
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Chapter Five
“An administrative ruling has been made on an upper limit of potency for one month's
supply”: regulating estrogen with labels, 1945-1953
Estrogens will produce such changes in tissues and, in susceptible experimental animals at least, large
doses of estrogens have increased the incidence of cancer. To quote one authority on this subject, Novak
(1944) said, “it is the consensus that the clinical employment of estrogens in the customary therapeutic
dosage presents no hazard, but prolonged used of these substances is contraindicated in persons
suffering from cancer, or who have a familiar history of cancer. This is one potent argument against the
use of proprietary cosmetics containing estrogenic substances.” – EL Devlin, 1952.1
…while the ordinary housewife is well able to determine when her food is grossly adulterated, subtleties
and the refinements in sophistication in this modern world are likely to pass unobserved under her
scrutinizing gaze and, therefore, an organization such as the Food and Drug Directorate is necessary to
protect her and her loved ones from fraud, sickness and possible death. – A. Linton Davidson (1949a).
Notwithstanding the opinion of a great constitutional lawyer of long ago that “Parliament can do anything
except change a man into a woman or a woman into a man,” it would have been preferable if cosmetics
and devices were treated as individual subjects in the legislation, rather than to distort the ordinary
meaning of a drug by including in it things which common sense rejects from it. – Robert Curran (1949)

In the previous chapter, the Canadian Committee on Pharmacopoeial Standards, National
Health, and Department of Justice performed estrogen multiply. They did so through a series of
enactments, themselves dependent upon techniques of validating, that declined to stabilize
estrogen’s potencies, doses, reference materials, forms, modes, or properties. Enacted as
potent and multiple and unleashed into markets and bodies, by the end of the 1940s, estrogen
was exerting its own influence on regulations under the Food and Drugs Act.
A new generation of National Health officials would seek to rein in estrogen. Unlike their
predecessors, they were motivated less by securing independent Canadian pharmacopoeial
standards, and more by avoiding irksome regulatory differences that interfered with trade with
the US. In section 1, this chapter describes National Health’s efforts to consolidate estrogen and
its enactments. In 1949, the four estrogens were dropped from the Canadian Supplement, and
the Sex Hormone Regulations were adjusted to subdelegate bioassay tests to the Laboratory of
Hygiene, consistent with National Health’s approach to many other biological drugs.
Estrogen continued to shapeshift, however, provoking new regulatory techniques in Canada.
In 1949, the government finally brought into force those statutory amendments, passed in 1939,
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allowing for cosmetics to be regulated as a sub-category of drugs. And it enacted the first
cosmetics regulation in Canadian history – a regulation specifically governing cosmetics
containing sex hormones. In another turn towards using consumer labels as a regulatory device,
and in an early example of risk regulation in Canada, the Department directed women buying
estrogenic cosmetics to ensure that they used these potent products “with care”.
Soon, however, the Department concluded that being careful was not enough. Fearing that
estrogenic skin creams could have hazardous or systemic effects, especially at high doses,
National Health officials nonetheless had little means to prevent women from “overdosing” on
these cosmetics. Indeed, as potency standards and dose ranges had been erased from
estrogen regulations in 1943, the relationship between estrogenic dose and estrogenic effect
had been rendered imperceptible. Section 2 describes how, in further amendments to the Sex
Hormone Regulations in 1950, National Health required a new label unique to estrogenic skin
creams. This time, women would be directed by a product label to “use only as directed”, and
the product package would be required to provide directions for use. Many of these products
were high-end cosmetics imported from the US, arriving in Canada in jars containing a “30-day
supply”. For those products immune to the US FDA’s regulatory supervision, however, National
Health inspectors sought to negotiate the content of these “directions for use”, by persuading
manufacturers to direct women to use a certain amount of a certain potency of estrogenic skin
cream every 30 days. Adopting a form of governance that they called “administrative ruling”,
their powers to standardize dose and potency delegated not by law but by labels, National
Health officials quietly reintroduced dose-response logics back into estrogen regulation.
Absorbed into cosmetic products and regulatory practices, estrogen thus spawned new
techniques of governance. Labels delegated power to National Health officials to govern
administratively, and delegated responsibility to women to use products safely. Mediated by
labels, estrogen and administrative practices were co-produced. This entanglement of estrogen,
cosmetics, and labels was highly gendered. Section 2 includes some of the advertisements
published by manufacturers of estrogenic breast and face creams that were investigated by
National Health inspectors under the revised Sex Hormone Regulations in the early 1950s.
It is easy to read the techniques devised for estrogenic cosmetics as a sexist substitution of
labels for standards. Still, estrogen had its own part to play. Having been performed in diverse
ways in factories, clinics, laboratories, boardrooms, and now at women’s vanity tables, its
effects rendered unknown at different doses, and in myriad molecular and manufactured forms,
estrogen was not a stable object with which regulators could smoothly interact. If not by
Nature’s design or regulators’ intent, estrogen was prepared to act up.
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1. Estrogenic consolidation and cosmetic innovation: 1945-1949
After decades of advocating for greater Canadian control over drug standards and for
diminished British influence, in 1945, Harry Lancaster and Velyien Henderson exited the scene.
Henderson died, and after years of poor health, Lancaster took early retirement. A new
generation of scientists was responsible for food and drugs at National Health. Born and trained
in the US, Dr. Clare Morrell was elevated after Lancaster’s retirement to the position of Assistant
Chief Dominion Analyst. When Aime Valin retired in 1946, Morrell became the Chief.2
Part and parcel of the explosion in regulated drug standards, the Department’s bureaucratic
machinery and infrastructure also expanded considerably in the second half of the 1940s.3 In
the fall of 1944, the government hived off pensions from the Department, creating a new
Department of National Health and Welfare.4 Shortly thereafter, the food and drug divisions
went through a major reorganization and expansion. In 1946, National Health created a Food
and Drug Directorate (often still referred to, in this period, as the Food and Drug Divisions),
comprised of three divisions and five regional offices. Morrell was appointed Director of the
entire directorate. He also headed the Food and Drugs Division, which was primarily
responsible for administering the Food and Drugs Act. The remaining two divisions were the
Proprietary or Patent Medicine Division and the Advertising and Labels Division. R.D. Whitmore
was Chief of the latter, which assumed responsibilities for compliance and inspections; in 1947,
this Advertising and Labels Division was rechristened Inspection Services.5
Morrell believed that, as in the US, Canada should regulate cosmetics that had the potential
to be injurious to health. In the fall of 1945, he advocated for the creation of an advisory
subcommittee on cosmetics, which would include dermatologists, to advise the Department on
emerging cosmetics challenges. The Deputy Minister, Dr. Brock Chisholm, was unsupportive
and the cosmetic subcommittee was never established.6 Unfazed, National Health officials
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began preparing to request that the statutory amendments regarding cosmetics, passed in
1939, be proclaimed into force. Officials advised the cosmetics industry of the Department’s
plans for regulating cosmetics; in response, the Toilet Goods Manufacturers’ Association
provided the Department with a lawyer’s opinion that the statutory licensing provision was
unconstitutional.7 The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) quickly confirmed this view. In Elmer
Driedger’s opinion, the cosmetics licensing provision was “of doubtful validity”. The crux of
Driedger’s advice was that the provision could not be supported as criminal legislation “because
nothing is prohibited”. In effect, National Health was precluded from licensing a substance under
the criminal law power unless licensing was integrated with a criminal prohibition, and relatedly,
National Health was therefore precluded from licensing anything but injurious substances.8
However, as the Food and Drugs Division remained committed to regulating cosmetics,
Driedger devoted significant efforts working with its officials in the spring of 1946 to draft a new
bill. The draft bill added a new Part to the Food and Drugs Act, with a central provision that
would prohibit the sale of “injurious cosmetics”, and that furthermore would empower regulations
respecting registration, packaging, and labelling of cosmetics; restricting the use of ingredients;
and prescribing standards and fixing limits of variability.9 In May 1946, on its way to Parliament,
the bill hit a snag. The Minister of National Health and Welfare, Brooke Claxton, decided at the
last minute that registering cosmetics might prove contentious and decided to drop all cosmetics
provisions from the bill,10 which otherwise passed.11 Minister Claxton’s resistance to regulating
cosmetics went beyond the registration measures in the new bill as, on July 1, 1946, the
definition of “drug” in the 1939 amendments was proclaimed into force “except the portion of it
which applies to cosmetics”.12

7

January 22, 1946 letter from Chisholm to Varcoe, in EA Driedger’s Cosmetics Regulation File, 1946-1947.

8

January 25, 1946 legal memorandum from Driedger to Varcoe, January 29, 1946 draft letter by Driedger, and February 1, 1946
final letter from Varcoe to Chisholm, all in EA Driedger’s Cosmetics Regulation File, 1946-1947.
9

January 25, 1946 legal memorandum from Driedger to Varcoe, and March 19, 1946 legal memorandum from Driedger to
Varcoe, in EA Driedger’s Cosmetics Regulation File, 1946-1947.
10

May 27, 1946 letter from Curran to Varcoe, in EA Driedger’s Cosmetics Regulation File, 1946-1947.

11

The Act was amended in July 1946, but, as in 1939, without its intended cosmetics provisions. As in 1939, the central focus
was on authorizing more expansive regulatory powers to control the sale of drugs by prescriptions, specifically for antibiotics
like penicillin which were not “ordinarily injurious to health but if too frequently administered might lose their full effects”. See
Davidson 1949a at 92; and An Act to Amend the Food and Drugs Act, SC 1946, c 23.
12

Proclamation, 1 July 1946, bringing into force part of section one of “An Act to amend the Food and Drugs Act”, in Canada
Gazette, Vol LXXX, No 29 at p 4837 (July 20, 1946).

152

At the end of 1946, Minister Claxton moved to National Defence.13 With Claxton’s departure
came the possibility of renewed political priority for cosmetics. The new Minister, Paul Martin,
would also have a new Deputy Minister. Having served as the Chief of the Laboratory of
Hygiene since 1939, Dr. G. Donald W. Cameron was characterized as a “particularly happy
appointment” as Deputy Minister of Health due to his familiarity with the Department and its
priorities.14 By 1947, the Food and Drugs Division was expanding its capacity to research and
control cosmetics, having creating a Cosmetics Section within Laboratory Services and
appointing an analyst as its cosmetics specialist.15 Moreover, with Robert Curran, the new legal
counsel to National Health, Driedger revised and polished the Department’s draft cosmetics
regulations in 1947, preparing for a time when the Food and Drugs Act would empower them.16
Cosmetics regulation was just one piece of a massive expansion of the Department’s
bureaucratic machinery and capacities. From WWII onwards, there had been an explosion of
orders in council and regulations “which, through a mass of amendments, were fast becoming a
labyrinth out of which even the administrative officials sometimes found it difficult to extricate
themselves.”17 Beginning in 1947, the Food and Drug Divisions began the task of consolidating
the Food and Drug Regulations, primarily aimed at streamlining but also introducing some
substantive revisions.18 The Food and Drug Regulations were repealed and replaced, in their
entirety, on April 5, 1949.19
In revising the regulations, National Health officials endeavoured mightily to constrain and
consolidate estrogen. Recognizing and troubled by the multiple drug standards wrought in 1944,
they sought greater uniformity through amendments to three estrogenic enactments: the
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Canadian Supplement, Sex Hormone Regulations, and Schedule B to the Food and Drugs Act.
The Department’s primary strategy for bringing uniformity to the estrogens was to remove them
from the Canadian Supplement.20 Oestrone, oestradioal benzoate, stilboestrol, and stilboestrol
dipropionate were all deleted from Part V of Schedule B,21 and their monographs were removed
from the 1949 Food and Drug Regulations. The old guard like Davidson clung to the idea that
the Supplement had value, but other officials were coming to view the Supplement as spent;
having served its purpose during and after the war, it was now ready to be retired.22 The
Supplement’s obsolescence was hastened with a revised British Pharmacopoeia in 1948, which
remedied the decline in pharmacopoeial standards occasioned by the “wartime addenda” and
included most of the prewar monographs that National Health had incorporated, in 1944, into
the Supplement. Thus, only a small subset of the monographs, about 40, were retained in the
regulations.23 Beyond this pragmatic reason for dropping monographs, however, was National
Health’s continuing and widening shift away from professional ways of regulating drugs and
towards administrative modes of regulation.24 Even the new name of the Canadian Supplement
reflected this, now styled within the regulations as “Drugs of Part V of Schedule B to the Act”. As
Director of the Food and Drug Divisions, Morrell continued to entertain superficially the notion of
a Canadian Pharmacopoeia, and he generally accepted that sometimes “peculiarly Canadian
(drug) standards will have to be maintained”, 25 but in a sharp departure from the wartime
nationalism, he was strongly inclined to follow the Americans’ lead on drug standards,
particularly to better facilitate importation of drugs from Canada’s largest supplier:
It is always a subject for debate as to what standard shall be written into the Canadian
Regulations. Shall that of the United States Pharmacopoeia be adopted, or of the British
Pharmacopoeia, or some other existing standard, or shall a special Canadian standard be
devised? Unless there are important reasons for doing so, the latter course is to be avoided.
There is no point in having differences just to be different. It would be an ideal course to
choose the International Standard and nomenclature, provided it was also used by a
substantial number of countries trading with Canada. Many of the irksome differences in
standards, which have no real significance from the medical point of view, but which if they
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exist mutually exclude the products of different countries, would disappear and the labeling
of imports would not cause the trouble it now does.26
As the Department phased out the Supplement,27 it also phased out the Canadian
Committee on Pharmacopoeial Standards. Despite the heated debates on estrogen among
Committee members in 1943, in 1949, National Health did not bother to seek the Committee’s
approval to drop the four estrogens from the Supplement, returning unilaterally to its original
plan to regulate estrogenic drugs solely through the Sex Hormone Regulations. The exact
timing of the Committee’s demise is unclear, as rather than formal disbandment, it fizzled out.
Yet it was certainly on its deathbed by 1950, and gone by 1952.28 There were other deaths not
metaphorical. On March 1, 1950, while at home writing a sermon, Linton Davidson had a stroke
and died. With his passing, so passed the practice of correspondence, figurative and literal,
between Department and Committee members on old and new ways of regulating drugs.29
In addition to dropping the four estrogens from the dwindling list of drugs in Part V and the
Supplement, National Health also had amendments made to the Sex Hormone Regulations.30
These amendments tinkered with the provisions that set standards (or more accurately, with the
provisions that delegated standard setting to National Health officials or to manufacturers).
Under the vague provision enacted in 1944 for reference standards, many manufacturers had
submitted reference materials for their products. With the proliferation of commercially available
sex hormone products in the 1940s, this meant that the samples submitted also proliferated,
becoming an unwieldy “multiplicity of standards” in the Laboratory.31 In 1949, National Health
ended manufacturers’ duties to submit standards and instead delegated to the Food and Drug
Laboratories the power to decide which materials it would keep as standards.32 With respect to
26
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potency, there were minor revisions that, contrary to Driedger’s legal opinion in 1944, expressly
subdelegated power to the Food and Drug Laboratories to set test methods for measuring the
potency of any products expressed in terms of the International Standard or the Canadian
Reference Standard. The potency labels remained, though, with tweaks to the rule for clarity.33
The most substantive amendment to the Sex Hormone Regulations was the addition of
cosmetics. On May 1, 1949, Canada finally brought into force the 1939 amendments to the Act,
making the legislative decision to define cosmetic and to make “any cosmetic” a subcategory of
drug (the unconstitutional licensing provision was never brought into force).34 As a result, in
1949, cosmetics became subject to the general provisions of the Food and Drug Regulations
related to drugs. Further, cosmetics could now be specifically regulated. The first – and the only
– cosmetics that Canada regulated, in 1949, were cosmetics containing sex hormones.35
By 1949, estrogen had been infused into skin creams for a decade. Consistent with the fact
that it was primarily white middle and upper-class women who sought out hormone replacement
therapy,36 estrogenic cosmetics were similarly classed. By 1939, they had arrived for sale in
Eaton’s and other Canadian department stores as luxury skin creams,37 though breast
enlargement creams also arrived by the slightly seedier route of mail order.38 With estrogenic
activity conjured from oestrone, oestradiol, oestriol, equilin, equilenin, and even from DES,
these products contained hormones whipped into emulsion creams or mixed into oils.39
Imported from the US, where, unlike drugs, cosmetics did not require pre-market approval under
the US FDCA, they were not supported by scientific studies showing their safety.
There was, in particular, a paucity of physiological evidence of whether, and to what extent,
estrogens in skin creams were absorbed into the blood stream and into bodies, although some
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researchers had tested the systemic effects of such creams. For example, in a 1938 study,
researchers examined creams that contained either androgens or estrogens.40 Using what was
characterized as a low dose, they established that sex hormones were easily absorbed through
the skin of various animals, and that face cream “sold commercially and recommended for the
removal of wrinkles from normal women has decided internal effects when applied daily on the
skin of experimental animals”.41 They concluded that the ready absorption of topical estrogen,
and the demonstrable effects on lab animals, presented a possible hazard to female
reproductive functions and urged more study.42 However, over the next decade, the studies
were sparse, and the cosmetic industry’s newfound enthusiasm for estrogen was abundant. As
Elizabeth Watkins shows, in assembling advertisements from the 1930s and 40s, the industry
promoted the message that youth and beauty were synonymous, and its “ads imparted a clear
message: use of estrogen-containing creams would make a woman’s skin look younger”.43
Neither the FDA nor the American Medical Association (“AMA”) harboured any positive
feelings towards estrogenic skin creams. To the contrary, from the late 1930s to the early
1950s, there was “a strong bias by the US medical profession against the over-counter sales” of
estrogenic cosmetics.44 Concerned about their carcinogenic potential, the AMA had initially
campaigned against these creams. After the AMA published a 1939 editorial that was highly
critical of Estrocreme, a product represented for use in breast enhancement,45 its manufacturer,
Hirestra, sued the AMA in defamation. Supportive of the AMA’s position, the FDA supplied
expert evidence. However, in its decision, the Federal Court rejected this evidence, holding that
the animal studies relied upon by the FDA to claim that estrogens were carcinogenic were
insufficient to prove a likelihood of cancer in women. Langston finds that, as a result of the court
decision, the FDA backed down from efforts to regulate estrogenic breast creams, its resolve
deflated.46 Taking a longer view, however, the FDA regained its enthusiasm by the late 1940s,
when it began targeting all sorts of estrogenic creams with prosecutions for misbranding.47
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Though it is not apparent whether Elmer Driedger knew of estrogenic creams, he had no
difficulty, conceptually or legally, with apprehending cosmetics as a subcategory of drugs.
Robert Curran, in contrast, often overtly disparaged this legislative decision. Curran was
National Health’s chief legal advisor, having joined the Department at the end of the war, and so
his public disdain for Canada’s legislative approach can be jarring. Right after the statutory
amendments were brought into effect in 1949, he wrote a journal article for a mainly American
audience, mocking the Canadian legislation in sexist terms (as set out in the quote at start of
this chapter),48 advancing in less than subtle rhetoric a gendered distinction between drugs and
cosmetics. Acknowledging that medicinal ingredients were found in cosmetics, he nevertheless
opined that cosmetics were “not expected to contain a high degree or medication nor are
extensive therapeutic claims likely to be made for them”. For Curran, the boundary was clear:
“[t]he borderline between cosmetics and drugs, of course, rests upon the claims which are
made”.49 Moreover, he felt that cosmetic companies’ claims must be given broad latitude, and
puffery should not be discouraged.50 After all, the public was not deceived by exaggerated or
false claims, as nobody really thought that cosmetics would do “what Nature has failed to do”.51
No substance challenged such rigid distinctions more strongly than estrogen.52 As will be
seen, some estrogenic “cosmetics” were more potent than “drugs”, and manufacturers often
implied therapeutic values for their estrogenic cosmetics. In the late 1940s and early 1950s,
advertisements for Premarin, a “drug”, and Helena Rubinstein’s hormone cream, a “cosmetic”,
made many of the same claims: youthful beauty, reproductive femininity, natural vitality, and
happier husbands. Yet Curran never mentioned estrogen, or the new regulation governing
estrogenic cosmetics, in his criticisms of the cosmetics scheme under the Food and Drugs Act.
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Perhaps his silence on estrogen was because it challenged his insistence on “common
sense” distinctions between drugs and cosmetics. The evolving scheme on sex hormones also
appeared, at least superficially, to challenge this distinction. Beyond recognizing that cosmetics
could be just as potent as drugs, in 1949, the term “sex hormones” disappeared from the Act.
Concurrent with the regulatory amendments and the cosmetics proclamation, Schedule B was
amended, with the term “sex hormones” deleted from Part II of the schedule, and the phrase
“hormones, and preparations of hormones” added to Part I.53 Were hormones being de-sexed?
The change was part of an intentional, broader policy decision that the only hormonal drugs still
requiring licensing were insulin and liver extract.54 Yet these sexless hormones did not last.
Whomever had held the pen, in redrafting Schedule B, had forgotten its integration with the
standards in the Sex Hormone Regulations. As of April 5, 1949, those regulations provided that
“[t]he drugs referred to in this Division are included in the term sex hormone as mentioned or
described in Part I of Schedule B to the Act”.55 Without the term sex hormone, this crossreference was meaningless. Soon realizing its error, National Health returned the term to
Schedule B three months later. 56 Momentarily gender-neutral, estrogen was rapidly re-sexed.
Tempting to shrug off as a drafting error, triggered by a well-intended but legally mistaken
effort to remove the “sex” from sex hormones, in fact this incident was less benign. Recall that,
under the scheme for biologics, drugs on Part 1 could be standardized but not controlled
through licensing. Why did National Health officials feel it necessary, in the first place, to move
(sex) hormones from Part II to Part I? Why did they wish to make (sex) hormones not just
unlicensed, as they had already been for two decades, but also “un-licensable”? One reason is
that, in 1947, the US formally excluded all hormones from licensing through regulatory
amendments, codifying a longstanding informal policy of the Public Health Service.57 National
Health’s decision to shift all “hormones” from Part II to Part I of Schedule B reflects how the
Food and Drug Divisions were increasingly inclined, by the late 1940s, to shadow US
developments. Although this is a convincing explanation on the face of the Schedule B, Canada
53
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did not, in fact, fully emulate the US regulatory decision. In practice, National Health officials
decided to keep a few hormonal drugs, like liver extract and insulin, under licensure, and to
reserve the possibility of licensure for pituitary hormones. Put another way, and by Pugsley’s
own admission, the only hormones made un-licensable, in practice, were sex hormones.58
The second reason that estrogen was made un-licensable was driven by prevailing gender
norms – which found expression in the journal articles by Curran discussed above – that viewed
cosmetics as little more than natural products for deceptive women. On the same day that
hormones were moved to Part 1, Canada obtained legislative authority to regulate cosmetics
generally,59 and amended the Sex Hormone Regulations to regulate estrogenic cosmetics
specifically.60 Cosmetics, however, were legally difficult to license. At least, that was the
message that National Health officials had taken from Driedger’s legal opinion in 1946, which
had caused them concern that licensing rules in the Biologicals Regulation might also be invalid
(though Driedger had brushed off that concern in his opinion). With sex hormones now legally
recognized, as of April 1949, as superficial stuff of ladies’ make-up, cosmetics dragged estrogen
down into an “un-licensable” class. Far from being de-sexed, estrogen was being reproduced as
ever more gendered, as natural feminine substances that did not require licensing.
That estrogen was provoking gendered distinctions within Canadian law is supported by the
techniques through which the Sex Hormone Regulations newly regulated hormonal cosmetics,
in the absence of either licensing or registration. While these regulations continued to prescribe
(or rather to delegate the prescription of) unconventional “standards” for sex hormone products,
beyond this, in its newly endorsed form of cosmetic products, estrogen would again be ruled
through labelling. Once again, the label devised was novel to Canadian food and drugs law, and
once again, these labelling innovations were only used for products sold to women. Section
C.02.0009 now prohibited the sale of cosmetic products containing a sex hormone unless the
label carried the statement: “This preparation contains a potent sex hormone. Use with care”.61
No Canadian consumer had previously been directed by a label to use a product “with
care”.62 In the 1940s, most food and drugs in Canada bore labels that served to state what the
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product was purported to be. These labels impliedly represented that the product met regulated
standards of quality or identity, and exposed manufacturers to misbranding prosecutions if their
products did not “measure up” to these regulated recipes, comparable to the US regulatory
approach.63 At this time, labels did not typically bear health information, including because
regulators believed that “such information would ‘confuse’ the ordinary food consumer.”64
Thus, as with estrogenic drugs five years earlier, in 1949, National Health performed a novel
regulatory move, enlisting labels to direct women to attend carefully to their own safety when
using estrogenic cosmetics. For these products, only used by women, the rules were suddenly
different. Safety would no longer be ensured by a “recipe”, built into the drug or food product by
a standard found in a pharmacopoeia or a conventional regulatory standard. Women consumers
would instead be made responsible for ensuring their own safety through careful product use.
It would be easy to conclude that this differential regulatory treatment, in which consumer
warnings were substituted for safety standards, reflected gendered norms about cosmetics. Yet
estrogen was now a wily substance, not readily amenable to regulatory controls. As materialized
by physicians, manufacturers, and government regulators in 1944, and by ongoing inattention in
National Health’s laboratories in the intervening years to its physiological activity, 65 estrogen
was both powerful and indeterminate. When National Health had avoided traditional standards
for estrogenic drugs – such as those afforded by dose limits, prescription controls, or ingredient
restrictions – it had scripted into estrogen an inherent unpredictability. Enacted as both potent
and safe, estrogen naturally provoked the injunction to “use with care”. Rules had engendered
estrogenic crystals, and now estrogen was crystallizing gendered rules.

2. Resurrecting dose through “administrative ruling”, 1950-1953
One year after introducing “use with care” labels to regulate estrogenic cosmetics, Canada
again amended the revised Sex Hormone Regulations.66 Repeating the pattern, the
amendments adopted another new form of product label, which continued the trend of
delegating responsibility for safety to women consumers. National Health’s latest labelling
innovation was specific to estrogenic cosmetics, provoked by the ambiguities that had been
asked for such modifications as might easily have nullified its effect”; Davidson 1949a at 84. In 1941, a different regulatory
approach was taken. Nevertheless, Davidson and Morrell would have been aware of the earlier “use with care” proposal.
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materialized in estrogenic drugs. Having erased dose and potencies from standards for sex
hormones in 1944, by rejecting the notion that these qualities and capacities should be legally
prescribed, departmental officials now subtly reintroduced dose-response considerations into
the regulation of estrogen. They did so through a combination of imposing new labelling rules
and by purporting to make “administrative rulings”, an unorthodox mode of regulating food and
drugs in Canada. In the process, estrogen and labels became ever more entangled.
The amendment split the existing cosmetic rule in two. A new provision now exclusively
governed estrogenic cosmetics,67 while the existing rule was limited to cosmetics “containing
any sex hormone other than a sex hormone purporting to have oestrogenic properties”.68 Why
National Health retained this latter provision is unclear, as at the time, there were no cosmetics
being sold with purported androgenic, gonadotrophic, or progestational properties– no
testosterone tonics, no gonadotrophic lip gloss.69 Only estrogen, that spring of youthful and
reproductive femininity, had infiltrated cosmetics. Nevertheless, should any other hormonal
cosmetics ever materialize, their manufacturers would continue to be obliged to advise
consumers to “use with care”.70
The new provision, limited only to estrogenic products, prohibited sale of any “preparation
manufactured for use as a cosmetic containing a sex hormone purporting to have oestrogenic
properties unless demonstrated to be free from systemic effect from sex hormones”, and unless
new labelling requirements were satisfied.71 In promoting this amendment, National Health
officials were alive to physicians’ continuing concerns about the carcinogenic hazards of
estrogen in cosmetic products. As cosmetics were now a legal subcategory of drug, National
Health could have limited these preparations to sale only under prescription, though physicians
presumably would not have been receptive to being asked to prescribe creams intended to
reduce wrinkles. Alternatively, National Health could have standardized cosmetics. For potency,
in theory, Canada could have prohibited the sale of cosmetics containing estrogenic substances
that exceeded a certain potency expressed in international units, using test methods determined
by the Laboratory of Hygiene and measured against reference materials, as for drugs.
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Standardizing dose, however, was more elusive. Pharmacopoeial monographs could fix
estrogen dose ranges to guide drug dispensers and prescribers, and regulated drug standards
could dictate the dose of certain dosage forms, whether in ampoules, suppositories, tablets, or
capsules. As seen in the previous chapter, though, in designing its Sex Hormone Regulations in
the mid-1940s, National Health had written dose out of estrogen regulations. Eschewing such
standards made it difficult to conceive of a “safe” or “hazardous” dose of estrogen. Instead, the
regulatory regime left it to firms to standardize products’ doses and to physicians to supervise
dosage over time (assuming women who purchased estrogenic drugs over the counter in the
1940s asked for physicians’ advice). Consequently, in the latter half of the decade, the
Laboratory of Hygiene had little incentive to monitor pharmaceutical companies’ evolving dose
ranges, or to research their physiological impacts. Nor is there evidence that it did so.72 What
amount of estrogen in an oral, injectable, or topical preparation was safe? What dose made the
poison? National Health did not know. Its scientists, and those on the Committee, had focused
squarely on knowing potency through measuring, but had ignored the other half of Paracelsus’
formulation. Imperceptible within regulatory control activities, dose was left to clinicians and their
patients, delegated to the unpredictable relations between drugs, bodies, and time.
Once statutorily empowered to regulate skin cream, National Health had to face up to dose.
Content to defer to the expertise of large pharmaceutical firms with in-house laboratories,
alchemical experiments by cosmetics outfits elicited more skepticism. Steeped in a regulatory
culture resistant to imposing limits on borderline products out of fear that this would amount to
endorsement, National Health officials were in a bind. With dose erased from drug standards,
how could they determine what dose – what amount – of a cosmetic was safe?
This question was complicated by the fact that skin cream, infused with hormones or not,
rarely came packaged in daily “doses”. Even had National Health scientists monitored the
effects of estrogenic preparations, in cold laboratories with mass-produced rodents and in
comfortable homes of middle-aged women, face cream and bodies met each other in ways less
precise. In that creamy form, in registers both material and conceptual, estrogen was slippery.73
Performed simultaneously as safe and potent in mass-produced pills and medically-supervised
injections, in daily, mundane beauty regimens, estrogen was less knowable and more fluid.74
How much cream a woman applied before going to bed in the evening, or when starting her day
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in the morning, was not determined quantitatively or mechanically, but through manual, sensory,
affective practices. How much cream does it take to make your skin feel softer, smoother,
firmer, less wrinkled? A dry winter’s wind, a poor night’s sleep, a husband’s bad mood – one’s
relations with estrogen changed. When these practices changed, so did estrogen. In its
cohabitation with wealthy women and their skin, estrogen enacted an ambiguous toxicity.
Dr. Leonard Pugsley was responsible for advising on this question. Like Morrell, Pugsley
had also been promoted after the war. In the 1947 re-organization, he became the Chief of
Laboratory Services, overseeing ten sections within the central laboratory in Ottawa and serving
as the technical adviser to five regional laboratories by guiding research and testing for food,
drugs, and cosmetics. He also continued to research and analyze hormonal products.75 In this
capacity, his research was quietly influential, leading National Health and eventually the US
FDA to end the agricultural practice of using DES in chicken feed.76 With cosmetics though,
Pugsley would prove much more willing to take his cues from US companies and regulators.
In 1951, Pugsley wrote a journal article about the Canadian regulation of endocrine products,
in which he simultaneously highlighted and obscured Canada’s practices.77 Aimed primarily at
an audience of American regulators and industry, he sought to explain and defend the recent
amendment for estrogenic cosmetics. He claimed that, while National Health had considered it
advisable to “limit the amount” of estrogen in cosmetic products, it had nonetheless decided
against setting any upper limit on potency in the regulations “because such would tend to
indicate approval and freedom from any undesirable side effects” at lower potencies.78 Instead
of regulated limits, Canada had chosen to limit the amount of estrogen that women would use
through a new labelling requirement added to the regulations. This double-barreled labelling
rule, in section C.02.010, required estrogenic cosmetic labels to include the statement: “Use
only as directed”,79 and then required manufacturers to indicate “directions for use”.80
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Thus, as with the caution label for estrogenic drugs and the self-care label for cosmetics,
again National Health expressly chose a label as an alternative to a safety standard. In 1949,
women had been told to “use with care”, but care of the self was no longer enough – women
would now need to comply with explicit directions to keep themselves safe from cancer. Yet
what exactly those directions should be was not articulated in the Sex Hormone Regulations,
and, in his article, Pugsley maintains a strategic silence on how this new labelling rule would
limit estrogenic exposures. Were directions being left to manufacturers, or were National Health
officials “directing the directions”? Most glaringly, his article is silent on what amount had been
identified by the Department as its “upper limit of potency.81 Thus, the reintroduction of doseresponse logics to estrogen regulation in Canada was left implicit and made discretionary.
Digging deeper, it seems that potency limits were set through two distinct practices: first, by a
practice of US cosmetics firms under the influence of the US FDA (and by the FDA under the
influence of Helena Rubinstein); and second, through administrative practices of National Health
officials negotiating label directions with those firms that had not received the FDA’s message.
Though the legal source of the FDA’s authority to stipulate the potency of estrogenic skin
creams is murky,82 the material source of the “rule” is not. The rule was enmeshed in the
products and marketing practices of Helena Rubinstein, the upscale cosmetics firm that led the
industry in luxury hormonal products. In the 1940s, the company had packaged its “Estrogenic
Hormone Cream” in jars that it advertised as containing one month’s supply.83 By indicating that
the jar held a “30-night supply” and that women should “use it for one month” to obtain results,
such ads implied how much cream should be used.84 Part of a wider strategy to paint its product
as scientific and therapeutic,85 this marketing tactic made cream seem like medicine and the
amount like dosage. Such ads aimed to persuade women to view the 30-night supply as the
minimum amount needed for a wrinkle-free complexion, and thus to buy a jar every month.
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Figure 9: Ad for Helena Rubinstein’s Estrogenic Hormone Cream, 1945. 86

“A scientific preparation that will help you achieve beauty for your skin by retarding the effects of
aging. 30-Night Supply.”
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Figure 10: Ad for Helena Rubinstein’s Estrogenic Hormone Cream, 1947.87

“Estrogenic Hormone Cream – Contains natural hormones which your skin absorbs? Result? You
look younger! Use it for one month. See the change. 4.50.” This direction that the product be used
for a 30-day period was only made for estrogenic cream, and for no other of these products.
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By the late 1940s, Helena Rubinstein’s marketing moves were taken up, tentatively, as an
informal policy position by the US FDA. In effect, the FDA adopted the position that existing
manufacturing and marketing practices of Helena Rubinstein (and other reputable firms)
reflected a permissible potency and dose for estrogenic skin creams. In 1951, counsel to the US
Toilet Goods Association disclosed the FDA’s “latest pronouncement on the subject”:
As to the local effectiveness of estrogens in the doses commonly used, we believe that the
literature as of today shows, after allowance is made for enthusiasm in some of the
publications, slight morphological and physiological alterations in older skins not produced
by the same ointment base without the estrogen. Whether or not these effects can be
extended for more than two or three months has not yet been determined. In replying to
inquiries in regard to harmful local systemic effects we have pointed out that the cosmetics
on the market in this country contain from 10,000 to 20,000 units of estrogenic substances
per ounce. The directions in most cases specify that a small quantity be applied to the face.
These articles have been widely distributed for about ten years and there have been no
reports in medical literature which suggest harmful effects resulting from their application.88
Similarly, Bennett finds that the FDA “appears to have settled on 10,000 International Units
(IU) of oestrogens per ounce as an acceptable amount for hormone creams, as long as the
amount used was no greater than 2 ounces per month.” This limit was intended “to ensure that
a user would have a maximum exposure of 670 IU of oestrogens per day.”89 It seems that the
“limit” was an administrative interpretation by the FDA of whether an estrogen cream was a drug
or cosmetic (and whether it was misbranded as either).90 The ambiguity of this interpretation
makes more sense in context of ongoing debates in which pharmaceutical firms and their
lawyers increasingly challenged the FDA’s authority to issue regulations and, relatedly, often
opposed the FDA’s efforts to regulate with administrative rulings or interpretations, insisting
such efforts were “simply advisory in character” and lacked the force of law. 91 At one point, the
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FDA tried to crystallize its “rule of thumb” on estrogenic cream into a firmer rule. In 1950, when
the House Commerce Committee was considering amendments to make it easier to restrict the
sale of prescription drugs, the FDA asked Congress to write into the act an “exemplary list of
prescription drugs” to guide interpretation of a new definition of prescription drugs.92 On that list
was “Estrogenic Substances - except skin creams containing not more than 10,000 International
Units of estrone, or the equivalent of other estrogens, per ounce of cream”.93 Industry opposed
this list and the Durham-Humphrey bill passed in 1951 without it.94 Regardless, right after the bill
passed, the FDA officially limited estrogenic drugs to sale on prescription.95
As in the US, Canadian practices of setting upper potency limits on estrogenic cosmetics did
not depend on any express authority to limit potency or dose. By emulating the Americans’
policy, Canada appeared to be a “shadow regulator”,96 and yet its legal forms and processes
were modified. Rather than a murkily authorized limit of 10,000 IU of estrone potency per ounce,
Canadian regulators chose a qualitative standard to distinguish cosmetics from drugs, with the
test requiring estrogenic cosmetics to be “demonstrated to be free from systemic effect”.97 This
test did not necessarily depend on dose-response reasoning or evidence. Moreover, on paper,
this appears to be a highly precautionary standard requiring positive proof of safety. How could
this test be congruent with the American policy, derived from cosmetics manufacturers, of
limiting the potency of estrogenic cosmetics to a certain strength in a certain amount of cream?
The answer lay in labelling. Under section C.02.010, to be permissibly marketed as a
cosmetic, not only did a preparation need be free of systemic effect, but as noted, it must
include the statement “Use only as directed” and provide “directions for use”.98 These labels
were the technique by which dose-response considerations, erased from the Sex Hormone
Regulations in 1943, were smuggled back into Canadian estrogen regulation. By requiring
cosmetic estrogen to bear product labels that directed use, in practice, National Health
inspectors could attempt to force companies to direct the amount of cream that women should

92

Ibid at 966. The definition of prescription drug was seen by the pharmaceutical industry as the “major controversy” in the bill.

93

Ibid at 969 (emphasis added). This articulation of what, presumably, was already the FDA’s working rule gets the closest to
expressing estrogenic potency units in a way that reflected the science of the day. As noted in Chapter 4, while this had been
widely misunderstood amongst regulators and manufacturers alike, there was not in fact one International Unit in which
estrogenic activity was expressed, but two; see Chapter 4, section 1.i, particularly that content associated with notes 10-11.
94

Ibid at 951.

95

Goodrich 1951 at 888-889.

96

The concept of “shadow regulator” is mentioned in Lexchin 2016 at 133.

97

1949 Sex Hormone Regulations, as amended in 1950, s C.02.010.

98

1949 Sex Hormone Regulations, as amended in 1950, s C.02.010(a)(v) and s C.02.010(b)(ii). Additionally, the amended
regulations also required a statement of the product’s weight or “net contents”, at s C.02.010(b)(iii).

169

use. If a certain amount of cream contained a certain amount of estrogenic activity, National
Health could deem it to have no systemic effect. If a firm was not willing to issue directions to
use those amounts of cream – in another idiom, doses – its product would be deemed a drug.
Pugsley painted this labelling approach as deriving from a “ruling on potency”, writing that
“[a]n administrative ruling has been made on an upper limit of potency for one month's supply.”99
The dose of a potent estrogenic substance would determine if it was a cosmetic or a drug, in
accordance with some ruling by some unidentified official. Having eradicated dose from
standards for estrogenic seven years earlier, National Health officials were awarding
themselves the discretion to determine dose through “rulings”. Clearly, the techniques for
standardizing dose had shifted far away from traditional dose specifications, bioassay methods,
and reference standards. Dose was now a matter of standardizing women’s behaviour and, to
that end, enrolling manufacturers to include specific directions on their product labels.
There is no evidence, to be clear, that any “ruling” in an adjudicative sense had in fact been
made. Pugsley’s article was translating the Canadian approach to his American audience. US
food and drug lawyers, bureaucrats, and industry representatives were accustomed, if not
always favourable, to the FDA’s administrative rulings, which were authorized by legislation.
The Food and Drugs Act and its regulations did not, in contrast, permit National Health officials
to make administrative rulings. The officials administering the Act and its regulations were
permitted to interpret their language, subject to the possibility of judicial review, but had not
been delegated power to issue rulings. Pugsley’s assertion to the contrary was unusual. Yet it
provides another example of the Department’s ongoing practice of delegating power to make
biologics standards to civil servants and industry, rather than codify standards in regulation.
Nevertheless, this story stays with the term “administrative rulings”. In many respects, it
perfectly captures a mode of regulation emerging for biological drugs at National Health in the
1950s. The term strongly evokes American regulatory practices, which National Health was
increasingly emulating and reproducing, albeit with variations, including in its new approach to
estrogenic cosmetics.100 The term also holds in mind the move away from regulated standards,
prescribed in subordinate legislation, and towards more individualized standards, exercised
through administrative discretion. In contrast to an administrative “rule”, administrative ruling
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reflects the processual dynamic in this mode of governance. Administrative rules tend to be
written down, codified, intended to apply generally; rulings, by contrast, evoke orally rendered
judgement unique to individual cases. Rather than one fixed interpretation, rulings were more
fluid and flexible. As shown by Pugsley’s article, the “upper limit” in his ruling remained
unspoken and unlocatable, except perhaps in private communications. Moreover, the term
helps to reveal the ambiguity of the source of authority for the ruling. “Administrative rulings”
were made by unidentified rulers, their authority delegated by an unidentified source of power.
For the purpose of this history of estrogen regulation, “administrative ruling” also provides a
convenient label not found in the historiography of Canadian public law. The interwar “battle
over the legitimacy of delegated legislation” is well-known, the protagonists and antagonists
including Hewart and Dicey, the American legal realists, and Canadian scholars like John Willis,
and I do not rehearse it here. Yet by WWII, this battle was won (or lost, depending on one’s
perspective). Delegating authority through subordinate legislation, much of which subdelegated
power to administrative officials, was the new constitutional and political reality in Canada, just
as it was in Britain and the US. However, and put here in very general terms, the regulatory
state – or perhaps better, the administrative state – was moving into a deeper and more
thoroughgoing form of delegation by the 1950s, developing a range of practices by which
administrators governed through discretion. As Michael Taggart put it, by the late 1940s,
“subdelegated legislation was difficult to distinguish from less formal guidance or advice, often
contained in circulars or the like”.101 In addressing the conceptual and nomenclatural confusion
over this emerging form of administrative governance, which “in other forms is with us today”, he
settles on the concept of “quasi-legislation”.102 Reminding us that R.E. Megarry had adopted this
label in 1944,103 and had “included under this rubric administrative interpretations of statutes,
glosses on statutes, and officially sanctioned arrangements between private parties that waived
the law or affected operation of the law between citizen and citizen”, Taggart characterizes the
defining feature of quasi-legislation as a lack of “binding legal effect”. One can understand
National Health’s approach as quasi-legislation, although in repurposing “administrative ruling”, I
hope to capture the fluidity, informality, and discretionary nature of this way of regulating.
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Dose-setting through administrative ruling was especially common for estrogenic creams
marketed for breast enhancement. In the early 1950s, National Health inspectors contemplated
“directions for use” for firms selling breast creams. Officials adopted varying performances of
the dose-response relationship. For example, in 1950, spurred by a series of ads for five breast
creams, Inspection Services asked the department’s cosmetics lead whether estrogenic breast
creams had systemic effects.104 J.T. Thompson reported back with a particular enactment of the
dose-response relationship. He started with the desired physiological response, growth of
mammary tissue, then worked backward to judge what amount would achieve it. In his view, the
requisite dose would be so high as to cause systemic effects. Admittedly, this view allowed
Thomson, responsible only for cosmetics, to take a hands-off approach to breast cream:
“I don’t think bust development creams should be classed as cosmetics or USED except
under medical supervision. To be effective, the dosage must be heavy, and I should
think some degree of systemic effect would be unavoidable. Enough at least to put the
preparations out of the cosmetic class. Having thus politely washed my hands of them, I
get out from under!”105
Pugsley, however, sent his own separate report to Inspection Services, taking issue with
Thomson’s view that breast creams had systemic effects (and thus could not be cosmetics).
Pugsley enacted the dose-response relationship differently. He acknowledged that these
estrogenic creams would cause growth in mammary tissue, but rather than move on to ask what
dose was needed to achieve that physiological response, he argued that growth in mammary
tissue was inherently cosmetic: “I would say this is an effect on local tissue and not necessarily
systemic action”. Ironically, Pugsley’s articulation suggested that breast creams did not actually
meet the legal test for an estrogenic cosmetic, which provided that a product was a drug “unless
demonstrated to be free from systemic effect”. Moreover, to ask if a product was “necessarily”
harmful reflected a lower threshold than to require it be “proven free” from harm. Pugsley’s
enactment of this weaker standard was entangled with his commitment to the idea that labelling
provided an adequate regulatory response. Even though the five creams were advertised at
30,000 I.U. of estrogenic potency – three times stronger than what the US FDA commonly
tolerated for cosmetics – Pugsley felt that a label with directions would suffice. He advised
Inspection Services to ensure that the manufacturers agreed to “the 30 day limit”, yet gave no
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advice on what that amount should be.106 His advice would have confused the inspectors, as the
five creams had already been advertised for sale in a 30-day supply. In this case, the “30 day
rule” would have required inspectors to ask the US firms to shrink down the size of the jars they
sold in Canada. Neutered by this regulatory approach, inspectors predictably took no action.
National Health’s most protracted investigation of estrogenic creams was pursued from its
Vancouver office in 1952.107 Inspector E.L Devlin was dutifully trying to bring Venus Products
into compliance with the Sex Hormone Regulations. Venus sold a breast cream called Formula
V-7, advertised with a pseudoscientific booklet. Devlin crafted a long, careful letter setting out
regulatory requirements and the “potential dangers” of estrogens taken at high doses or for
prolonged periods. His letter performed a subtly different variant of dose-response. Like
Pugsley, he began by focusing on the intended response. Unlike Pugsley, he found that, given
effects of estrogen on breast tissue, one should assume that applying Formula V-7 to breasts
would affect “the body hormone balance”, such that the product must be “regarded as having
systemic effects”. Thus, he deemed Formula V-7 to be drug (though at 6000 I.U., it was one-fifth
the potency of the five creams deemed to be cosmetics in 1950). As a drug, Formula V-7 would
need to comply with the drug labelling rule in Section C.02.007 which, according to Devlin,
“requires that the proper name, Oestrogenic Substance, be used and the potency be declared in
International Units per ounce, indicating what amount is to be used over a 30 day period.”108
Without question, Devlin’s interpretation was legally incorrect, although it further exemplifies
how the distinction between cosmetics and drugs was enacted in informal, fluid administrative
ruling of officials. Unlike section C.02.010 governing cosmetics, the drug labelling rule in section
C.02.007 did not, in fact, require any labels to provide “directions for use” or to stipulate what
amount should be used. By allowing its officials to indirectly influence use and dose, cosmetic
labelling rules afforded National Health more power to limit estrogenic dosing than it had for
drugs. In any event, Venus Products complied with Devlin’s direction,109 promising to label its
jars with the weight, the fact that the product contained 6000 I.U. of Oestrogenic Substance per
ounce, and a direction to not use more than 1 and 2/3 ounces each month”.110 Whether women
hoping for fuller chests would follow that direction was another matter. Arguably, National
Health’s turn to regulating through label directions may have made the creams more dangerous.
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In this case, Devlin asked Venus to remove an insert from its advertising booklet for Formula
V7. The insert outrageously asserted that while “Formula V7 is not intended for the discovery of
existing cysts but if its use is instrumental in doing so, then it may be considered an additional
though unintentional benefit”, and Venus tried to argue that the insert was an “amplification” of
the directions for use on the label. In its startling association of Formula V-7 and breast cancer,
the insert may very well have caused women to have second thoughts about using the product.
Because it was a “somewhat misleading” direction, though, Devlin insisted that it be removed.111
Leveraging power through labels, the Inspection Service was enacting dose controls that
National Health senior officials and Committee members had rejected in 1943. Taking a vague
labelling rule for cosmetics that had become infused in practice with dose-response
considerations, shifting those considerations back into the regulation of drugs, asking not just
“how to measure” but also “how much”, inspectors resurrected dose and reinserted it into the
regulatory regime. Without doubt, reining in a little local company dabbling in quackery was not
the same as interfering in innovations of major pharmaceutical firms. Power was material. Yet
estrogen too was powerful, insistent that regulators re-embrace logics previously disavowed.
Devlin wrapped up his compliance efforts with Venus Products in May 1952. Less than a
month later, a Select Committee of the US House of Representatives, known as the Delaney
Committee, released its final report on chemicals in cosmetics. The report followed two years of
high-profile congressional hearings, chaired by Congressman James Delaney, to investigate the
use of chemicals in foods and cosmetics.112 Medical experts of various specialties, including
endocrinologists, allergists, and dermatologists, had testified at the hearings, and many had
been questioned regarding the potential hazards of estrogenic skin creams.113 Some witnesses
equivocated,114 while others were crystal clear that these products could be hazardous.115
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Figure 11: Booklet insert for Formula V-7 Treatment, Venus Products Ltd, 1952.
Library and Archives Canada, RG29, Vol 259, File 347-1-6 (part 4), reproduction copy
number I-115336
Venus Products objected to National Health’s request that it remove this insert from its advertising
booklet, claiming it was part of its directions for use. Venus was candid about its reasons for these
“directions” to women users: “Our only hope was that in the event of cancer being discovered
coincidental with the use of Formula V7 that the victim would think and do a little investigating before
going off half cocked and blaming us unjustly. One claim with the publicity that would be sure to attend
regardless of how unjust that claim was or whether our product was proven harmless in the highest court
the results to us would be so adverse that it could well put us out of business”. 116
sex hormones in certain amounts are capable of producing malignant change”, the creams might stimulate existing malignancy,
and there was not enough evidence to conclude the creams could be used safely except under a physicians’ supervision.
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Almost all stated, or at least implied if they recommended physician supervision, that the hazard
would be a question of dosage.117 As the products were sold as both night creams and day
creams, the Committee’s report observed that women could be “covered by these substances
24 hours of every day”.118 The Committee also expressed concern that, as it was known that
estrogens were absorbed dermally, these cosmetics may cause “undesirable physiological
changes”.119 However, as the expert witnesses had disagreed on the likelihood of systemic
effects, the Committee recommended only that there should be more research.120
Only a few such studies were ever done. One found that, even at small doses, estrogenic
cream could produce systemic effects – namely, endometrial hyperplasia – if applied over a
long period.121 Another found that the creams did not induce any visible or clinically observable
changes to the appearance of facial skin.122 Overall, the small body of research indicated that
not only were estrogenic skin creams ineffective, but they were harmful.123 Regardless, some
researchers were willing to argue the industry position that, even if used for years, there was no
evidence they caused “cancerous changes in the skin”, and there was “a consensus of opinion
amongst experienced observers that cosmetic hormone creams with a maximum potency of
10,000 IU per ounce (31 g.) of vehicle, if used in the manner by the informed manufacturer, are
free from systemic effects.”124 Estrogen was being performed as harmful and worthless by
medical practitioners, and as safe and controllable by cosmetic manufacturers and researchers.
Faced with a substance that could not be pinned down, National Health officials retreated to
regulating claims rather than regulating potency. By 1953, the centrality of labelling to the safety
of estrogen had become routinized. When local Toronto inspectors raised questions about an
advertisement for Lady Esther Hormone Cream, which boasted of the cream’s high potency and
ability to “renew the beautifying effects of your own waning hormone supply”, Whitmore
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Figure 12: “Stay Lovely … Stay Loved … with Lady Esther Natural Estrogenic
Hormone Cream”, 1953
Library and Archives Canada, RG 29, Vol 258, File 347-6-6 (Part 2), reproduction copy
number e-011195706
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Figure 13: “Your husband looks at you with new interest”, 1952
Toronto Daily Star (1900-1971). Feb 6, 1952: 27. ProQuest Historical Newspapers:
Toronto Star.
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confidently advised that the claims were “within the realm of permitted cosmetic puffery”.125
Labelled at 10,000 I.U. and marketed as a 30 days’ supply, Lady Esther’s Hormone Cream
exemplified compliance with the unwritten rules and bureaucratic discretion characterizing this
mode of “administrative ruling”. Advertisements by Lady Esther, Helena Rubinstein, and other
hormone cream manufacturers exploited North American women’s fear of aging and “preyed on
women’s economic and emotional dependence on men”, raising the scenario “of a husband
fleeing his wife’s wrinkled skin and finding comfort in the arms of a smoother-skinned
woman”.126 However, National Health inspectors had no power, and perhaps no inclination, to
find any “objectionable greasiness” in the many ads warning middle-aged women that, if they
did not use these potent estrogenic skin creams, they would lose their husbands.127
***
Ten years before Lady Esther’s advertisement came to the attention of National Health
inspectors, the Deputy Minister of Health, Robert Wodehouse, had intervened to ensure that the
Canadian Committee on Pharmacopoeial Standards would endorse the Sex Hormone
Regulations without recommending dose or potency limits. In the intervening decade, with the
practices of Canadian regulators, estrogens had become biologics that eluded measurement
and domesticated cream permissibly claimed as the “Greatest Agent Known for Counteracting
Signs of Age”,128 potent substances that some physicians believed should only be sold on
prescription and “natural” cosmetics that would let middle-aged wives “Stay Loved”,129
substances of questionable therapeutic value that should not be endorsed through licensing and
medicine effective for “menopausal symptoms” and other “estrogenic deficiency”.130
Potent but safe, hazardous but ineffective, natural but an artifice, systemic but cosmetic,
estrogen was a provocation to regulators. By the early 1950s, regulators continued to view “low
doses” as the key to ensuring that estrogen was safe. However, whether for drugs or cosmetics,
Canadian regulators never studied, defined, or regulated any thresholds for safe doses. Dose
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had been repeatedly delegated – to pharmaceutical manufacturers, clinicians, cosmetics firms,
and women consumers.
National Health did attempt to consolidate and unify estrogen in 1949, by removing four
estrogenic molecules from the Canadian Supplement and by extending to sex hormones its
practice of (unlawfully) subdelegating bioassay methods to government scientists. Rather than
regulate dose, however, National Health began regulating “potency limits” through
administrative practices – first for cosmetics, then for breast creams deemed to be drugs. Still,
National Health officials did not enact dose-response relations in a uniform way. Its inspectors,
tasked with scrutinizing advertisements to identify and pursue non-compliance, always on the
alert for fraudulent or misleading claims in pursuit of the Act’s public health and consumer
protection purposes, were inherently suspicious of overblown claims made for estrogen creams
and inclined to assume adverse effects, working from this assumption of hazard to ensure safe
doses. The Chief of National Health’s Laboratory Services, by contrast, as an endocrinologist,
had an openness to hormones and scientific skepticism of unproven claims that these creams
caused systemic effects. Pugsley worked from an assumption of safety that viewed labels less
as a means to reduce dosage, and more as a performance of administrative oversight. Both
practices, however, ultimately sought to accomplish “potency limits” through regulatory
techniques and material technologies of labelling. For regulating ambiguously potent
substances marketed exclusively to women, labels were becoming instrumental.
In this entanglement of law, gender, and toxicity, estrogen was not the only phenomenon
becoming naturalized. The concept of menopausal women was also being normalized. Estrogen
was a substance whose bodily effects were being rendered, in regulatory practices, as
unpredictable, deceptive, malleable, and individual. In turn, National Health began regulating
dose and potency through labelling directions that displaced responsibility for safety away from
the Department, targeting directions at women assumed to have those same characteristics.
Born from a “junkie” or “quickie” improvisation aimed to sidestep perceived legal constraints,
with estrogen, consumer caution labels were also becoming naturalized as a regulatory
technique. As seen in the previous and current chapters, estrogens were the first substances for
which labels were used in lieu of standards in Canada, first for drugs and then for cosmetics.
Labels allowed regulators to require potent ingredients to be identified in consumer products, to
caution women to use cosmetics “with care”, to discipline women to regulate their own exposure
by following directions, and, in all of these functions, to displace responsibility for ensuring a
standard substance with predictable properties away from the state. Caution labels for drugs
and cosmetics made it explicit, for the first time, that women would need to assume
180

responsibility for their own safety. National Health’s potent mixture of labels, delegation, and
administrative governance to apprehend and respond to the hazards of estrogen is, therefore,
an early example of risk regulation in Canadian law.
Mandatory labelling of gendered consumer products would soon travel to other contexts.
While the 1949 Sex Hormone Regulations had contained the first cosmetics regulation in
Canadian history, standalone cosmetic regulations followed three years later.131 With a focus on
dangerous ingredients, these regulations governed cosmetics with “appropriate cautions as well
as with advertising or label claims” – techniques first introduced with estrogen.132 In cosmetics
regulation and beyond, estrogen would leave its mark on Canadian law.133
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PART III
Musings on potency, on power, on possibility: a conclusion
This thesis has shared an account of law-in-estrogen and estrogen-in-law, in Canada in the
1940s and early 1950s, examining how these realities were enacted with regulatory practices.
In this time and place, regulating estrogen was coterminous with materializing estrogen as a
potent substance. Put differently, I have argued in this thesis that toxicity and law – or, further
collapsing the distinction between the onto-epistemological and the political that this formulation
solidifies, that potency and power – were co-produced.1 In exploring the historicity of estrogen
as a legal phenomenon, and the historicity of labelling as an estrogenic phenomenon, I have
illustrated how mid-century regulatory practices performed the dose and made the poison. By
the early 1950s, a potent estrogen was thoroughly installed into Canadian laws and soon to
encounter millions of Canadian bodies, and Canadian regulators had conducted their first
experiments with using labels, rather than standards, to intervene in dose-response relations.
In these concluding reflections, I return to the present, to ask whether this historical
entanglement of potency and power might resound in current regulatory performances. Does
this story of estrogen and regulation matter today, and if so, for whom? I also briefly consider
the concept of toxic enactment that has arisen from and driven this historical narrative.
The Introduction provides a sense of where this history travels.2 By the mid-1950s, estrogen
was already being performed differently in Canada; prescriptions were required for the sale of
estrogenic drugs and, in a move that would radically change socio-material realities, estrogen
emerged in the form of the contraceptive pill. Yet the multiple potencies and doses, scripted into
estrogen in the 1940s, continued. Premarin became hugely popular in the 1960s, fuelled by its
promotors’ injunctions to be “Feminine Forever”.3 By the 1970s – after decades in which DES,
Premarin, and the Pill circulated in doses and dosages, in forms and formulations, no longer
conceivable – stories began emerging of suffering and illness, disease and death. As estrogen
turned from “hero to villain”,4 the main regulatory response was patient package inserts – in
essence, a new, lengthier, more informative label.5 As in the 1940s and 1950s, if for different
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Antonio Negri, The Savage Anomaly: The Power of Spinoza’s Metaphysics and Politics, trans. Michael Hardt (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 2003). Originally published as L'anomalia selvaggia. Saggio su potere e potenza in Baruch
Spinoza, Negri identified as “potere” and “potenza” what in English translations of Spinoza had both been reduced to “power”.
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See Introduction, particularly that content associated with notes 11-18.
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Robert Wilson, Feminine Forever (New York: Evans, 1966).
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Watkins 2007 at 93.
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Another response, in Canada, was to ban the sale of cosmetics containing estrogen; Cosmetic Regulations, CRC, c 869, s 15(b).
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reasons, compared to other drugs, estrogen was unique in attracting these inserts. Beyond
these labelling techniques, the material residue of this legal history persists in many bodies.
Perhaps this story of law-in-estrogen and estrogen-in-law can generate historically informed
debates about how endocrine disrupting chemicals should be regulated today.6 Toxicity and
labels, after all, seem ever more imbricated.7 Go to the drugstore, stand in an aisle, scan the
shelves for a moisturizer without parabens, a sunscreen without oxybenzone, a non-toxic nail
polish. Do you see other people – probably women,8 maybe with small children in strollers –
reading the labels? Ponder that, on average, American women use 12 personal care products,
containing 168 cosmetic ingredients, every day,9 and that teenaged girls use nearly 17 products
containing an estimated 174 ingredients daily.10 Recall how, in 1952, the Delaney Committee
worried that women might be covered by creams containing estrogen 24 hours of every day”.11
Then think of Environment and Climate Change Canada and Health Canada’s joint response,
in June 2018, to the lengthy report released a year earlier by the House of Commons’ Standing
Committee on Environment and Sustainable Development.12 After hearing evidence and
receiving briefs,13 the Standing Committee had made numerous recommendations for amending
CEPA to provide greater protection from endocrine disrupting chemicals.14 The two departments
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chemicals, see e.g. Roberts 2007 and Langston 2010.
7

It should be noted that when it comes to hormonal changes materialized through topical skin products, not everybody has
been given the option of attending to their own exposures. Transgender women and genderqueer people wanting softer skin,
less body hair, or breast enhancement may find themselves limited by the option of buying over-the-counter drug and cosmetic
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those boundaries are rigidly enforced. Indeed, in this enactment, labelled drug indications are necessarily disregarded.
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agreed with the recommendations, even choosing to highlight endocrine disruptors as
“chemicals of high concern” in the Minister of Environment’s press release accompanying their
response.15 However, with not enough time (or priority) to introduce legislative amendments in
this parliamentary session, the departments indicated that, for the time being, they would
continue to employ “available risk management tools” – including product labels. Product labels
may “further improve Canadians’ access to information they need to make informed decisions
about the products they use”, and, moving beyond label technologies, the “use of technologies
such as cell phone apps could help consumers make point-of-purchase decisions”.16 Thus, as in
the 1940s and early 1950s with estrogen, as an alternative to stronger legal tests for what
substances can be and do, Canadian regulators are considering using labels and other
information-providing technologies to delegate to (women) consumers the responsibility to make
decisions about whether to buy and how to use chemicals of high concern. Though using labels
in lieu of standards was an estrogenic innovation 75 years ago in Canada, today it has become
thoroughly naturalized as a regulatory response for products containing ingredients of concern.
In summarily noting the continued entanglement of hormone-disrupting chemicals and labels,
it is important not to lose sight of how these relations materialize. Whether working explicitly with
enactment, or within other frameworks that account for what people think, say and do, doseresponse relationships are done in different ways by different people, institutions, interactions,
disciplines, times, and places. As conceptualized in this thesis, toxicity is enacted by and enacts
regulatory practices – and practices change. Contrary to unnuanced claims being made by
some STS scholars working on toxicity, it is not the case, at least in Canada, that “[n]early all
existing environmental regulations and laws around toxicants are based on threshold limits –
normally measured in relation to effects on human bodies”.17 When examining environmental
laws governing toxic substances like endocrine disruptors, an approach recognizing that
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governance and law are contingent, mutable achievements would instead examine ways that
regulatory practices intervene in and produce variable dose-response relations or thresholds.
While this point can only be sketched summarily here in this conclusion – more definitive
claims would require careful, empirical research and analysis – there appear to be parallels
between how Canada regulated estrogen in the 1940s and current federal regulation of
endocrine disrupting chemicals. The Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999 (“CEPA”) is
the primary legislation governing the assessment and regulation of toxic substances,18 and
central to CEPA’s toxics scheme is a legislated test for determining if a substance is “toxic”.19
That toxicity test fundamentally relies on dose-response logics (although not necessarily
conventional ones), by providing that a substance is only harmful to the environment or to
human life or health if it is entering or may enter the environment in a quantity, concentration, or
under conditions that make it harmful. In other words, to determine if a substance is toxic,
Canadian assessors must consider how much or what amount of a substance is sufficient to
make it harmful – that is, what dose makes the poison. Yet the legislation is silent on the
question of “how much is safe”, disavowing any quantitative thresholds and leaving this question
to varied administrative practices.20 Evidence of exposure quantities and concentrations is scant
or speculative, particularly for exposures through consumer products (which, unlike some
industrial point sources, are not monitored under the act). With the question of “how much”
Canadians are exposed to an endocrine disrupting chemical made very difficult to answer,
administrators are left to their own discretionary practices to determine how to perform an
exposure-response assessment. This resonates with the historical case in this thesis. For
National Health’s endocrinologist, relatively high potency estrogenic creams did not have
systemic effects because the amount of exposure could be hypothetically limited through labels;
for National Health enforcement officials, a relatively low potency estrogenic cream was deemed
to have systemic effects because it was intended to grow mammary tissue. Current Canadian
practices for regulating endocrine disrupting chemicals appear steeped in the same potent
mixture of imperceptible exposures, uncertain thresholds, and dose-response logics: in
determining if a substance is toxic, assessors faced with the absence of any pre-determined
safe thresholds enact multiple, varying, discretionary administrative practices to apprehend how
much of a substance is harmful, how much is released, or how much Canadians are exposed.
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Just as National Health officials in the 1940s and 1950s turned to labelling to grapple with
exposures to unstandardized potent substances, today, well-intentioned advocates and
academics posit that, in the absence of regulatory prohibitions on endocrine disrupting
chemicals, labelling can serve as a stop-gap or a band-aid.21 This recalls the position that Dr.
Henderson and his academic colleagues on the Canadian Committee on Pharmacopoeial
Standards enacted, in January 1943, when they abandoned a call for regulated potency
standards in exchange for National Health’s promise to circulate information about bioassay
methods, including to researchers.22 Yet enacting endocrine disrupting chemicals as entities for
which consumers and researchers need “more information” may buttress the Canadian
government’s plans to postpone legislative reform by promoting labels, and other technological
fixes, to help (women) consumers navigate their own safety in the marketplace.
This thesis has experimented with a concept that I have called toxic enactment. It conceives
regulatory practices as actively involved in enacting toxicity, and toxic substances as actively
involved in enacting legal orders. In musing about whether toxic enactment helps to make better
sense of the world – whether that world is in the past, the past folded into the present, or in
possible futures – I do not wish to exaggerate its potential. One concern with using the concept,
at least in the field of legal history, is that it potentially reifies the problematic idea that ‘theory” is
the only legitimate means of producing scholarly knowledge. Compelling, well-researched
accounts of the legal past can have value regardless of whether they engage directly with
theoretical constructs. Perhaps this study did not need to tinker with Mol’s concept of
enactment, toxic or otherwise, to describe how estrogen emerged with evolving modes and
techniques of drug and cosmetic regulation in Canada in the mid-20th century.
Conversely, enactment has given me a unique entry point into understanding this topic and
constructing this narrative. The historiography of sex hormones, particularly in the work of Nelly
Oudshoorn, Anne Fausto-Sterling, Celia Roberts, and Jean-Paul Gaudillière, often builds, if to
different extents, on network theories, examining how interactions between the material and
discursive practices of scientists, industry, clinicians, and other social actors materialized
estrogenic drugs. Other regulatory histories of sex hormones, such as that by Nancy Langston,
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provide crucial insights without explicit reference to theory, using source material evidencing the
deliberations and activities of federal food and drug regulators. By extending a focus on
networked practices to regulators and regulation, while still attempting to hold onto how
estrogen materialized through material practices like diverse bioassay methods, varying forms
and modes of application, and different labelling practices, toxic enactment has helped me to
bridge potent methodological elements from these multiple historiographical traditions with my
largely regulatory source materials. Following Gaudillière, this bridge has allowed me to narrate
a more integrated history of estrogen and regulation, unlocking fresh ways of approaching each.
Furthermore, if one takes seriously, as I do, Mol’s argument that it is possible to approach
ontological questions empirically in social science and humanities research, and that relational
materialism is more of a methodological commitment than a theoretical explanation, then I
believe it is no great leap to conclude that (toxic) enactment can be a productive framework for
empirical legal research, including in legal history. While the term enactment may have been
popularized by an ethnographer, archival documents are just evidence of past human activities,
and there is no principled reason that legal historians cannot adopt praxiological methodologies.
If anything, the larger challenge is thinking law and materiality together. As Tom Johnson
notes, despite the suspect politics of severing law from the world, law is still “commonly seen as
a discourse, something that is distinct from, yet gives meaning to, things in the ‘real world’.”
However, for at least some topics, close readings of certain types of historical evidence can
reveal law’s material formations and matter’s legal forms. Holding together matter and law – or,
even more tightly, potency and power – subverts insistent representations of toxicity as
“wayward particles behaving badly”,23 allowing us to approach toxicity as “a way to focus on
how forms of life and their constituent relations, from the scale of cells to cultures, are enabled,
constrained, and extinguished within broader power systems”.24 In this way, toxic enactment
might potentiate efforts to apprehend and intervene in the chemical reactions of law and toxicity.
For scholars of public law or the regulatory state, enactment may no longer feel like a
theoretical concept. The metaphor has been literalized in law, much like “constitution”. Many
lawyers and legal scholars think of enactments as concrete nouns – statutes and regulations,
physically printed in books or from websites, rules that you hold in your hand. Long buried is the
sense of enactment as an abstract noun –– an activity that is made to happen and that makes
other acts happen. As Mol puts it, to speak of objects being enacted in practices “suggests that
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activities take place – but leaves the actors vague. It also suggests that in the act, and only then
and there, something is – being enacted”.25 In law, enactments as statutes and regulations can
seem like codified, calcified, captured objects, rather than dynamic things, performed in
practices, which themselves activate new actions, practices, and realities. By re-apprehending
laws and regulations as enactments compounded in relational practices, rather than as separate
and static elements, perhaps we can begin to see the possibility of formulating other worlds.
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